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Motivating this dissertation is a concern for how Western philosophical, cultural, 
and political practices tend to privilege speech and voice as emancipatory tools and 
reduce silence to silencing. To locate power in silence and not exclusively in speech and 
voice, the dissertation grapples with the normative implications of coloniality vis-à-vis 
the phenomenon of silence at both the theoretical and sensible levels; it investigates how 
modern/colonial assumptions affect Western understandings of the phenomenon of 
silence and eventuate modalities of existence that preclude hearing the polyvocality of 
silences. To press Western culture beyond its negative affinities with “silence,” I develop 
and defend the concept of “deep silence.” Unlike “silencing,” which is understood as the 
opposite of speech and signification and, as such, as a matter of an already available 
utterance being smothered or unspoken, “deep silence” indicates a transformative power 
that generates meanings that have not yet been voiced and that, importantly, breaks with 
colonial norms and expectations. Deep silences, I argue, can be a powerful decolonizing 
tool. 
The main interlocutors of the dissertation are Gloria E. Anzaldúa and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty. For these authors, silence is not the opposite of speech, or a matter of an 
already available utterance being smothered or intentionally withheld. Rather, it plays a 
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central role in giving human beings sensible access to the world. Both thinkers, 
moreover, appeal to the aesthetic to express the otherwise-elusive senses of silence. 
Working closely with Anzaldúa’s decolonial mythopoetics and Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetic 
and ontological writings, I propose that the modality whereby one bears witness to 
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than eliding, deep silences in one’s account decenters key assumption of Western 
thinking, opening onto modalities of healing often overlooked by Western legalism and 
Transitional Justice initiatives; it makes “visible” colonial historias without capitulating 
to specularization, i.e., rendering experiences of coloniality specular to and readily 
available for dissection and inspection by the colonizing gaze. My project thus not only 
offers a critique of discursive approaches to emancipation; it also provides a 
philosophically rich contribution to current debates about decolonizing methodologies 
and sense-making. 
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I say mujer mágica, 
empty yourself. 
Shock yourself into new ways of perceiving the world, 
shock your readers in the same. 
Stop the chatter inside their heads. 
[…] 
There is no need for words to fester in our minds… 
Throw away abstraction and the academic learning, 
the rules, the map and compass. 
Feel your way without blinders. 
To touch more people, 
the personal realities and the social must be invoked 
—not through rhetoric 
but through blood and pus and sweat. 
Write with your eyes like painters, 
with your ears like musicians, 
with your feet like dancers… 
write with your tongues of fire. 




“What do I know?” is not only “what is knowing?” 
and not only “who am I?” 
but finally: “what is there?” 
and even: “what is the there is?” 
These questions call not for the exhibiting of something said 
which would put an end to them, 
but for the disclosure of Being that is not posited 
because it has no need to be, 
because it is silently behind all our affirmations, 
negations, and even behind all formulated questions, 
not that it is a matter of forgetting them in its silence, 
not that it is as matter of imprisoning it in our chatter, 
but because philosophy is the 
reconversion of silence and speech into one another… 
—Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible 
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I. QUESTIONS OF SILENCE 
 
What if we learn to listen for silence? 
—Jill Stauffer, Ethical Loneliness 
 
[Silence] is not always or necessarily a denial or extinguishing of some reality 
[…] It can be fertilizing, it can bathe the imagination, it can, as in great open 
spaces […] be the nimbus of a way of life, a condition of vision. 
—Adrienne Rich, “Arts of the Possible” 
 
 
As I write this introduction, the edited collection 50 Concepts for a Critical 
Phenomenology has recently been published. The collection sanctions a self-reflective 
shift, if you will, of phenomenology; aware of the structural openness of its method, by 
becoming “critical,” phenomenology re-orients itself toward the political.1 Concretely, 
this means two things: critical phenomenology is more than the mere description of 
(oppressive) conditions of possibility but their hacking, and conditions of possibility are 
not transcendental but quasi-transcendental or historical. First, critical phenomenology 
departs from the project of classical phenomenology by extending its scope beyond that 
of mere description or grasping the eidos of phenomena to that of tracking and 
challenging the racist-colonial normative structures that render the “familiar” a site of 
marginalization for many. Critical phenomenology does not strive for apodictic 
knowledge, but, rather, aims to identify and contest oppressive material-historical 
conditions of possibility of experience. Second, critical phenomenology, in its return to 
“the things themselves” (Husserl 2001, 168), ought to contend with the ways in which 
power relations structure experience. As Lisa Guenther writes in her contribution to the 
anthology, these structures  
shape our experience, not just empirically or in a piecemeal fashion, but … in a 
quasi-transcendental way. [They] are not a priori in the sense of being absolutely 
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prior to experience and operating the same way regardless of context, but they do 
play a constitutive role in shaping the meaning and manner of our experience. 
(2020, 12) 
 
As Sarah Ahmed and Alia Al-Saji show in their respective analyses in Queer 
Phenomenology (2006) and “A Phenomenology of Critical-Ethical Vision” (2009), 
structures like compulsory heterosexuality and whiteness operate like “straightening” and 
“whitening” tendencies, preemptively demarcating the border between sense and non-
sense, instituting fields of visibility and intelligibility according with which experiences 
may count as phenomena or knowledge in the first place. That is, operating pre-
reflectively, historical structures make certain kinds of experience of the world possible 
and meaningful, while foreclosing others. In the context of coloniality, experiences and 
phenomena that are not bound by the presence of modern/colonial consciousness fall 
through the cracks; cast to the shadows, so to speak, they remain “unthinkable” and 
“nonsensical.” As I will argue throughout this dissertation, one of these phenomena is 
silence, whose polyvocality and generativity is lost in a modern/colonial world. 
Consider the case of the three Native American shields found in a cave in Utah by 
the Petcol family in 1926 and repatriated earlier this century to the Navajo tribe. 
Although the nuances of the case are beyond the scope of the present inquiry, this 
example concretizes the ways in which historical structures like coloniality are more than 
what we see, socio-political institutions, or our naïve beliefs about the world, i.e., more 
than objects of analyses;2 they shape modalities of perceiving and making sense of the 
world that become habitual ways of being in the world, preemptively foreclosing the 
possibility of encountering phenomena (like the generativity of silence) that may rupture 
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our familiarity with the world and its colonial and heteropatriarchal structures and 
institutions. 
1. The Case of the Three Native American Shields 
In 1990, Congress passed the Native American Graves Protection and Reparation 
Act (NAGPRA) to redress a long history of cultural insensitivity, wrongs, and abuses 
done to Native Americans. In “Claiming the Shields,” legal scholar Debora Threedy 
observes that for the two centuries predating the Act, remains of Native American origin 
were considered scientific specimens, which effectively meant that it was legal for white 
Americans to appropriate skeletal and cultural artifacts from graves and store them in 
archives (2009, 93). The NAGPRA addresses the ownership of human remains and 
sacred objects found after November 16, 1990 and the repatriation of those founds prior 
to the Act. Regarding the latter, it sanctions that Native American remains ought to be 
repatriated according to “claims to ownership,” established on the grounds of lineal 
descent, the relationship to the land on which the remains are found, and cultural 
affiliation with the relics (Threedy 2009, 96). Remarkedly, the NAGPRA adjudicates 
claims to ownership by taking into account oral history equally as scientific evidence.3 In 
this way, the NAGPRA is “sensitive to different ways in which cultural memory gets 
stored and transmitted” (Stauffer 2015, 98). Yet, as Jill Stauffer points out in Ethical 
Loneliness, “even a piece of legislation designated, like the NAGPRA, to redress past 
harms in ways sensitive to the incommensurate forms of meaning-making in U.S. 
legalism and Native American culture” may fail to listen to claims made by tribal 
representatives (2015, 98). This is what happened in the case of the shields. 
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Scientific determinations of the source of the shields yielded inconclusive results, 
as both archeologists and anthropologists could not come to a consensus on which tribe 
“owned” the shields. Caught in the in-between of Western and indigenous law, the tribes 
interested in the shields had to advance legal claims to ownership. The Navajo tribe 
offered what was deemed to be a persuasive narrative about the shields, recounted by 
Navajo elder and storyteller John Holiday, who claimed that the shields were sacred 
objects needed for the “Protection Way Ceremony, as well as objects of cultural 
patrimony” (Threedy 2009, 98).4 The Ute/Paiute tribes did not produce a story, 
presenting instead a legal argument in which they sought to establish legitimate 
relationship to the land and cultural affiliation. Although the latter presented a more 
conventional legal argument for ownership contra the oral history of the shields offered 
by the Navajo tribe, the Ute/Paiute tribes remained silent about central aspects of their 
religion, insisting not only that “objects belonging to the sacred realm [such as the 
shields] cannot legitimately be claimed by any particular tribe or individual,” but also that 
they were not culturally permitted to speak the names of deceased relatives. These 
costumes made it impossible for them to provide discursive evidence regarding who 
“manufactured and buried the shields” (Threedy 2009, 118), details included in Holiday’s 
narrative instead. Lee Ann Kreutzer—the archeologist in charge of adjudicating the 
case—awarded the shields to the Navajo tribe over the contending joint filing of the 
Ute/Paiute tribes on the basis that the latter’s claim “lacked[ed] credibility.” As she put it, 
“in fairness to other claimants and the general public, the National Park Service cannot 
simply accept a tribe’s unexplained, unelaborated, and unjustified request for reparation” 
(Threedy 2009, 117). 
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As both Threedy and Stauffer point out, what sanctioned the difference between 
the two testimonies was how each tribe mobilized the “unspeakable” (Threedy 2009, 
117) and, crucially, how Kreutzer related to it. Although the Navajo tribe’s testimony was 
a story, it satisfied criteria (laid out by Lance Bennett and Martha S. Feldman in their 
1981 Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom) whereby a story’s persuasiveness is 
determined based on its structure and external corroboration. “The more ambiguities in 
the connections between the central action of the story [i.e., hiding the shields] and the 
key symbols for the elements of the story [i.e., key facts like the agents, scene, agency, 
and purpose], the less persuasive the story is” (Threedy 2009, 111).5 Kreutzer judged 
Holiday’s testimony to be internally coherent or “unambiguous” and, as such, 
“persuasive” (Threedy 2009, 113). On the other hand, albeit presented in the form of an 
argument, the Ute/Paiute tribes’ testimony was deemed “not persuasive or even 
adequate…seriously lacking in credibility” (117). The ambiguity and lack of persuasion 
in the latter’s argument was credited to their silences, to those aspects of the Ute/Paiute’s 
culture they would or could not speak about: 
The tribes’ claim is based on the fact that the dating and location of the shields are 
consistent with Ute/Paiute occupation, and that some favorable comparisons have 
been made between the shield motifs and known Ute shield pictographs. No link 
to particular individuals, groups, or specific ceremonies has been offered. While 
such generalities might be acceptable were this collaborative claim the only claim 
for the shields, they do not outweigh the specific and detailed information 
provided by the Navajo Nation regarding these shields. (Kreutzer 2002, 22) 
 
As Threedy observes, although Kreutzer stated that the “lack of Ute oral traditions in 
regard to the shields means nothing,” when compared with the detailed and (according to 
Western criteria) internally consistent account provided by the Navajo tribe, “the absence 
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of comparable narrative evidence damaged the Southern Ute claim” (2009, 115). In 2003, 
the three Native American shields were repatriated to the Navajo tribe.  
What is of interest here is not who the rightful owner of the shields may be. 
Rather, cases like the three Native American shields presents us with a paradigmatic 
instance of Eurocentered approaches’ inability to listen for silences, which, in turn, 
makes explicit epistemic and ontological modern/colonial assumptions whereby the 
phenomenon of silence is conceived as inadequate to meaning making and rational 
thinking/argumentation. Even though the NAGPRA interrupts the adversarial system of 
U.S. legalism by expanding the conception of what counts as a reliable speech 
act/witness to include oral history (within U.S. legalism, oral history is discarded as 
inadmissible evidence qua hearsay), and Kreutzer was well intentioned and meant to 
judge well, she was not able to “hear what some of the claims she judged were saying” 
(Stauffer 2015, 166). What Kreutzer missed in the Ute/Paiute tribes’ claim—what she 
could not hear—was the significance of silence, which instead was taken to index lack of 
persuasion and adequacy, mere silence (Threedy 2009, 117). “The loss,” as Stauffer 
points out, “is that of the opportunity to recognize that there are other forms of judgment 
and meaning-making” (2015, 102), Specifically, as I propose in this dissertation, the loss 
is that of the complexity, polyvocality, and fecundity of what I call “deep silence.”  
While I will elaborate on the notions of “deep” and “mere” silences below, for 
now it suffices to know that “mere silence” indexes the conception of silence largely 
prevalent in Eurocentered theorizing and informed by modern/colonial assumptions 
whereby the phenomenon indexes either absence and lack of sense, or the inability to 
speak resulting from oppressive patterns of exclusion from the subject position, of 
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silencing. “Deep silence,” on the other hand, stands for silence as an agent of (personal, 
ontological, and political) transformation. I am aware that my choice of terminology deep 
silence may inadvertently reify problematic dichotomies such as surface/depth that have 
been central to the modern/colonial project. In “Beyond the Closet as a Raceless 
Paradigm,” Marlon B. Ross criticizes Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s epistemological theory 
of the closet by pointing out that the surface/depth dichotomy is at play in the delineation 
of sexual modernity whereby homosexuality is marked by claustrophilia, that is, the value 
promoted by the White, intellectual establishment of deep, hidden or “closeted meaning” 
(Ross 2005, 139).  
Primitives, savages, the poor, and those uneducated in the long history of 
epistemology are not normally represented as epistemological subjects, partly 
because they do not have the luxury of composing the kind of voluminous texts 
that bear the weight of such deep buried—and thus closed/ closeted up—
intellectual dilemmas begging for painstakingly close readings. (139) 
 
Aware of the imbrication of the binary surface/depth with the reification of 
Eurocentered norms, in the context of this dissertation, “deep” is deployed to effect an 
epistemological suspension of the familiar, problematizing the widespread and 
monovalent conceptions of silence as mere silence or silencing. Given the decolonial 
lineage within which this work is situated, the deployment of “depth” as a qualifier for 
the generative and fecund silence at stake in this dissertation is also meant to evoke the 
work of “making visible the invisible,” to borrow Nelson Maldonado-Torres’s words, 
“and analyzing the mechanisms that produce such invisibility or distorted visibility” 
(2007, 262). “Depth” indexes the recuperation of such invisibility. It is meant to remind 
us of its complexity and alert if to its polyvocality foreclosed by the current historical 
formation. 
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2. Questions of (Deep) Silence 
Upon reading a report subsequently submitted by the Skull Valley Goshute Tribe 
addressing what was not and could not be heard in the Ute/Paiute tribes’ claims of 
ownership, Kreutzer remarked on the irony of “writing down oral historical and religious 
narrative and then employing methods derived from Greek logic to objectify, analyze and 
evaluate it” (2008, 382). Cases like the three Native American shields, then, alert us to 
the fact that, contra modern/colonial expectations, silence is an integral part of sense and 
sense-making practices and invite us to deploy other interpretative aptitudes vis-à-vis the 
phenomenon of silence. 
These concerns raise questions of silence that orient the present project: What 
would it mean not to dismiss the deep silence (and the meaning it eventuates) constantly 
exscribed through contact with the world and cross-cultural communication? That is, as 
the epigraph asks, “what if we also learn to listen for silence?” (Stauffer 2015, 104). And 
how do we accomplish this task when coloniality’s norms of intelligibility and livability 
foreclose the recognition of modalities of existing, speaking, and hearing that do not 
conform to its logic, including the polyvocality of silence? 
This project pursues two lines of interrogation, concerned, broadly, with modality 
and power and, specifically, with phenomenology’s methodology and methodology’s 
normative implications. Analytically, cases like the three Native American shields help 
us home in on questions of method: What are the strategies that critical phenomenology 
ought to devise to pull up traces of these quasi-transcendental structures consigned to 
invisibility that foreclose hearing the reverberations of silences? But also, how does 
critical phenomenology harken to these deep silences that modern/colonial ears are not 
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accustomed to hearing? How does I “put into words” these silences that exceed the 
presence/t of consciousness? Since posing questions of method without attending to the 
nuances of the situation would abstract from the concrete historical structures and those 
affected by them, grappling with these issues means attending to the specific operations 
of power and asking questions like, why are silences like the Ute/Paiute tribe’s read as 
lack of adequacy and persuasive evidence? That is, what are the structures and logic—in 
sum, the modality of existence distinctive of coloniality—such that the phenomenon of 
silence is immediately perceived and conceived as absence and non-sense? 
It is important to stress that the distinction between modality and power is merely 
analytic; as I argue throughout this dissertation, the two dimensions are intimately 
intertwined. The modality/method by which the inquirer bears witness (i.e., harkens to 
and expresses phenomena) is normatively laden, which is to say that, at once, reproduces 
normative structures while also being instituted by existing historical power formations. 
Concretely, this means asking, how does critical phenomenology avoid falling prey to the 
same irony to which Kreutzer finds U.S. legalism and Western epistemology 
capitulating? The case of the three Native American shields is a canary in the mine for 
the dangers of bearing witness to experiences of marginalization in ways that deploy 
normative assumptions central to the modern/colonial project like transparency. 
“Employing methods derived from Greek logic” to bear witness to them subsumes, yet 
again, the other and their silences into familiar schemas, ultimately reifying that very 
same logic that a critical phenomenology seeks to decenter. So how is it possible to bear 
witness to the violence waged and those victimized by colonial heteropatriarchy without 
capitulating to modern/colonial logos? 
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Oriented by these questions, in this dissertation, I propose a return to the 
phenomenon of silence, laying the groundwork for the exploration of what a revised 
concept of silence—what I call “deep silence”—could mean for the development of a 
critical phenomenology that, first, seeks to make explicit the operations of power that 
condition experiences and our perception of them in a modern/colonial world and, 
second, that effects possibilities to sense and communicate beyond logocentric/verbal 
structures privileged by colonial heteropatriarchy. Deep silences, I argue, can be a 
powerful decolonizing force: In my view, at stake in (a) decolonizing critical 
phenomenology is the twofold task of 1) developing sensibilities capable of listening for 
what otherwise falls through the cracks of a philosophy of reflection (like the silences of 
the Ute/Paiute tribes) and 2) expressing such experiences without an appeal to those same 
normative structures like modern/colonial logos, transparency, and the linearity of time 
that sustain the modern/colonial apparatus.  
This is to say that, in my view, critical to a decolonizing phenomenology is the 
development of what I call an aesthesis of deep silence, i.e., sensibilities that offer a 
different kind of access to the world, that make sense and make sensible beyond presence 
attuning the beholder to the reverberations, echoes, and hauntings of existence. An 
aesthesis of deep silence has political and ontological implications. Politically, it thinks 
from the experiences of subjects who, to use Walter Mignolo’s expression, inhabit the 
dark side of modernity (2011). Thinking from this vantagepoint reveals categories of and, 
importantly, modalities of thought foreclosed within a modern/colonial world. 
Ontologically, an aesthesis of deep silence recovers a fundamental openness to the 
originary operations of being, i.e., to a “logos that,” as Maurice Merleau-Ponty observes, 
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“pronounces itself silently in each sensible thing” (VI 207–08) and that differs, in 
significant ways, from the abstracting, universalizing, and presencing logos that sustains 
the modern/colonial project (modern/colonial logos for short).6  
From here on, I will refer to this sensible or implicit logos as “silent logos” in 
order to emphasize its inherence in the sensible world (which includes both natural 
phenomena and the aesthetic), its resistance to propositional articulation, and its affinities 
with what I have been calling “deep silence.” As I understand it, in fact, silent logos 
accounts for the signifying operations of deep silence. Remarkedly, silent logos is not 
contrary to language and signification, but, rather, is intertwined with it as its lining or 
doublure. As I will discuss in more detail in Part II, while silent logos cannot be 
conveyed through modern/colonial logos, it finds expression through “another rhetoric” 
(I 261), as Gloria Anzaldúa calls it, such as the painting of Matisse discussed by Merleau-
Ponty, the pink crosses scattered throughout Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, and the 
mythopoetics of Anzaldúa. Bearing witness to this silent logos means that, in its 
expression of sense, being, the world, and the other, a critical phenomenology of deep 
silence upholds the impossibility of self-presence, the delusion of a total grasping. As 
such, this time-space opened up by a critical phenomenology of deep silence is the 
starting point for radical political action, for envisioning other forms of political-aesthetic 
agency.  
3. Silence in a Modern/Colonial World 
At this junction, it seems appropriate to note the challenges posed by the task of 
listening for and speaking silence. The inadequacies of current interpretative frameworks 
to listen for the polyvocality of silences should not come as a surprise; as Jill Stauffer 
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points out, “in the discourse of Western legalism, […] silence cannot be its own 
phenomenon but always rather stands for something that simply has not yet been spoken” 
(2015, 101). As we will see in more detail in Part I, Ofelia Schutte explains this 
interpretative shortcoming by claiming that modern/colonial theories of meaning treat the 
incommensurability present in (cross-cultural) communication as “irrelevant to 
philosophical meaning and knowledge, and thus irrelevant to the operations of reason” 
(1998, 61). This is because incommensurability is approached as the residue of an 
equation whose balancing entails communicative transparency. That is, the 
modern/colonial epistemic stance treats sense and reality as transparent, thus skating over 
the “silence,” “opacity,” or “excess of meaning” inherent in sense and reality.7 
Concretely, this means that, within this modern/colonial logic, ways of life or sense-
making practices that are not normed by logocentrism (with its desiderata of purity and 
transparency), like the Ute/Paiute’s silence surrounding the sense of objects belonging to 
the sacred realm, are misunderstood, overlooked, and rendered invisible; rather than 
being taken in their strangeness and allowed to displace usual expectations, what cannot 
be heard from the modern/colonial subject’s standpoint is marked as unintelligible, 
nonsensical, and inadequate—in a word, as mere silence.  
In addition to the erasure of decolonizing onto-epistemological frameworks—
what Cherríe Moraga calls “theor[ies] in the flesh” (Moraga and Anzaldúa 2015, 19)—
the modern/colonial assumption about the transparency of sense also mean that, in a large 
part of the Western tradition from Aristotle to Audre Lorde, the phenomenon of silence is 
conceived over and against the fullness of speech and signification (Carillo Rowe and 
Malhotra 2013). The outcome is that silence is almost unequivocally associated with 
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lack/absence, i.e., with senselessness, powerlessness, and oppression, such that “many of 
us … assume that whereof one cannot speak, one is simply inadequately educated and 
articulate—or lying” (MacKendrick 2001, 4). That is, silence is reduced to mere silence. 
Although the 20th century has witnessed a move toward the disavowal of Western 
rationality and, as Chela Sandoval notes in The Methodology of the Oppressed, the 
“galvanizing [of] whole new expressions of consciousness, politics, and aesthetic 
production” (2000, 6), the enduring legacy of modern/colonial culture continues to be felt 
in its framing of the phenomenon of silence, which is signified negatively, treated, at 
best, as irrelevant to meaning making and, at worst, as an obstacle that needs to be 
overcome for meaning to be obtained (Sommer 1996; Schutte 1998; Stauffer 2015).  
It is in these terms that silence has been taken up within most of Western feminist 
and liberatory theorizing. Since the 1978 publication of Tillie Olsen’s Silences (originally 
presented at a talk in 1963 at the Radcliffe Institute) and Mary Daly’s Beyond God the 
Father (1973), the topic of silence has become a primary concern to feminist theorizing 
and literary inquiry. In their theorizing of oppressions, second wave feminists focused on 
the phenomenon of silence understood as the outcome of exclusion and marginalization 
predicated by the patriarchal oppressor upon those who are deemed (and thereby also 
produced) as lacking epistemic authority. Silence was thus largely theorized in relation to 
the univocity of patriarchal silencing as an oppressive phenomenon. By the mid-1980s, 
third wave and poststructuralist analyses of oppression complicated the concept of 
silence. As theorists such as Audre Lorde ([1978] 2007), bell hooks (2015), and María 
Lugones and Elizabeth Spelman (1983) insisted, silence could no longer be the exclusive 
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marker of patriarchal oppression; silence had to be recognized also as a phenomenon 
endemic to feminist discourse.8  
Although the phenomenon of silence accrued complexity, coming to index not 
just the literal silence that the patriarchy historically impose upon women, but also the 
speech of women of color that often lacks uptake within white feminist circles as well as 
patriarchal culture, women of color feminism left unchallenged the guiding political 
imperative of “breaking the silence” by “coming to voice,” continuing to espouse a 
conception of silence co-extensive with oppression, equating it to “starvation” (Moraga 
2015, 24) or a locus of peril and vulnerability (“your silence will not protect you” [Lorde 
(1978) 2007, 41]). To this day, although in selected academic circles such as 
communication theory, rhetoric, and, sporadically, philosophy, “silence” has been 
reclaimed from its abjection (see, for example, Clair 1998, 2013; Glenn 2004; Weldt-
Basson 2009; Carillo Rowe and Malhotra 2013), the popular conception of silence—as 
evidenced by the recent public outcry against sexual violence spearheaded by the 
#MeToo and #Timesup movements—continues to uphold an understanding of silence 
such that it is equated with the silencing of oppression.9  
The binary logic of speech vs silence yields two closely intertwined imperatives, 
one political and one epistemic. Politically, for an individual or group to (re)gain power 
and “to resist and transform the conditions of their oppression,” they “must activate their 
voice” (Carillo Rowe and Malhotra 2013, 1, order rearranged). Voice and speech are thus 
appealed to as the ubiquitous emancipatory tools. Epistemically, for an event, experience, 
or phenomenon to make sense, silence ought to be “broken.” Language and naming are 
 
  15 
power; they provide the tools to draw phenomena out of their silence, to make sense of 
events that would otherwise, i.e., in the absence of words, lack significance and meaning. 
The conception of silence as mere silence (i.e., as absence and non-sense) largely 
operative within the historical formation of coloniality entails a series of performative 
difficulties with which any project that seeks to articulate or speak about this 
phenomenon ought to contend. Because silence does not take a straightforward object, it 
resists objectification in propositional language. As such, it is often deemed ineffable, 
commanding the absence of words.10 A great deal is at stake in devising linguistic 
structures that accommodate this phenomenon traditionally conceived to be so 
inaccessible to language, especially when silence comes to index, as it often does in 
Western, postmodern culture, a long tradition of institutionalized oppression. For 
instance, the call to find one’s voice and speak of one’s experience of oppression (i.e., of 
having been violated and silenced) loudly championed by the #MeToo movement seems 
to be, among other things, an attempt to objectify silence, to put into words this otherwise 
elusive phenomenon.  
Yet, as I argue in this dissertation, when language is tasked with forcing silence 
into avenues of objectification, the account risks losing track of the complexity, 
polyvocality, and fecundity of silence. In part, this is because the epistemic framework 
undergirding this enterprise of representation that seeks to objectify silence posits speech 
over and against silence, thus not only treating silence as non-sense and, as such, unable 
to signify on its own, but also conceiving of language as processes of adequation 
whereby the truth of the phenomenal world, which includes silence, can be grasped by 
stating it.11 Since coincidence or adequation with the sensible world (whether it is 
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accounting for an experience of sexual violation or the phenomenon of silence) is 
impossible, the injunction to “speak up” or to “name the silence” to which oppression has 
relegated its victims will continue to mishear the polyvocality of silence; the silence that 
it will put into words will only be one, barren facet of a much richer and more fecund 
phenomenon. Importantly, it will be a phenomenon conceived through an interpretative 
framework that measures it over and against modern/colonial speech and logos and that, 
therefore, likely misses the signifying operations of silence beyond presence.  
To express one’s voice wherein silence has none, then, reproduces problematic 
metaphysical assumptions that inevitably lead to untenable positions. But what if silence 
is no longer understood, as it often is in a modern/colonial world, as the opposite of 
language and signification, as “inarticulate void” (Fóti 1988, 274)? Instead, what if 
silence is approached in its depth and polyvocality, as a phenomenon with its own 
signifying operations and structurally intertwined with and lining language? Perhaps, 
then, (mythopoetic or aesthetic) language would no longer have to fail vis-à-vis the 
phenomenon of silence and silence would be listened for, its polyvocality and fecundity 
rehabilitated. 
4. From Silence Toward Deep Silence 
Before proceeding any further, it is important to make explicit what I have been 
thus far suggesting: The silence at stake in this project—what I call “deep silence”—is 
more expressive than mere ineffability, more complex than the eviscerated silence of the 
#MeToo movement, and more sensible/sonorous than the lack of sound. My contention is 
that silence “is” more than absence and non-sense; viewed from a decolonizing 
standpoint able to sense beyond the transparency and presence of modern/colonial logos, 
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what was taken to be mere silence is, in fact, a rich phenomenon that opens onto non-
propositional or “conceptless” (EM 172), as Merleau-Ponty would put it, sense-making. 
It is deep silence, a phenomenon that, as noted regarding silent logos, finds its expression 
through the aesthetic.  
Acknowledging the depth of silence means that “deep silence” is 
incommensurable to modern/colonial taxonomies whereby silence is conceived 
dualistically over and against the fullness of speech and signification. In her glossary 
“para saber de quien hablamos y que queremos decir por ‘hablar’,” María Lugones lists 
the reductive logocentric categories that ensure from such a binary framing, like “refusal-
to-speak-silences, tongue-cut-out silences, …[or] refusal-to-listen silences” (2003, 167). 
If we think back to the three Native American shields example, we see that deep silences 
cannot be accounted for by a “refusal-to-listen silence”—a disposition more akin to the 
involuntary response of Lee Ann Kreutzer. Nor are they a “tongue-cut-out-silence”—the 
kind of silence we are accustomed to think about in Western, postmodern culture, which 
includes the silencing invoked within the feminist tradition whereby sexual violence, 
political repression, or power asymmetries prevent vulnerable populations from 
contributing to the conversation. The tongue-cut-out phenomenon more closely resembles 
the effects that Kreutzer’s inability to listen for the Ute/Paiute tribes’ silences had on the 
latter. In fact, it was not the tribes’ silence that equaled silencing, but the outcome of 
Kreutzer’s deploying Western and logocentric sensibilities and conceptual frameworks to 
make sense of the tribes’ silence that did. Lastly, deep silences are not a “refusal-to-
speak”—a silence that calls to mind the self-imposed silence of Rigoberta Menchú Tum 
or Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz in her famous Carta Antenagórica, which were strategically 
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deployed as withholding to evade and resist colonial and religious authority.12 The 
Ute/Paiute tribes were not withholding words in protest or for politically strategic 
reasons. Rather, their silences suggest something other; they point to a deep silence that 
functions as an inchoate opening to the world and, as we will see in chapter 2, a “radical 
meaning making” (Martínez 2014, 239). It would be a mistake, then, to frame deep 
silences in terms made available by modern/colonial taxonomies. Such an approach 
would conceive deep silence, yet again, over and against speech, as an already available 
utterance being unspoken or silenced within an already constituted domain of meaning.13 
Framing silence as the contrary of language, speech, and voice—as that which does not 
have a voice of its own—eviscerates its polyvocality and fecundity; it prevents deep 
silences like the Ute/Paiute tribes’ to signify differently, to speak with what Merleau-
Ponty calls “the voices of silence.”14  
What needs to be done—and what I strive to accomplish in the present study—is 
to re-member deep silences as having their own logic (but perhaps I should say their own 
sensuality and poetics) which make sense/sensible. In fact, the deep silences to which I 
invite the reader to harken throughout this study should be approached on their own 
terms, as silences pregnant with meanings that have not yet been voiced and could not be 
foreseen in advance. The Ute/Paiute tribes’ deep silence, for instance, opens onto 
modalities of sense making that do not rely primarily on conceptual/propositional 
thinking, revealing sense to be the ephemeral accomplishment of on-going processes 
deeply intertwined with the local geography, sacred rituals, and the carnal relations 
tradition institutes with the land and the people partaking in them. As the report 
submitted by Skull Valley Goshute Tribe Historic Preservation Director Melvin Brewster 
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attests, “the shields were a permanent, on-going prayer offering” whose disinterment 
would interrupt that evolving sense-making ceremony (Threedy 2009, 118). As such, the 
meaning of the shields could not be expressed propositionally, subsumed under concepts 
and wholly other categories of existence/thought—or, at the very least, doing so would 
alter their sense. Even though cultural norms prohibit it, one could describe what the 
shields are and the function they carry out within the tribes’ cultural performances. Yet, 
such an account would fall short of conveying the sense-making/making sensible of the 
shields. If heeded to, deep silences, give way to meanings where coloniality hears none, 
to a body of practices, knowledges, and arts for re-forming sense and historical 
structures.15 After all, it is sense-making processes like this that Kreutzer’s inability to 
listen for the depth of silence missed. 
5. Methodological Approach and Dissertation Structure 
For the purpose of this dissertation, my (re)turn to silence means that that my 
relationship with critical phenomenology is dual: On the one hand, I follow the critical 
turn of phenomenology by contextualizing my investigation into the phenomenon of 
silence within the broader historical and social structures that make the analysis possible. 
It is this situating that positions me, in chapter 3, to put forth the notion of the 
“coloniality of silence,” which I explain in more detail in what follows. Importantly, the 
present inquiry into the phenomenon of silence is carried out by attending to the 
experiences of those who do not enjoy the “sheltering comfort and interpretive stability 
of historically privileged ‘home’ perspectives” (Ruiz 2014, 198).16 I investigate Ernesto 
Martínez’s experience of “joto passivity,” or the apparent nonresponsiveness of young 
queer Latinos in the face of sexualized violence (chapter 2); the grief of mothers who 
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have lost their daughters in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico to feminicide and the seeming 
ineffability of such an experience (chapter 5; and collective memory-work and 
reinscription of the colonial past through the myth of la Llorona as it appears in 
Anzaldúa’s writings (chapter 7). Thinking through these experiences exposes the 
historical contingency of modalities of perceiving, thinking, and being taken for granted 
within a given historical formation, including the taken-for-granted assumption that 
silence indexes non-sense, complacency, or forced submission.17  
On the other hand, alerted by the challenges inherent to a critical 
phenomenological project—i.e., the difficulty of bearing witness to experiences of 
marginalization without capitulating to key colonial structures—it seems to me that a 
critical phenomenology ought to be critical of its own method of description. This is one 
of this project’s main interventions in the field of critical phenomenology. Although 
critical phenomenology’s turn toward the political, i.e., to structures like coloniality, 
facilitates tracking “the weight of the world” and its “restructuring” (Guenther 2020, 13, 
15), in my view, the modality whereby critical phenomenology bears witness to such 
experiences matters. Specifically, I propose that developing sensibilities whereby one can 
harken to and mobilize deep silences in phenomenological descriptions is key to bearing 
witness to colonial experiences of marginalization without the recapitulation of 
transparency and linearity of modern/colonial logocentric apparatuses. This means, first, 
learning to listen for silences and their meanings and, second, mobilizing them in one’s 
descriptions. This dissertation is such an endeavor.  
The dissertation is divided into an Introduction and six chapters, thematically 
organized into three parts. In Part I, “Listening for Silences,” I draw from Latinx 
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decolonial literature and women of color feminism to show the limitations of 
Eurocentered epistemic theories of meaning and liberatory projects such as the #MeToo 
campaign that privilege dialogical approaches to emancipation and subsume the 
complexity of silence to “silencing.” Decontextual appeals to “speak up,” I argue, 
foreclose questions about the normativity of voice, concealing the fact that, within a 
colonial context, the voice that can be heard is that of the modern/colonial subject. In this 
sense, although “speaking up” is hard to argue against as it is lived as liberatory by many, 
I propose that such an imperative is rooted in a colonial framework that ought to be 
questioned if we intend to develop strategies of insubordination that do not play into 
coloniality. In Part II, “The Voices of Deep Silence,” I think through the challenge of 
putting into words an elusive phenomenon like silence. Grounding my analysis in both 
theoretical insights from Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Gloria E. Anzaldúa as well as the 
signifying effected by the pink crosses scattered through and marking feminicides in 
Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, I propose, first, that the sense of deep silence is conveyed 
through the aesthetics. Second, I begin to show how the mobilization of deep silence in 
phenomenological analyses and aesthetic expression can be a powerful tool for ethical 
and political resistance. It is to this question that I turn in Part III, “The temporality of 
Deep Silence”. Focusing the onto onto-temporal dynamics of deep silence such that it 
accounts for the fecundity of being, I show how deep silence decenters key assumption of 
Western thinking, opening onto modalities of healing often overlooked by Western 
legalism and Transitional Justice initiatives. 
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5.1. Chapter 2: The Emancipatory Limits of Voice 
Given the harms entailed with being silenced and the fact that speaking up is lived 
as liberatory by many, the value of “voice” and “speech” seems hard to contest.18 The 
aim of this project—and, specifically, of Part I—is not to dismiss the importance of 
giving voice to those who have been confined to silence. Rather, informed by instances in 
which voice fails to bear witness to either a violent and traumatic past or to cultural 
practices, and leery of the subjugating snares that this ostensibly emancipatory tool brings 
about, I seek to locate in deep silence resources for the renewal of sense, for making 
sense of experiences that would otherwise remain unhearable and inexpressible within a 
modern/colonial world. To this end, I begin the dissertation, in Part I, by decentering the 
modern/colonial assumptions that equate silence with the non-sense of mere silence. 
Re-examining the question of silence from the phenomenological standpoint of 
Ernesto Martínez’s lived experiences of sexual violence, in chapter 2, “The Emancipatory 
Limits of Voice,” I bring attention to the limitations of Eurocentered epistemic theories of 
meaning and liberatory projects, such as the #MeToo campaign, that often uncritically 
privilege dialogical approaches to emancipation. When “speaking up” or “coming to 
voice” becomes the ubiquitous appeal of liberatory movements, I argue, it abstracts from 
the concrete situations and lived experiences of those who inhabit silences, at once 
transcending and foreclosing a critique of the violences entailed by the normativity of 
voice and a conception of silence that eviscerates it of its fecundity and complexity. The 
immediacy of voice sought after (even if implicitly) in imperatives to speak up or in the 
belief that speaking up would give voice to, i.e., allow to be heard, those who have been 
silenced not only relies on a binary repressive-expressive conception of speech premised 
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on the modernist notion that the truth (conveyed through speech) will make those who are 
excluded from the subject position free;19 it also participates in and perpetuates an 
intellectual fantasy of presence, that recognition will be unproblematic once one’s story is 
told. Following María Josefina Saldaña-Portillo’s remarks about testimonial critics, we 
can say that, because of its desire to end a culture of silence toward subaltern visibility, 
the #Metoo movement “wished away the problem of subaltern political and figural 
representation” (2003, 159), specifically that of the colonial normativity of voice. Rather 
than remaining attentive to the traumas, fears, and motivations specific to one’s 
experience of (sexual) violence that may preclude one from speaking and call for or find 
in silence avenues for radical meaning making, the imperative to speak up transcends the 
particularity of the situation into “a generic subaltern subject whose voice may then be 
codified into a recognizable set of criteria for an appropriative critical practice” (Saldaña-
Portillo 2003, 160). Problematically, as I will argue, voice codified and subsumed into a 
set of predetermined (modern/colonial) criteria does not yield new meaning, but instead 
reifies the historical structure of coloniality.  
At this juncture, it should be noted that, as Adriana Cavarero claims in For More 
than One Voice, “voice” is itself a polysemic phenomenon. Per the Western epistemic 
tradition beginning in Greece, which concerned itself with knowledge as the “self-
clarification of logos,” and culminating with 20th century linguistics, philosophy “avoids 
getting caught up in the vey question of the voice” (Cavarero 2005, 9). That is, the 
signature mark of metaphysics is to split speech from speaker/voice and relegate the 
former into thought, in a “mental signified of which speech itself, in its sonorous 
materiality, would be the expression—its acoustic, audible sign” (9). Voice thus becomes 
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deprived of the uniqueness that its bodily resonances mark; it becomes voice in general, 
that very abstracted/ing and universal voice appealed to in the commands to break the 
silence! I find Cavarero’s analysis very compelling, as it lays bare the inaugural act of 
metaphysics and the colonizing operations of modernity. As I will argue throughout this 
dissertation, however, in my view, at stake in any project that seeks to destabilize the 
theoretical bond between (metaphysical) voice, presence, and emancipation to reveal it in 
its singularity is tending, first and foremost, to silence, not voice.20 
In fact, in addition to the material harms effected by transcending particularity, 
the imperative misses the opportunity to recognize the fecundity of deep silence. It skates 
over the transformative or liberatory power of deep silence in that it may sometimes be 
important not to say something, that silence may be a way—and even, in certain 
situations, the only way—to advance new meanings. In this sense, although “speaking 
up” is hard to argue against as it is lived as liberatory by many, I claim that the 
imperative to “speak up” is rooted in a colonial framework that ought to be questioned if 
we intend to develop strategies of insubordination that do not play into coloniality. The 
approach I thus adopt is that of listening to silences, to the reverberations the Western 
ears are not accustomed to feeling.21 Deep silences, in fact, are the openings, opacities, or 
moments of hesitation necessary for singularity to eventuate; they afford voice “a 
meaning of its own that is not already destined to speech” (Cavarero 2005, 13). This 
meaning, as Martínez’s account will suggest, is affective and somatic. As such, it eludes 
firm conceptual articulation.  
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5.2. Chapter 3: The Coloniality of Silence 
In chapter 3, “The Coloniality of Silence,” I focus on the processes characteristic 
of coloniality whereby the depth and polyvocality of silence are “flattened” to a mono-
dimensional phenomenon primarily indexing ontological absence and epistemic non-
sense, and responsible for the interpretative failure vis-à-vis silence thus far discussed. I 
call these processes the “coloniality of silence.” Anyone familiar with feminist, 
decolonial, and postmodern critiques of Western philosophy cannot help but be 
suspicious of the coloniality of silence’s evisceration of depth. After all, it is a symptom 
of a problem that has to do with Western philosophy’s affinity for abstraction and 
universalization. Let’s think back to the case of the three Native American shields, as it 
helps to identify the outlines of the issue. The fact that the Ute/Paiute tribes’ silences 
went largely unheard indicates that the depth of silence has to do with the concrete, 
particular, fleshy/material givens of experience. But this is not the problem, which lies 
instead with philosophy’s—but, we should add, Western metaphysics’—predilection for 
ignoring of the unique. This flattening, I argue, becomes a central mechanism of the 
modern/colonial project insofar as it is predicated on the universalizability of the human 
subject and his experiences. By foreclosing the apprehension of experiences of, e.g., 
many survivors of (sexualized) colonial heteronormative violence like Ernesto Martínez 
who do not live silence exclusively as oppressive, and that would undermine key 
presuppositions of modern/colonial theories of meaning such as 
epistemic/communicative transparency or the concidentia rerum et intellectus, coloniality 
preserves its internal, artificial coherence. Together, chapters 2 and 3 challenge 
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modern/colonial assumptions about the transparency of sense and begin to let the 
polyvocality of silence resonate. 
5.3. Chapter 4: The Silences of Merleau-Ponty and Gloria Anzaldúa  
Opening silence to its multi-dimensionality and a plurality of signifying practices 
means grappling with the methodological question at the heart of this project, i.e., how is 
possible to express deep silence without undermining its constitutive opacity, without 
accounting for it through representational models and concepts that would implicitly reify 
those same modern/colonial assumptions that reduce silence to mere silence? Saying that 
silence is not the opposite of speech is not enough to avoid silencing the phenomenon of 
silence, reducing silence, yet again, to ineffability. The goal of the present work—to 
think meaning according to a certain silence, or to think deep silence as meaningful—
requires deploying tools that allow giving voice to deep silence.  
In part II of this dissertation, “The Voices of Deep Silence,” I take up this 
challenge, turning to Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Gloria E. Anzaldúa for guidance on the 
matter. In chapter 4, “The Silences of Merleau-Ponty and Gloria Anzaldúa,” I reflect on 
what 20th century French phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty and Chicana author Anzaldúa 
have to offer to a project like the present one that stives to unleash the fecundity and 
polyvocality of deep silences from the shackles of coloniality. At first sight, and for 
different reasons, each thinker appears as an unlikely ally. Steeped in colonial France, 
Merleau-Ponty assumed attitudes and assumptions central to that historical formation, 
even against his best intentions. Although sensitive to the decolonial cause, Anzaldúa 
often espoused a stance vis-à-vis silence that closely echoes that of Western feminism 
discussed above. As we will see, however, when their thinking and writing is approached 
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with care, i.e., with attention to their own sometimes unspoken commitments, the 
dialogue that ensues from these two thinkers offers insights helpful to navigate the 
difficult task of listening to and expressing the polyvocality of silence.  
Although these two thinkers belong to different cultural, geographical, and 
historical contexts, they not only share a metaphysical understanding of the world that 
moves beyond Cartesian dualisms, upholding ambiguity and complexity, and similar 
methodological sensibilities of thinking through phenomena rather than “from above.” 
Anzaldúa and Merleau-Ponty also share a praxical commitment to the aesthetic as a key 
modality of meaning making beyond the presence of consciousness. Through the 
“conceptless opening onto things” offered by the aesthetic and, often, by letting art, myth, 
and images guide the inquiry, both thinkers show how the beholder is re-oriented by the 
summons of the world and becomes attuned to its inchoate, burgeoning sense (EM 172). 
That is, they show how sense eventuates as a level prior to the conceptual and 
propositional one.  
Because of these sensibilities, Merleau-Ponty’s and Anzaldúa’s ability to express 
the experience of the sensible, the experience of what traditional philosophy tends to cast 
as mute, ineffable, or senseless silence (as mere silence) is remarkable. In his later 
writings, Merleau-Ponty comes to see that bringing silence to expression calls for an 
aesthetic or indirect language that harkens to and allows deep silence to reverberate 
through speech, thus giving rise to, on the one hand, a “felt understanding” of the depth 
of the sensible world and, on the other, a renewed sense of language (Mazis 2016).22 
Akin to the work that images perform in Proust’s La recherche, which, on Merleau-
Ponty’s account, allows for literary and artistic expression to convey meaning without 
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subsuming it under concepts or categories, throughout her corpus, Anzaldúa deploys 
mythopoetics to engage colonial experiences as an in-between, as liminal experiences 
that otherwise remain conceptually and propositionally elusive. Recuperating Merleau-
Ponty’s and Anzaldúa’s contributions to the question of expression (of silence) from the 
former’s imbrication with the coloniality of silence and the latter’s seeming downplaying 
of silence is instructive to think through how deep silences can be mobilized to resignify 
colonial historias. 
For both authors, the aesthetics’ logic—or, I should say, its poiesis—is not 
representational, but a “diacritical, relative, oppositional system” (VI 213) that, 
importantly, responds creatively to “the silent persuasion of the sensible” (VI 214).23 
Merleau-Ponty and Anzaldúa thus accomplish the expression of the silent sense of the 
sensible not as a way of resolving or bypassing opacity, ambiguities, and aporias, but 
through and by virtue of a fundamental darkness or obscurity—the opacity of time, sense, 
reflection. Merleau-Ponty and Anzaldúa put into practice a philosophy that does not have 
to fail vis-à-vis deep silence, or, at the very least, that would “fail” very differently than 
logos-as-rational speech. This is an aesthesis (here to be understood in terms of its Greek 
root, aisthèsis, i.e., the sensible access to the world) of deep silence.  
It is important to note that, in the context of this dissertation, “aesthetic” does not 
refer to modern aesthetics inaugurated by Immanuel Kant as a theory and regulator of the 
capacity to “sense” the beautiful and the sublime, which comes to serve as the 
mechanism to produce and regulate sensibilities. Rather, as defined by decolonizing 
scholars and artists, here, “the aesthetic” or “aesthetics” refers to what Walter Mignolo 
and Rolando Vazquez call “aesthesis,” or “the artistic practices that aim to decolonize the 
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senses, that is, to liberate them from the regulation of modern, postmodern, and 
altermodern aestheTics” (Mignolo and Vazquez 2013). Modern/colonial aesthetics have 
partaken in the configuration of a purportedly universal normativity that disavows “forms 
of aesthetic practices or, more precisely, other forms of aestheSis, of sensing and 
perceiving” that do not conform with modern/colonial standards (Mignolo and Vazquez 
2013). Aesthesis includes popular arts and culture as well as critical intervention within 
the field of contemporary arts itself. 
5.4. Chapter 5: An Aesthesis of Deep Silence 
In chapter 5, “An Aesthesis of Deep Silence: Re-Membering the Disappearing 
Daughters of Ciudad Juárez,” I think through the sense of deep silence and its modes of 
expression by attending to the concrete case of feminicides in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico. I 
suggest that deep silence makes possible thinking through the eventuating of being and 
sense in their polyvocality by attuning us to a different modality of being. This aesthesis 
of deep silence provides the means to articulate these “voices of silence” without falling 
back onto the impasse in which propositional language culminates when faced with the 
paradoxical question, can the subaltern speak? As Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on Proust 
in the Institution and Passivity Lectures and the Visible and the Invisible indicate, the 
diacritical sense-making of art brings attention to the fact that each event is lined by 
“halos of signification” (MA 234), marked by indefiniteness and polyvalences. The 
aesthetic evokes more than itself, “betray[ing] a series of relations in the sense of a world 
and is thus connected to the process of differentiation and the depth of being that belies 
this world” (Kaushik 2011, 24). For Merleau-Ponty, the aesthetics’ sense-making resists 
propositional expression, making sense prior to concepts, in the in-between of the 
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sensuous and silent contact with being through which sense is borne. Moreover, as Rajiv 
Kaushik argues in Art and Institution, the aesthetics resists propositional signification 
because it displays “an immediacy of the unidentifiable, or a showing of remoteness 
itself. It is this showing that grasps us, the beholders of the text, and usurps our power to 
grasp or appropriate it” (2011, 25). The beholder does not grasp the meaning of the work 
of art, but, rather, is grabbed and oriented by it. 
The realization that the aesthetics eventuates a “conceptless” signification matters 
to a decolonial feminist project that seeks to go beyond colonial epistemologies in at least 
two ways. First, ephemeral art like the pink crosses scattered throughout Ciudad Juárez 
makes possible expressing a phenomenon, like the loss of one’s daughter or silence, that 
would otherwise seem ineffable. Second, it bears witness to gendered-violence while 
refusing inscription within colonial epistemologies. Ephemeral art, I propose, 
accomplishes this task by exposing the beholder to an experience of loss and 
disappearing (a claim to which I will return in chapter 7). Engaged at the affective level, 
the beholder is transformed into a witness who “joins”—rather than “thinks”—the 
disappearings and feminicides. Thus, the crosses’ fragility transforms the disappearing 
into a living past and keeps the work of denouncing and remembering an open and 
ongoing process. Importantly, as anticipated, the aesthetic puts on display a silent logos 
that is beyond subjectivity. That is, the sense disclosed through aesthetic language is not 
the product of an agent’s explicit reasoning or deliberate choice, but, rather, a corporeal 
reorientation that emerges through the negotiations of the concrete situation—through 
living. The meaning of the crosses scattered through Juárez emerges in the convergent 
space between the gesture of the mothers-activists and the local geography.  
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5.5. Chapter 6: Le monde du silence 
In Part III of the dissertation, “The Temporality of Deep Silence,” I think through 
the onto-temporal dynamics of deep silence. In chapter 6, “Le monde du silence: 
Ontological Possibilities and the Impossible Time of Deep Silence,” I investigate this 
silent logos of nature that art displays by attending to Merleau-Ponty’s Nature Lectures. 
Thinking deep silence along with Nature, I suggest, reveals deep silence as essential to 
being, a dimension wherein being manifests itself in its absence. As such, I propose, deep 
silence is the condition of possibility of being and sense. Prompted by Emmanuel Alloa’s 
(2014) and Marcello Vitali Rosati’s (2016) work on the topic, I suggest that deep silence 
as possibility is more than a mere logical non-impossibility and less than what actually is. 
As virtual, possibility must exist “prior” to the eventuation of beings in the sense of 
making the eventuation of being possible, without being causally reducible to them. To 
make sense of this seeming paradoxical modality of existence, I turn to the temporal 
dynamic of precession, a peculiar movement of retrograde inscriptions of possibility 
whereby being grows or transmutes internally. As Merleau-Ponty reminds us, precession 
is a movement of mutual anticipation of terms whereby the “priority” of, e.g., the 
possible over the actual or the actual over the possible, is undecidable. This means that 
the possible comes into existence along with the actual, “as a virtualizing of the actual” 
(Al-Saji 2012b, 353). As such, deep silence as the conditions of possibility of being is not 
a “closed set of possibilities,” but a “pregnancy of possible” that accounts for being’s 
fecundity through the retroactive instituting of unpredictability, hesitancy, and openness 
at the very heart of being. Remarkedly, as condition of possibility, deep silence actualizes 
the present without its normativity being knowable in advance. Rather, I propose, its 
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normativity becomes visible through praxis, traceable though the concrete eventuating of 
phenomena. 
Casting deep silence as the virtual invites developing an alternative conception of 
silence than the one traditionally upheld throughout the history of Western philosophy. 
Deep silence as the virtual no longer functions as the figure of finitude or as the necessary 
opposite of philosophical logos, figuring as the “abyss of dark, mute nature that must be 
filled with speech, or the always-beyond of speech, which both sets a limit and marks out 
a task” (Williams 2010, 33). Rather, deep silence exists in being, sense, and thinking, but 
its existence is not fully graspable by present consciousness. Key figures in the history of 
Western philosophy who tried to recuperate, think, or let silence come into thought have 
done so by appeal to myth—an uncertain and opaque language that is not rational logos 
and that leaves much unknown. Here we can think of the Platonic dialogues, in which 
myth functions as a way around the aporias that logos and philosophical discourse cannot 
think through, or Nietzsche’s Zarathustra.24 Myth is a rhetorical strategy deployed by 
Gloria Anzaldúa as well.  
5.6. Chapter 7: Anzaldúa’s Decolonizing Mythopoetics 
In chapter 7, “The (Deep) Silence of Bearing Witness: On Gloria Anzaldúa’s 
Decolonial Aesthetics,” expands on my claim, in chapter 5, that the aesthetic allows us to 
express phenomena that cannot be accounted for propositionally or even discursively and 
argues for the necessity of mobilizing deep silence to yield decolonial sense-making. 
Attending to Gloria Anzaldúa’s iterations of the myth of la Llorona in “My Black 
Angelos” and Prietita and the Ghost Woman, I argue that Anzaldúa invites the audience 
to attend to what remains unsaid or the silences of cross-cultural encounters. Specifically, 
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her deployment of silences positions the reader to remember the colonial past as loss, that 
is, through an experience of its loss. By evoking traces of the lost past through a poetic 
language of images, affect, and, most importantly, deep silences, Anzaldúa’s mythopoetic 
“holds on” or “bears witness” to the colonial past in its absenting. Thus, Anzaldúa’s work 
bears witness to experiences of colonization, violence, and trauma spectrally, i.e., 
presenting them as what, although never fully present, continues to haunt the present. In 
this sense, the mobilization of deep silences in a phenomenological description positions 
the reader to listen to what is not said—to silences—thus making “visible” colonial 
historias without capitulating to specularization, i.e., rendering experiences of coloniality 
readily available for dissection and inspection by the colonizing gaze. It accomplishes 
this task, I argue, through its deployment of silences.25 
 Overall, Anzaldúa’s mythopoetics inaugurates decolonizing sensibilities attuned 
to silences and opacity rather than speech and transparency. In this sense, I propose that 
mythopoetics is not a matter of mimetic representation or interpretation of facts, but of 
being-with; its power of insubordination does not lie in its bearing witness to facts or 
preserving the past as an eternal, immutable present, but, rather, in its acknowledgment of 
“the impossibility of any adequate representation” (Acosta Lopéz 2014, 81). Concretely, 
this means that myth exposes not only the limits of cross-cultural communication (as we 
will see in chapter 2), but also makes explicit how the opacity of the aesthetic and 
mythopoetic writing, specifically, and of being and sense, more broadly, ought not to be 
translated but rather harkened to when decolonizing reality. In sum, myth’s silences make 
explicit the écart of being.  
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6. Towards a Critical Phenomenology of Deep Silence 
In the conclusion of the dissertation, I return to where this project began, i.e., to 
methodological considerations regarding how to “bear witness to the violence waged and 
those victimized by colonial heteropatriarchy without capitulating to logos.” Listening for 
silences reveals that the modality of bearing witness matters when striving to go beyond 
modern/colonial epistemologies. As I will have explored throughout the dissertation, the 
mobilization of deep silences in phenomenological descriptions can be a powerful 
decolonizing praxis. This is so in at least two ways. First, it avoids the recapitulation of 
specularization, i.e., rendering experiences of coloniality “spectacular” and “specular.” 
Second, it institutes a non-linear temporal dynamic that avoids fixing the past into an 
eternal present; instead, it eventuates the presencing of traces of multiple pasts, ultimately 




1 In “Critical Phenomenology,” Guenther writes that, “as a political practice critical 
phenomenology is a struggle for liberation from the structures that privilege, naturalize, 
and normalize certain experiences of the world while marginalizing, pathologizing, and 
discrediting others” (2020, 15). 
2 Examples of failures to listen for silences in cross-cultural encounters abound. For 
instance, we are faced with a similar dissonance upon reading Rodolfo Kusch’s 
description of his encounter with the Aymara grandfather, during his visit to the Andean 
highlands of Oruro, Bolivia, narrated in Indigenous and Popular Thinking in América. 
Kusch remembers that, when he and his students, who were there to conduct fieldwork, 
“pestered [the grandfather] with questions,” the grandfather responded reluctantly, giving 
abbreviated answers. When one of the students asked him why he would not purchase a 
hydraulic pump to irrigate the arid fields, “a heavy silence” followed as the grandfather 
did not answer (2010, 9). Scandalized by the grandfather’s attitude, one of Kusch’s 
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students interpreted the silence as a marker of “ignorance” (2010, 10), of a lack of 
rational understanding. Yet, Kusch tells us, there was more in the grandfather’s silence 
than epistemic and ontological inferiority—an observation that resonates with the shields 
case. The grandfather’s silence opened onto another sense-making whereby “movement, 
events, the process of becoming” were registered “before things,” and also affect, not 
mere facts or ends, drives one in the face of reality—in sum, another cosmology where 
one “sees to feel” (Kusch 2010, 11). 
3 The legislation lists “linguistic, historical, archeological, and genetic evidence” as 
legitimate sources of evidence, and the standard of proof to be applied is that of “a 
preponderance of the evidence” (Threedy 2009, 108, 96).  
4 The story offered in testimony by the Navajo representative, John Holiday is the 
following: “The shields were made by a man called Many Goats White Hair, nine 
generations ago. The shields were sacred ceremonial objects. When the Navajos were 
being rounded up by war parties, the shields were in the care of two men, Man Called 
Rope and Little Bitter Water Person. Man Called Rope was John Holiday’s grandfather. 
Concerned for the shields’ safety, the two men decided to hide the shields in the area we 
call the Mountain With No Name [Henry Mountains] and Mountain With White Face 
[Boulder Mountain]. The location of the hidden shields was then lost” (cited in Stauffer 
2015, 99). 
5 After all, as Threedy notes following Bennett and Feldman, determining the connection 
between the elements of a story depends on the interpretative aptitude and knowledge of 
the audience. 
6 Unless otherwise indicated, throughout this project, logos indexes the modern/colonial 
logos just indicated.  
7 At this juncture, we can think of Habermas’s theory of communicative action as a 
leading example of Western theories of meaning’s logocentrism. This assumption 
regarding the desideratum of communication and the nature of silence informs strategies 
devised to reduce barriers to cross-cultural communication. Because sense is assumed to 
be transparent, cross-cultural incomprehensions or silences are taken to be direct results 
of a lack of information. And the solution to this “lack” is taken to be “more”: 
comprehension and communication, this logic goes, are achieved by providing more 
complete, unambiguous, and persuasive information, all features that were deemed 
missing from the Ute/Paiute’s testimony. 
8 Attending to what came to be known, thanks to Kimberlé Crenshaw’s groundbreaking 
essay, “Mapping the Margins” (1991), as the intersectionality of oppression entailed 
calling into question the racialization of silence, that is, the assumption that silence is co-
extensive with femininity. Inter-sectional analyses of oppression revealed that “silence” 
(as well as “passivity” or “fragility”) characterized and normalized the experience of 
(most) WASP women, not of all women (Collins 2000, 14). In the collective imaginary 
and their communal spaces like the family and the church, Black women are often very  
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vocal to be point of being framed as rowdy and loud (Lorde 1978/2007; hooks 
1989/2015). The racialization of silence performed a double erasure: that of the 
intersectional experiences of women of color and white feminism’s complicity in the 
oppression of women of color. So long as silence was cast as coextensive with the 
feminine (while, in fact, it primarily designated white femininity), women of color whose 
existence and experiences did not conform with this silent, white feminine norm were 
made invisible within (white) feminist discourse. And by taking the experience of white 
women as indicative of the feminine, second-wave feminism foreclosed the recognition 
of its participation in the marginalization and exclusion of women of color. Attending to 
the intersectionality of oppression, however, also revealed the limitations of the 
emancipatory strategy of effecting the transition from silence to voice; at stake in women 
of color’s emancipation was the production of speech that would compel listeners, speech 
that would be heard—as Lorde and hooks argued. 
9 Over the decades, there have been attempts to reclaim silence outside of philosophy. 
Communication studies scholar Robin Clair, for instance, follows the path paved by Max 
Picard, arguing that silence and voice should not be thought as “bifurcated concepts,” but 
as “self-contained opposites” (Clair 1998, xiii; see also Picard 1952). In Organizing 
Silence and “Imposed Silence and the Story of the Warramunga Woman,” Clair 
investigates strategies to organize silence such that it becomes possible to hear the voices 
of those who have been silenced (Clair 1998; 2013). Following a deconstructive 
approach, Clair investigates the “silencing aspects of communication and the expressive 
aspects of silence” (Clair 1998, 5) as a way of moving beyond the bifurcation of voice 
and silence. Notably, Clair argues that aesthetics “provides a means for silence to escape 
and become expression, and an aesthetic perspective allows us to see it … an aesthetic 
perspective provides a way of exploring how silence is expressed” (40). Aimee Carrillo 
Rowe’s and Sheena Malhotra’s Silence, Feminism, Power is a collection dedicated to 
critiquing, from a feminist standpoint, the dominant conception of silence that casts it as 
exclusively oppressive and recovering it as also a space of possibilities (Carrillo Rowe 
and Malhotra 2013). 
10 In Immemorial Silence, Karmen MacKendrick observes that within contemporary 
thinking in the humanities silence marks the limits of thought (she refers to Maurice 
Blanchot’s “outside” and George Bataille’s “non-knowledge” or “the erotic”) and 
language. Of the latter, she writes, “we find it in ancient mysticism as the ‘ineffable,’ in 
negative theology as the unnamable, in the Nietzschean warning that grammar seduces us 
into a belief in metaphysics, even in the Wittgesteinian warning that philosophy, being all 
language games, must not infrequently remain silent” (2001, 3). Common to both 
positions is an economy of the excess, which she defines as “an intensification beyond 
meaning, a transgression of the very boundaries of speaking, of writing, of language, and 
of time” (MacKendrick 2001, 4). In other words, per its traditional definition, silence 
marks a limit (of language and thought). 
11 This representational conception of language, which is based on the rationalist model 
coincidentia rerum et intellectus, turns language into what Merleau-Ponty refers to as “a  
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power of error” (VI 123). Philosophy’s adequation with originary silence, i.e., with the 
advent of truth, is “rather a wakeful and thematized participation in the ‘dehiscence’ of 
Being” (Fóti 1988, 280). As Véronique Fóti argues in “Merleau-Ponty on Silence and the 
Work of Philosophy,” philosophy’s role is paradoxical, at once one of creation and 
communion “to an original concealment” (1988, 273), which is to say that philosophy (as 
linguistic expression) is a negotiation with the ontological texture of silence from which 
it arises. This observation is echoed by Waldenfels (2000). 
12 In “Tricks of the Weak,” Josefina Ludmer argues that Sor Juana’s not knowing how to 
respond to the bishop, to someone her superior, leads to her silence. Her silence, Ludmer 
argues, creates “another textual space, her own, stripped of rhetoric, in which she writes 
what is not said in the other zones” like “saying, writing, and publishing […] are 
demands originating from others and associated with violence, with coercion: ‘Y, a la 
verdad, yo nunca he escrito, sino violentada y forzada y sólo por dar gusto a otros; no 
sólo sin complacencia, sino con positiva repugnancia’ (And, in truth, I have written 
nothing except when coerced and constrained, and then only to give pleasure to others; 
not alone without pleasure of my own, but with absolute repugnance)” (1991, 90). 
Another example is the silence of Rigoberta Menchú, who, on Doris Sommers’s account, 
strategically deployed silences to protect her people’s secrets, thus functioning as a form 
of resistance to the inquisitive Western eye as withholding (1996). 
13 The terms “refusal-to-speak” (i.e., intentional withholding of speech), “tongue-cut-out” 
(i.e., inability to speak), or “refusal-to-listen” (i.e., intentional lack of uptake of speech) 
suggest precisely this. 
14 Silence would be consumed by violence and oppression. The violence would consist in 
assimilating deep silences into familiar meanings; their complexity, ambiguity, and 
opacity made invisible by the available logocentric, transparent, and binary taxonomies 
that would reduce the multiplicity of silences to, literally, oppressive silencing. But this 
conceptual violent consumption, i.e., the reduction of the difference of deep silences to 
the sameness of silencing, entails another, material violence: the assimilation of deep 
silence into familiar taxonomies and meaning would render invisible the “reality” of the 
Ute/Paiute tribes’ deep silences by abstracting from their opaque and ambiguous concrete 
experiences. 
15 One could object that the recoil to “silence” and the linguistic choice of deploying this 
term would, inadvertently, erase the colonized’s (but especially colonized women’s) 
testimonies. Equating silence/ing with the experience of the colonized (and locating 
oneself in that experience to generate novel signifying practices) would render invisible 
not only the experiences of women of color whom, as noted, are not normed by/to 
silence, but also the signifying practices that already take place within those 
communities. In sum, it would be implicitly adopting the perspective of the colonizer. To 
avoid theses misconceptions, it is important to understand that, at stake in this 
dissertation, is the resignification of silence, a displacement carried out by thinking 
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longer casts it as literal silence by juxtaposing it to voice. As AnaLouise Keating puts it 
(in reference to Anzaldúa’s work), “personal experiences—revised and in other ways 
redrawn—become a lens with which to reread and rewrite the cultural stories into which 
we are born” (2005, 6). Furthermore, in my view, it is important to hold on to the 
language of silence for two reasons. First, invoking the concept “silence” brings attention 
to the phenomenon whose complexity I seek to uncover, a phenomenon that is too 
quickly associated with oppression and whose subversive power is overlooked. In this 
sense, I focus on the taken for granted. Calling this phenomenon by a different name risks 
shifting the attention away from what appears as silence-as-non-sense, ultimately 
eviscerating the phenomenon of silence yet again (which is precisely the practice I seek 
to undo). Second, by focusing on deep silence, I make visible the overlooking of silence 
characteristic of modern/ colonial episteme, thus inviting the question of why silence is 
flattened/overlooked. What is it about silence (what can silence do) that makes it 
dangerous or threatening to the dominant epistemic/political/ontological frameworks? In 
the dissertation, I suggest that silence threatens the colonial logic because of its potential 
to signify otherwise. Calling the phenomenon something else risks foreclosing these 
questions, thus becoming complicit in the erasure of silence’s fecund potential for non-
colonial sense-making.  
16 In “Musings: Spectral Phenomenologies,” Elena Ruiz describes this alienating 
modality of existence as “spectral dwellings” (2014, 198). 
17 This situating, i.e., this bringing to bare the weight of non-normative experiences onto 
what the canon takes to be familiar, is, perhaps, the unifying thread of the disparate 
projects in critical phenomenology being carried out today, as well as at its inception. 
Following in the footsteps of Simone de Beauvoir (2011) and Frantz Fanon, for instance, 
contemporary critical phenomenologists like Mariana Ortega’s work on multiplicity 
(2016), Megan Burke’s work on the temporality of feminine existence (2019), or Al-
Saji’s work on the coloniality of affect (2019b) bring to bear the weight of non-normative 
experiences onto what the canon takes to be familiar, thus revealing it as a site of 
marginalization and alienation for many. 
18 For a rich discussion of how metaphysics ignores the weight of the materiality and 
uniqueness of voice, which is reduced to the abstract universality speech, see Adriana 
Cavarero’s For More than One Voice (2005). Thus abstracted, Cavarero argues, voice in 
general becomes “the phonetic component of language as a system of signification” 
(2005, 9). Whether through the ancients’ focus on logos or 20th century linguistics, the 
voice that is at stake in each (as speech in the former or language for the latter) is never 
taken up in its singular materiality.  
19 Within this binary framework, speech is either liberatory (wherein the speech of, e.g., 
women is heard) or oppressive (wherein heteropatriarchal speech dominates). 
20 Cavarero tells us that, in order to rediscover the uniqueness of voice that “logocentrism 
radically denies,” “to contest the efforts of its devocalization, it is thus necessary to adopt 
another method—a method […] faithful to the vocal phenomenology of uniqueness, and 
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it consists in listening to speech as it resounds in the plurality of voice who […] speak” 
(2005, 13, 14).  
21 In Italian—not only Cavarero’s, but also my native language—the word sentire has the 
double valence of both “to listen” and “to feel.” Differently from ascoltare, which 
conjures up a kind of listening geared toward the semantic, sentire evokes sounds and 
their materiality. 
 
22 Thus conceived, as Merleau-Ponty observes in “Man and Adversity,” language is far 
from its “ordinary” conception as “resemblance to things” or “servant of signification” (S 
233, 232); rather, per Valéry’s formulation, aesthetic language is “the act of signifying 
itself” (S 232) through which signification is produced via “carnal relationships of 
meaning, the halos of signification words owe to their history and uses—as a result, in 
short, of the life that words lead within us” (S 234). As such, what is proper to 
(aesthetic/poetic) language are insecurity and approximation; its meaning is not graspable 
from the outside, but, rather, poetic language manifests itself by dwelling in and using 
language (S 232). Not surprisingly, existing scholarship appeals to Valéry or Proust as 
emblematic of an indirect language that expresses the bond between the sensible and 
signification—after all, it is Merleau-Ponty himself, who, in addition to the explicit 
references to Proust and Valéry in “Man and Adversity,” says, in the Visible and the 
Invisible, that “no one has gone further than Proust in fixing the relations between the 
visible and the invisible, in describing the idea that is not the contrary of the sensible” (VI 
149). 
23 In Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy (2008), Lawrence Hass argues that, for Merleau-Ponty, 
thought, language, and knowledge do not, as the tradition has them, represent reality, but, 
rather, fundamentally create it (2008, Chs. 6–7). 
24 It should be noted that, although both Plato and Nietzsche deploy myth as a way to 
“give voice” to silence, their relationship to silence is different. For instance, in The 
Republic, Socrates’s speech about the good beyond being is interrupted by silence 
because, as Williams puts it, “what must be spoken of cannot be spoken of, except in 
images, and this is as far as the logos of the good beyond being gets (or has ever gotten)” 
(2010, 34). In this sense, myth is invoked when philosophical speech tragically fails to 
put into words or thought a certain silence, a wildness of being that it cannot grasp. 
Although Nietzsche similarly grapples with the challenges of thinking through matters 
that seem to elude philosophical discourse and remain silent, Nietzsche deploys myth and 
the aporias that it allows to uphold not as the other or limit of philosophical discourse, 
but as its starting point, as opening a realm of thinking, an ethos, that does not remain 
inaccessible to philosophical logos, but radically reconfigures or overturns it. Nietzsche’s 
Zarathustra, for instance, is not only framed as a story; it also ends with silence—a silent 
weeping, to be precise. In the conclusion of his journey, Zarathustra grows “quite silent. 
His heart, however, was loosened, and tears fell from his eyes down upon his hands” 
(2003, 334). This indicates that Nietzsche does not merely value the sensible over the 
intelligible. Rather, on Nietzsche’s account, they are not two juxtaposed realms; logos is  
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inherently silent, whereby silence emphasizes this sensuous and affective otherwise of 
thetic/dogmatic philosophical knowledge. Note the relationship between knowledge and 
silence. To hear the sound (or the call) of life in his silent tears, to learn how to self-
overcome, Zarathustra needs to be silent. It is silence that life demands of Zarathustra 
when she asks him to stop “crack[ing his] whip so terribly!” (2003, 242). 
25 Myth, as deployed by Anzaldúa, is a means to think through colonial experience as an 
in-between, as a liminal figure that remains conceptually and propositionally elusive. In 
fact, as Scott and Tuana point out, myth deploys “liminal figurations and senses outside 
the restrictions of grammar, good sense, rationality, or analysis: that means outside the 
human world” (2017, 13). 
 









PART I – LISTENING FOR SILENCES 
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The Decolonial Turn is about making visible the invisible and analyzing the 
mechanisms that produce such invisibility or distorted visibility in light of a 
large stock of ideas that must necessarily include the critical reflections of the 
“invisible” people themselves. 
—Nelson Maldonado-Torres, “On the Coloniality of Being” 
 
We must, however, take a moratorium on naming too soon, if we manage to 
penetrate there. There is no other way for you and me to penetrate there. 
—Gayatri C. Spivak, in conversation with Jenny Sharp 
 
In a New York Times article, American author and long-distance swimmer Diana 
Nyad recounts her experiences of sexual assault, perpetrated in 1964 by her swimming 
coach, who, it turned out, was a serial sexual predator (Nyad 2017). Like many 
testimonies before and after hers, Nyad’s places great emphasis on finding one’s voice, 
on speaking up vis-à-vis sexual violence as a means to regain power in the wake of 
shame and humiliation. “We need to prepare coming generations to speak up in the 
moment, rather than being coerced into years of mute helplessness,” she states. As the 
#MeToo campaign forefronts, speaking up “takes something that women had long kept 
quiet about and transforms it into a movement” aimed at revealing the pervasiveness and 
systemic nature of sexual violence while building solidarity through empathy (Gilbert 
2017). In this vein, Nyad concludes the article with a plea: “Tell your story. Let us never 
again be silenced.” 
Testimonials like Nyad’s bring attention to the two interrelated assumptions 
operative in much Western feminist theorizing about oppression and emancipation.1 First, 
they affirm that coming to voice or speaking up about one’s own experience of, for 
example, sexual violence is an empowering practice that breaks the silence to which 
harmful practices like sexual violence and the shame associated with it have relegated its 
victims. Second, they attest that being silenced is “a punishment equal to the molestation” 
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(Nyad 2017); the silence induced by fear and shame associated with sexual violence 
within a hetero-patriarchal culture further oppresses survivors. Thus, Nyad’s testimonial 
brings to focus the logic and assumptions structuring emancipatory narratives according 
to which “voice” is associated with empowerment and is juxtaposed to silence, which 
comes to be equated with the silencing of oppression. As Aimee Carrillo Rowe and 
Sheena Malhotra point out in the introduction to Silence, Feminism, Power, the binary 
logic of speech versus silence and the almost commonsensical equation of silence with 
powerlessness and oppression in the Western tradition from Aristotle to Audre Lorde 
presumes a political imperative: for an individual or group to gain power and “to resist 
and transform the conditions of their oppression,” they “must activate their voice” 
(Carillo Rowe and Malhotra 2013, 1, order rearranged). In the words of Wendy Brown, in 
the Western tradition, silences must be assaulted, repeatedly with stories, testimonies, and 
histories, until “the silence itself is rendered articulate as an historically injurious force” 
(1996, 186). “Speaking up” and “breaking the silence” are thus unequivocally appealed to 
as the imperatives necessary to counter displacement, oppression, and marginalization. 
After all, as Adrienne Rich puts it, “in a world where language and naming are power, 
silence is oppression, is violence” (1979, 204). 
Given the harm entailed in being forced to silence and the fact that speaking up is 
lived as liberatory by many (as Nyad’s testimony indicates), “speaking up” seems hard to 
argue against. And yet, I suggest, “voice” is too broad a term; it is not nuanced enough to 
prevent its own deployment as an instrument of oppression rather than liberation. In fact, 
when voice becomes the ubiquitous appeal of liberatory movements, it abstracts from the 
concrete situations and lived experiences of those who inhabit silences, first, transcending 
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the concrete violences entailed by the normative power of voice and, second, dismissing 
silence as a fecund source of aesthetic and political value. Abstract and unequivocal 
appeals to “speaking up,” promote a fantasy of presence and overlook the ways in which 
“breaking the silence” and “speaking up” may converge with non-emancipatory 
tendencies in modern/colonial culture, ultimately feeding the structures of power they 
meant to starve.2 For example, what to do with the co-opting of the call to “having your 
voice heard” for the reactionary fight spearheaded by fake news? Or appeals to “free 
speech” as means to advance alt-right messages? Or the logically analogous instance 
whereby French actress Catherine Deneuve wrote an open letter, published in Le Monde 
in 2018, in which she undermines the #MeToo campaign, contending that men should be 
“free to hit on” women? Though public oral testimony may be a practice that, in certain 
contexts and circumstances, is called for, the ubiquitous imperative to speak up and its 
association with moral agency and political power upheld by most liberatory narratives 
entails harms of its own that ought to be brought to light to avoid complicity with 
structural oppression. After all, what about instances in which silence is needed not only 
for self-care and self-preservation, but also for radical meaning-making? 
Listening carefully to Nyad’s account, however, reveals that silence also indexes 
the unspeakability of her experience. “The events we have suffered are at once 
unspeakable and yet need to be spoken,” she remarks (2017). Their unspeakability, 
Nyad’s testimony suggests, is due to the fact that they exist at the affective level, carrying 
emotional, rather than primarily cognitive or conceptual, valence. Casting silence as non-
sense or an obstacle for the eventuation of meaning, therefore, forecloses the possibility 
to listen more closely to and make sense of experiences like Nyad’s, to that “emotional 
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significance” that the violence her coach inflicted upon her bears; it precludes grappling 
with how silence, in addition to signaling a harm and exclusion, can also be a radical 
avenue for meaning-making grounded in a different affective dimension of being.  
Consider the childhood memory of literary critic Ernesto Martínez, recounted in 
“Con Quién, Dónde, y Por Qué Te Dejas?”: His older cousin Felipe, after having initiated 
sexual contact, grabs his throat, pushes him on the bed, and repeatedly asks “¿Te gusta? 
¿Te gusta?” (2014, 239), all the while Martínez remembers remaining still, silent. Within 
the dominant binary framework of voice versus silence, silences like Martínez’s are 
eviscerated of their complexity and ambiguity, read as instances of complacency or 
forced submission to oppression, not unlike the silence Nyad describes. In his silence, 
Martínez did not comply with the “no te dejes” imperative (roughly translated as “don’t 
let them do that to you” or “fight back”)—a demand that, similar to “speak up!,” has 
purchase on the subjected, not the aggressors—and his silence or lack of struggle is read 
over and against the positively coded and overtly explicit imperatives of voicing one’s 
dissent or physically rejecting the aggression as modes of resistance. Within this 
framework, his silence and passivity are taken to index oppression and, specifically, 
failures, absences of sorts, or complacency. After all, why would Martínez remain silent 
in the face of aggression? 
Yet, Martínez remembers, there was more in his passivity and silence than 
silencing, than either complacency or forced submission. He recalls living that silence as 
an expression of what he calls “joto passivity,” that is, “the seeming nonresponsiveness 
of queer Chicanos in the face of violence” (2014, 238), which, contra (modern/colonial) 
common sense, was also felt as resistant behavior; his silence was also a practice of 
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“radical meaning making” from which he could envision and bring about radically 
different gendered practices of resistance like nonmisogynist and nonhomophobic ways 
of performing masculinity (2014, 239, 241). To be clear, Martínez states that his “joto 
passivity” was not a liberatory solution that removed violence from his life. Nonetheless, 
it was an “embodied negotiation” that enabled him to “account for the contradictions” of 
his situation, and that reminded Martínez that, as a queer man of color, he was “not 
consumed by violence” (2014, 239, 245). 
Dwelling, for a moment longer, in Martínez’s experience, more precisely, in the 
mis-hearing or misreading of his silence, raises the following questions: If it is the case 
that silence, as Martínez indicates, can be lived differently than as the mark of exclusion 
from the subject position, inferiority, or oppression, why is Martínez’s embodied 
response immediately read as submission? What are the structures and operations of the 
dominant logic such that inhabiting Martínez’s silence otherwise is foreclosed? What are 
the mechanisms, as Nelson Maldonado-Torres asks in the epigraph, that produce such 
invisibility? And what would make reading and/or inhabiting Martínez’s silences 
otherwise possible? Similarly, we could ask, what are the structures of power such that 
the account of silence that transpires through Nyad’s testimony frames it exclusively as 
something that needs to be overcome, its complexity and “emotional significance” thus 
overlooked? My aim in the next two chapters is to make visible the mechanisms that 
make invisible the fecundity, complexity, and polyvocality of the phenomenon of 
silence—what I call “deep silence”—within a colonial context.  
The case for deep silence is, at least in part, a case for the limits of voice as a 
liberatory concept. Informed by Martínez’s experience (but also reminiscent of the 
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Ute/Paiute’s testimony), in chapter 2, I focus on silence and sexual violation to break 
open the polyvocality of silence. I draw from recent decolonial literature to problematize 
the uncritical appeal to voice as emancipatory, an appeal that continues to guide much of 
feminist theorizing reaching well beyond academia. (It suffices to think of the 2017 
public outcry about racial and sexual violence, in which the #MeToo and #TimesUp 
campaigns are loud examples of movements that express the necessity to “speak up” 
about and “break the culture of silence” surrounding one’s own experience of racialized, 
sexualized, and gendered violence).3 By bringing into dialogue Jacques Derrida with 
decolonial insights from the modern/colonial research project (MC henceforth), I seek to 
make explicit the ways in which the onto-epistemology reproduced by coloniality is, in 
fact, a racialized metaphysics of presence within which logos and the field of presence 
are exclusive domains of the modern/colonial subject. Thus situated, I suggest that 
uncritical appeals to “speak up” or “come to voice” foreclose questions about the 
normativity of voice, ultimately upholding modern categories of thought, sensing, and 
being (logocentrism, to be precise) that reify the oppressive colonial apparatus they seek 
to resist. 
In chapter 3, I develop and problematize what I call the “coloniality of silence,” 
i.e., operations of power that eviscerate deep silences of their depth and complexity, 
flattening them to a transparent, mono-dimensional phenomenon indexing epistemic non-
sense and ontological absence—what Frantz Fanon calls the “zone of non-being” (Fanon 
2008, xii). This analytical tool, I argue, not only brings to light the tendency of 
modern/colonial epistemic and ontological frameworks to skate over what Ofelia Schutte 
calls the “incommensurability” of sense, thinking, and being—a move that, in turn, 
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renders invisible non-dominant cultures by assimilating them into familiar meanings. 
“The coloniality of silence” also reveals that the evisceration of silence is not accidental 
to coloniality. Rather, this historical formation of coloniality relies upon and actively 
promotes the evisceration of the depth and polyvocality of silence for its perpetration and 
legitimization—an operation of flattening that is actively concealed through the 
naturalization of epistemic and ontological inferiority. Much, in fact, hinges upon the 
preservation of the colonial historical fiction of linear chronology and transparency; the 
apprehension of the complexity, fecundity, and multiplicity of deep silence and its being 
an inherent component of sense, thinking, and being would undermine the epistemic, 
ontological, and temporal presuppositions of coloniality. 
 
NOTES
1 American writer, historian, and activist Rebecca Solnit’s latest book, The Mother of All 
Questions, is a prime example of how the phenomenon of silence is conceived and 
treated in mainstream white feminist circles. The author discusses how feminists have 
long used silence as a metaphor for oppression and makes the case for how liberation is 
“always in part a storytelling process: breaking stories, breaking silences, making new 
stories. A free person tells her own story. A valued person lives in a society in which her 
story has a place” (Solnit 2017, 15). Silence, she claims, is what condemns “people to 
suffer without recourse, what allows hypocrisies and lies to grow and flourish, crimes to 
go unpunished. If our voices are essential aspects of our humanity, to be rendered 
voiceless is to be dehumanized or excluded from one’s humanity” (18). As I 
acknowledge in the body of the article, although there are oppressive forms of silencing, 
the equation of silence as oppression and voice or storytelling as emancipation forecloses 
critical analyses of the violence entailed by the normativity of voice. 
2 On this point, and for reflections on the feminist politics of voice that resonate with my 
own, see Wendy Brown, “In the ‘Folds of Our Own Discourse’” (1996) and Valerie 
Hazel, “Disjointed Articulations” (1994). Given the spatial constraints of this chapter, I 
cannot thoroughly engage with critiques of ableist and normative modes of 
communication such as (narrow forms of) voice put forth by disability studies. A fruitful 
starting point for those engagements is Christine Ashby’s “Whose ‘Voice’ Is It 
Anyway?,” in which she takes up the difficult challenge of “giving voice” to those 
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individuals who experience disability—in her case, those who do not use speech as the 
primary mode of expression—while also calling into question narrow conceptualizations 
of voice. “Ensur[ing] a space within a critical, qualitative framework for the inclusion of 
‘voices’ that do not speak” entailed problematizing the use of the term “voice,” which, as 
she observes, too often goes unchallenged, as well as the assumptions behind the desire to 
give voice. Ashby recognizes the importance of silence as a means for the individual to 
“give voice to his experience and provide an opportunity to talk back to the technologies 
of power that oppress. … perhaps not speaking, or not typing, is also a way to subvert 
systems of power that limit and marginalize” (Ashby 2011).  
3 “Me Too” was founded in 2006 by Tarana Burke as a MySpace page to promote 
conversations and build community among women of color who were survivors. The 
movement sought to address the dearth of resources for survivors of sexual violence. 
While the public outcry may help direct attention to and put pressure on the state to 
restructure, e.g., budgets and allocation of resources, “speaking up” alone is not sufficient 
for radical change. Moreover, the movement sought to speak to the needs of a broader 
spectrum of survivors, including those traditionally underrepresented and most affected 
like queers, trans, women of color, and people with disabilities. 
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II. ON THE EMANCIPATORY LIMITS OF VOICE  
 
 
Initially informed by Derrida’s powerful critique of “voice” as the appeal of a 
metaphysics of presence (Derrida 2010; 2016) and subsequently by postcolonial and 
decolonial critiques of modernity, over the past three decades scholars have challenged 
the logocentrism of the West, bringing attention to the dangers of advancing liberatory 
discourses not rooted in and attentive to the cultural specificity of the phenomenon one 
strives to account for. Building on the Subaltern Studies Group, scholars like Trinh T. 
Minh-ha, Gayatri Spivak, Cheryl Glenn, and Krista Ratcliffe have suggested that the role 
of academic left scholars (but also of those who hold power and public access to voice) is 
to “learn to listen and to decode subaltern inscriptions” (Carrillo Rowe and Malhotra 
2013, 8; see Trinh 1989; Spivak 1999; Glenn 2004; and Ratcliffe 2006). To this end, 
while they acknowledge that silence “has been a tool of marginalization and exclusion,” 
the contributors to Silence, Feminism, Power, for instance, strive to “free silence from 
domination’s grip” (Keating 2013, 32, 33), reclaiming it as a powerful site of resistance 
that allows “the freedom of not having to exist constantly in reaction to what is said” 
(Carrillo Rowe and Malhotra 2013, 2).1  
Steeped in this tradition, in this chapter, I strive to make visible and problematize 
the assumption operative within much of liberal discourse that voice (modern/colonial 
logos broadly construed) is key to emancipation, alerting us to the emancipatory limits of 
voice and shifting the conversation toward deep silence. Specifically, I show how appeals 
to dialogical communication reify, by uncritically deploying logocentric tools such as 
“voice” as means of liberation, oppressive colonial power structures that have predicated 
the exclusion and oppression of those same people who seek emancipation through voice. 
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I contend that “voice”—when appealed to and deployed abstractly and uncritically—
remains a vehicle of Eurocentric colonization because, within a colonial context, voice—
and, in turn, presence/being—is limited to the voice of the modern/colonial subject of 
modernity. Taking for granted the normativity of voice (which is the implication of 
abstract appeals to voice) has the pernicious effect of making invisible signifying 
practices that operate otherwise than coloniality.  
The first step toward understanding the ways in which uncritical appeals to voice 
reify colonial structures is to take a step back—or, better yet, outward—to contextualize 
the current critique of voice within the bounds of the specific historical formation of 
coloniality. Differently from “colonialism,” which refers to political and economic 
relations among nations, “coloniality” indexes patterns of power and epistemic structures 
that outlive colonialism and are maintained alive through media, cultural performances, 
common sense, etc. To use Nelson Maldonado-Torres’s words, “coloniality and 
decoloniality refer to the logic, metaphysics, ontology, and matrix of power created by 
the massive processes of colonization and decolonization” (2016, 10).2 Importantly, 
while it is true that coloniality emerged from colonialism, it did not emerge from any 
given colonial relation; “coloniality emerges in a particular socio-historical setting, that 
of the discovery [sic] and conquest of the Americas” (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 243). 
Pivotal to coloniality is the joint operation of the two axes of power, the “coloniality of 
power” and “modernity,” structuring and sustaining what Aníbal Quijano calls the 
“Eurocentered capitalist modern/colonial world power” (2000, 218). Attending to these 
patterns of power makes visible the imbrication of coloniality and voice, more precisely, 
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how coloniality undermines the conditions of possibility of emancipatory dialogues, 
revealing as naïve any abstract appeal to voice as liberatory.3 
1. The Coloniality of Voice 
In his seminal essay “Coloniality of Power and Eurocentrism in Latin America” 
(2000), Aníbal Quijano explains that the axis of the “coloniality of power” refers to that 
“specific basic element of the new pattern of world power that was based on the idea of 
‘race’ and in the ‘racial’ social classification of world population” (218). The invention 
and deployment of the category of “race” from the sixteenth century onward are pivotal 
in reframing the discourse surrounding the inferiority of the non-European “other” from 
one tied to conquest, war, and domination to one that casts inferiority as natural and 
ahistorical. Thus presented, “race” and racial discourse come to legitimize the domination 
of the “Indians,” “Blacks,” and “Mestizos” by the “Spanish” and “Portuguese” (all of 
which are newly produced social historical identities) on natural grounds (216). Take the 
distribution of work, for instance. In the Eurocentered, capitalist modern/colonial world 
system, work distribution followed racial lines, distinguishing between “salaried, 
independent peasants, independent merchants, and slaves and serfs” (Quijano 2007, 171) 
and reserving waged labor exclusively for white Europeans. Analogously, racial 
discriminations regulated the ascription of gendered identities, distinguishing between 
“women” and “females” and extending the status of women so described in the West only 
to white women, while understanding colonized females “to be animals … in the deep 
sense of ‘without gender,’ sexually marked as female, but without the characteristics of 
femininity” (Lugones 2007, 202–03). As María Lugones points out, even when colonized 
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females were turned from animals into similes of bourgeois white women, “there was no 
extension of the status of white women to colonized women” (203). 
The second axis of power, “modernity,” refers to the systematic elaboration, 
carried out by modern, Western Europe, of a new intersubjective universe based on a new 
knowledge perspective compatible with the cognitive needs of capitalism (Quijano 2000, 
221). This knowledge perspective is labeled as “rational” and conforms to strict epistemic 
criteria such as neutrality, objective validity, and transparency (Collins 2000, 274). The 
cognitive needs of capitalism include the carving up, quantifying, and measuring of what 
is knowable so as to exert control over resources, others, and reality for the sake of 
commerce and exchange. Although Eurocentered, this way of knowing was/is imposed 
upon the capitalist world as the only valid rationality and as emblematic of the progress 
of modernity.4 
Importantly, the axes of power instituted through and instituting of “coloniality” 
not only outlive formal colonialism, remaining integrated in the succeeding social orders, 
but also are constitutive of modern identity, of the modern ethos, which includes ways of 
knowing, thinking, perceiving, imagining, and loving—in sum, sensibilities vis-à-vis the 
world. In “Purity, Impurity, and Separation,” Lugones describes the modern/colonial 
subject as the outcome of an abstraction from the ambiguity and multiplicity constitutive 
of concrete subjects and realities aimed at exerting control and imparting order upon the 
mestizaje of being and living. That is, this modern/colonial subject is the product of and 
deploys a logic of purity that prunes, eliminates, forbids, and purges; it frames complex 
realities in the fictional terms of a unified reality and a unified subject that can be split-
separated, that is “internally separable, divisible into what makes it one and the 
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remainder” (Lugones 2003, 128). This modern subject, which is constituted over and 
against what she calls “impure” or “thick” subjects that perceive richly and cannot be 
split-separated, is one-dimensional and occupies an ahistorical and acultural “vantage 
point from which unified wholes, totalities, can be captured” (128). Not surprisingly, 
internally split-separated into “sense/emotion/reason,” “reason, including its normative 
aspect, is the unified subject” (129). 
Thinking through voice in light of coloniality raises important questions about the 
normativity of voice that would otherwise be foreclosed. In fact, coloniality is such that 
the rejoinder to Spivak’s infamous question, “can the subaltern speak?” (1999), is no: 
Within a colonial context, “speech” requires conformity to Eurocentric standards that 
exclude subaltern communicative practices and being. (Note that this no should not be 
taken to suggest—as critics too often have taken it to indicate—a communicative or 
political paralysis. Rather, the no points to a fundamental paradox at the heart of 
intelligibility. As we will see in what follows, the paradox arises when the desideratum of 
intelligibility is epistemic transparency.) The demand to speak places the subaltern in an 
untenable position. Were the subaltern to speak in their native languages, their speech 
(and their demands for normative treatment) would lack uptake. But were they to speak 
in a way that was intelligible to the modern/colonial subject, they would subscribe to and 
be rewritten by a conceptual and linguistic framework that inscribes their culture, 
language, and being as inferior. As Maldonado-Torres puts it, they would deploy a 
framework that had “already been shaped by understandings of the world as a battel field 
[sic] in which [the colonized] are permanently vanquished” (2007, 249). Moreover, by 
expressing themselves through colonial frames of reference, they would also sacrifice 
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their cultural specificity.5 In Woman, Native, Other, Trinh T. Minh-ha claims that this 
constitutes a “double mischief”: 
unspoken and unable to speak, woman in exile with herself. Stolen language will 
always remain that other’s language. Say it obliquely, use trickery, cheat, or fake, 
for if I tell you now what I would like to hear myself tell you, I will miss it. 
Words thoroughly invested with realities that turn out to be not-quite-not-yet-
mines are radically deceptive. Whenever I try my best to say, I never fail to utter 
the wrong words; I weasel, telling you “hen” when I mean something close to 
“duck.” (1989, 20) 
 
Thus, by deploying the language of the modern/colonial subject, subalterns would cease 
being subalterns because the dominant group would not be hearing the subaltern in its 
idiosyncrasies, but, rather, a mere reflection of its own message and image. “Stolen 
language will always remain that other’s language.”6 Ofelia Schutte explains this paradox 
thusly:  
delimiting my capacity to speak in my culturally differentiated voice will have an 
effect on what I say in response…What my interlocutor recognizes is not what I 
would have liked—an encouragement to communicate insights I offer from a 
standpoint of cultural difference—but only my ability to enter a standard Anglo-
American speaking position, a position that exists in negotiated tension with my 
culturally differentiated, reflexive sense of self. (1998, 60) 
 
To be clear—attending to the joint operations of these axes of power reveals—as 
the guiding logic of coloniality—an epistemic production that, by demanding conformity 
to purportedly universal (but in fact modern/colonial) epistemic standards, relies upon 
and produces at least a double erasure. First, it erases the colonized’s communicative 
practices and knowledge-validation processes, which come to be regarded either as 
smothered or primitive and lacking the sophistication, clarity, and accuracy necessary to 
produce knowledge. As Spivak’s paradox highlights, coloniality is such that to be heard 
entails expressing oneself in a manner that conforms to the epistemic model of the 
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Eurocentered, capitalist modern/colonial world power, that is, in a rational and 
dispassionate manner; it requires being a split-separated subject who does not perceive 
richly. The normative weight of testimonial conformity to modern/colonial standards thus 
often entails “testimonial smothering,” an instance of epistemic injustice that Kristie 
Dotson defines as the “truncation of one’s testimony in order to ensure that the testimony 
contains only content for which one’s audience demonstrates testimonial competence” 
(2011, 244). As women of color feminists have argued, then, not only is uptake 
differentially distributed across gender, ethnic, and racial lines resulting in “testimonial 
quieting,” an instance of epistemic harm occurring when an audience fails to identify a 
speaker as a knower (Dotson 2011, 242);7 peoples whose expressive means do not 
conform to purportedly universal epistemic criteria are perceived by the colonizers “in 
speaking their tongues as doing less than being able to express knowledge” (Veronelli 
2015, 113). This, Gabriela Veronelli points out, is what happened to Indigenous peoples 
of the Americans. But other non-Western languages like those of Taoism and Zen that are 
“perfectly clear but rife with paradox” similarly do not qualify, to a modern/colonial ear, 
as persuasive or correct, for “paradox is ‘illogical’ and ‘nonsensical’ to many Westerns” 
(Trinh 1989, 16). Broadly, expressive modes that, analogously to these, do not “prune, 
eliminate, forbid, purge, purify” (Trinh 1989, 17) are regarded as “simple 
communication,” a form of communication that conveys more than denotative meaning, 
but less than dialogical rational communication, and that, as such, is taken to be an 
inherently less valuable form of expressivity than Eurocentric languages (Veronelli 2015, 
118–19).8 As Lugones puts it, “[a] subject who in its multiplicity perceives, understands, 
grasps its worlds as multiple sensuously, passionately as well as rationally without the 
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splitting separation between sense/emotion/reason lacks the unidimensionality and the 
simplicity required to occupy the privilege vantage point” offered by, in this case, the 
Eurocentered locus of enunciation (2003, 129). 
The distortion and exclusion from what counts as proper communication, 
knowledge, and, more broadly, the subject position of nonnormatively modern/colonial 
experiences has characterized the lives of U.S. Black women, who have relied on 
alternative expressive forms like music, literature, and daily conversations as sites to 
develop self-definitions as well as produce and validate knowledge (Collins 2000, 270; 
see also Jones 1991; Davis 1999;  and Lordi 2013). Take, for instance, the differential 
treatment received by Anita Hill’s testimony compared to that of Christine Blasey-Ford, 
or the erasure of the 2006 founder of “Me Too” Tarana Burke from the #MeToo 
movement when it first took off over a decade later in 2017. As Burke observes in a 2018 
Vibe interview with J’na Jefferson, women of color—who, statistically, experience higher 
rates of rape and sexual assault than white women—are not only less likely to report, but 
their stories have not been granted nearly as much public attention as the testimonies of 
white women.9 Reflecting on her own experience with “Me Too,” Burke asks, “Why isn’t 
it valid when we talk about it?,” thereby raising questions about 1) how race affects the 
epistemic authority of the survivor (but also of who qualifies as a survivor in the first 
place), and 2) of the extent to which credibility and correctness of an utterance is afforded 
by demanding conformity to grammatical and syntactic rules, key words, or technical 
terms. In this vein, Burke asks, “Is [“Me Too”] only valid if CNN talks about it?” 
(Jefferson and Burke 2018).10    
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But the two axes perform a second (perhaps more insidious) erasure: this 
epistemic production conceals its own structural complicity in the reification of a system 
that casts the “other” as inferior. The move whereby the in-fact-European epistemic 
standards/knowledge-validation processes that norm what counts as knowledge and 
language is presented as universal naturalizes racialized differences, making the 
processes that produce these differences, that is, coloniality, invisible. Because the 
colonized deploy communicative practices that do not conform to the putatively universal 
model of rational expression, they are perceived as naturally inferior. In turn, such a 
naturalization makes invisible the mechanisms that produce the colonized as inferior in 
the first place. As this logic goes, if Martínez did not fight back or verbally object to his 
aggression or the Ute/Paiute tribes remain silent about aspects central to their culture, it 
must be because, by virtue of their natural inferiority, they lack the ability to provide 
persuasive argumentation or perform norms of masculinity that required that he’d stand 
up for himself. The outcome of this logic is that the difference produced by the 
colonizing logic itself is concealed by appeals to natural difference or, to be precise, to 
the natural inferiority of the racialized other.  
Given the seeming impossibility of making sense of subaltern experiences without 
assimilating or distorting their differences into familiar meanings, how are we to 
approach these differences? Can these differences be addressed by engaging in dialogical 
exchanges that seek to minimize the incommensurability by providing as much meaning 
as possible into the plus or translatable side of the exchange? Or are these communicative 
barriers the outcome of historically and geographically specific patterns of power that 
displace the racialized and colonized “other” from the subject position and locus of 
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enunciation? And if the latter, is addressing the epistemic disauthorization of non-
modern/colonial subjects sufficient to address the harms entailed in the normativity of 
voice or should we attend to the processes whereby cross-cultural silences are dismissed 
as nonsense? 
Decolonial thinker Gabriela Veronelli suggests the latter, arguing that voice and, 
more broadly, dialogical exchanges play into what she calls “the coloniality of language 
and speech” (CLS henceforth) (Veronelli 2016, 408). Veronelli defines CLS as the 
process of racialization of the colonized as communicative agents that began in the 
sixteenth century, whereby the colonized are reduced to nonhuman status and their 
language and ways of knowing are dismissed as expressions of their natural inferiority. 
By presenting the colonized as incapable of expressing themselves rationally, their 
putative inferiority is naturalized discursively (409). Thus, CLS forecloses the possibility 
of any dialogical relationship between colonized and colonizers (but also between 
colonized subjects) by erecting what are perceived as “natural barriers” to intelligibility 
and communication;11 it vacates the colonized’s speech of the possibility of being heard 
by making the colonized’s modalities of communication and existence invisible to the 
colonizers. It is in this sense that, as Veronelli argues, CLS is more than the colonization 
of a language as a system of meaning, but a “process of dehumanization through 
racialization at the level of communication” (2016, 408). 
In light of these considerations, we begin to see how the two axes of “coloniality” 
and “modernity” work in unison within CLS to discursively dehumanize the colonized 
and racialized “other,” ultimately undermining the conditions of possibility for 
emancipatory exchanges. On the one hand, “modernity” naturalizes the colonial 
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difference by upholding putatively universal and rational epistemic standards, a move 
that casts all those who do not conform to those criteria as naturally inferior or incapable 
of rational and clear linguistic communication. On the other hand, “coloniality” 
distributes this natural epistemic inferiority along racial lines; those who are 
epistemically inferior (putatively) by nature are those who are racialized as other. The 
outcome is that the epistemic criteria upheld by “modernity” are such that the natural 
inferiority of the non-European, racialized “other” is constantly reified through its own 
conceptual and linguistic schemas, which include reason, dialogical communication, and 
voice—in sum, modern/colonial logos.  
Note that the claim that coloniality undermines the conditions of possibility of 
dialogical emancipation should not be taken to suggest that the colonized do not have a 
“voice” or cannot speak. Such an understanding would play into the same binary and 
totalizing logic this dissertation seeks to destabilize. The colonized do have a “voice” and 
appeal to knowledge-validation processes, but to hear these “voices” and epistemic 
processes one needs to attune oneself to the echoes reverberating through and fissuring 
the putative mere silences to which they are relegated by colonial logic. Once allowed to 
reverberate, the voices reveal the thread of silences with which they are imbricated, the 
affective and somatic meanings they disclose. Take the institutionalized sexual violation 
of black women under conditions of segregation, for instance. As Linda Martín Alcoff 
points out, “even if there is an official silence in the majority community concerning a 
given issue … this does not mean the silence is total;” black communities knew what 
happened even before the NAACP chapters began taking cases to the courts (2018, 38). 
“Even if these were not echoable in dominant discursive practices,” the necessity for 
 
  61 
safety and knowledge-sharing led to the development of methods of communication not 
repressed by Eurocentered norms (38). Rather, thinking through questions of voice in the 
context of coloniality reveals that, while coloniality displaces the colonized from the 
subject position by producing them as incapable of intelligible expression, a simple 
appeal to voice as emancipatory does not suffice; within a colonial context, the voice that 
can be/is heard by the majority community is normed by coloniality and, thus, is 
exclusively the voice of the modern/colonial subject (that is, the voice that conforms to 
modern/colonial criteria). This speech/voice, in fact, is the putatively universal voice of 
reason, a voice that is taken to be not tainted by cultural or embodied markers like 
sensuality, affectivity, race, gender, and, more broadly, culture. As María Lugones 
explains, akin to his voice, the subject of modern/colonial enunciation is “transparent” 
and “pure,” i.e., “abstract, without particularity,” and “outside historicity and 
concreteness” (2003, 128, order rearranged). The abstract imperative to speak up—the 
imperative according to which speaking up is the way to address oppression and violence 
irrespective of the nuances of a given, concrete situation—thus skates over the important 
question of whose voice norms that imperative.12 Put differently, uncritical appeals to 
voice do not allow the critical distance (which, not so paradoxically, can actually be 
obtained by remaining grounded in concrete lived experiences of those who experience 
silences) necessary to question the (modern/colonial) world in which language and 
naming are power, and “voice” a colonial tool. Quite the contrary—they play into 
existing power structures by deploying tools, like language, naming, and voice, that 
continue to be normed by and effect the norming of coloniality, giving voice exclusively 
to the modern, split-separated, and rational lover of purity. Uncritical appeals to voice 
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thus perpetrate the making invisible non-Western “voices”: because the voices that can 
be/are heard are those that conform to the epistemic norms of coloniality, those that do 
not conform are not recognized as communicative, rational subjects and are dismissed as 
nonexistent and nonsensical. As Lugones reminds us, “[a]s thick, [colonized subjects who 
do not conform to the norms of modernity] are marginalized through erasure, their voices 
nonsensical” (2003, 140).  
By now, the MC affirmation, echoed by Veronelli, that “there is no way out of 
coloniality from within modern categories of thought” should have accrued weight and 
clarity (Veronelli 2016, 405). As the above remarks suggest, the dire implications of 
these two erasures are not just epistemological, but ontological; they entail a world, a 
metaphysics, in which the only resisting subjects and modes of resistance that are 
recognized as existing, as sensical, are those normed by coloniality. In other words, the 
implications of the concealed normativity of voice are that those who are not heard/seen 
protesting—those who do not resist in a manner consonant with the standards prescribed 
by coloniality—risk being dismissed as either invalid or as facilitating their own 
oppression, as Martínez’s narrative reminds us. In this sense, coloniality produces an 
ontology that strives to eliminate any “residue” of resistance: along with non-Western 
“voices,” non-Western modes of insubordination, sense-making, and, as the following 
discussion will show, being, are also erased; the modes of insubordination, sense-making, 
and being made available are those sanctioned by colonial logic, modes that, even in their 
insubordination, play into coloniality by appealing to its concepts, structures, and logic. 
In what follows, I unpack this last claim, suggesting that the abstract and 
uncritical appeal to voice is complicit in the reproduction and reification of colonizing 
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epistemic and ontological norms—what I call a racialized metaphysics of presence—that 
make visible only modes of existence that are normed by coloniality, ultimately 
preemptively foreclosing ways of reading and writing reality that uphold its complexity 
and ambiguity, that make sense beyond the presence/t of modern/colonial consciousness. 
2. A Racialized Metaphysics of Presence 
The second step toward understanding the ways uncritical appeals to voice reify 
colonial structures is by grappling with the ontological implications of coloniality. 
Although the theories discussed thus far focus predominantly on the epistemic 
ramifications of coloniality, this historical formation affects the “general understanding 
of being” (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 242). First, the casting of colonized people as lacking 
rationality has the effect of depriving them, in Frantz Fanon’s words, of “ontological 
resistance,” that is, of being. We saw this implication operative in the preceding 
discussion of CLS, especially in the discursive dehumanization of the colonial other 
through racialization. But this first ontological erasure relies on a second, conceptual one. 
The modern/colonial world power produces a racialized, dualistic conceptual framework 
or, more precisely, a metaphysics that limits “the sense of being within the field of 
presence” (Derrida 2016, 24)—what Derrida calls a metaphysics of presence—whereby 
this field of presence appears as the exclusive domain of the modern/colonial subject. In 
this sense, I speak of a racialized metaphysics of presence. As we will see, this racialized 
metaphysics of presence of being versus nonbeing, sense versus non-sense, light versus 
darkness, strives to reduce the multiplicity, complexity, and ambiguity of (the) being (of 
subjects who do not conform to modern/colonial standards) to nonbeing. Not only, then, 
are the colonized made invisible, reduced to nothingness through an exclusion from 
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presence, but their being is conceived through a framework inadequate to express their 
complexity and ambiguity. 
Take the first ontological implication of the modern/colonial world power that 
“the absent of rationality is articulated in modernity with the idea of the absence of Being 
in others” (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 252–53). In “The Coloniality of Being,” Nelson 
Maldonado-Torres argues that the Cartesian ego cogito and its instrumental rationality 
operate according to an attitude of permanent suspicion—what he calls the “racist/ 
imperial Manichean misanthropic skepticism” (2007, 245)—regarding the humanity of 
colonized and racialized “others,” which can be summarized thus: “‘I think (others do not 
think, or do not think properly), therefore I am (others are-not, lack being, should not 
exist or are dispensable)’” (252). The tacit assumption guiding this logic marks the 
colonial and racial subjects as dispensable; it puts them under the murderous and rapist 
sight of the modern/colonial ego cogito. 
Fanon’s reflections in Black Skin, White Masks and Gloria Anzaldúa’s testimony 
in Borderlands/La Frontera are a powerful testament to this insight. Because the colonial 
world is structured by colonial conceptual and linguistic frameworks grounded in 
misanthropic skepticism—here it suffices to think of Fanon’s powerful description of his 
(linguistic) encounter with the young white boy’s shout, “Look a Negro!”—“in the eyes 
of the white man … the black man [sic] has no ontological resistance” (Fanon 2008, 90, 
order rearranged). Coloniality is such that the colonized appears, in the eyes of the 
dominant group, not as a subject, that is, someone who has a culture, history, and 
language, but as nothingness. As Anzaldúa’s narrative conveys, when interpreted through 
colonial schemas, the complex, ambiguous, and paradoxical dimensions of her being are 
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taken to be an indication of her inferiority, of her non-sense. “I have so internalized the 
borderlands conflict that sometimes I feel like one cancels out the other and we are zero, 
nothing, no one. A veces no soy nada ni nada” (B 85), she recounts. In a colonial context, 
ontology collapses into Manicheanism whereby the colonized are reduced to the dark side 
of the light-dark equation; they are reduced to “a zone of non-being, a sterile and arid 
region, an incline stripped bare of every essential from which a genuine new departure 
can emerge” (Fanon 2008, xii). 
This Manichean ontology, however, does more than relegate the damné to the 
dark side of the dichotomy; it deprives the colonized of a (nondualistic and 
nonlogocentric) “metaphysics” of their own capable of accommodating the complexity of 
(their) being (Fanon 2008, 90).13 Given the colonial episteme at his disposal, Fanon 
painfully realizes that the answer to the question, “Where do I fit in?” (93), is that he does 
not fit in. He has arrived “too late!,” so to speak, in a world that chains him, through 
coloniality and the working of the two axes of power, to pre-existing images, concepts, 
and significations that have been fabricated without him and that relegate him to 
nothingness. (I will return to Fanon’s remarks about lateness in chapter 5. As we will see, 
his “lateness” is the symptom of what scholars call the coloniality of time.) As the 
anguish permeating the chapter titled “The Lived Experience of the Black Man” suggests, 
Fanon’s existential struggle to make sense of his being through the colonial episteme 
leads him to one untenable position after another, ultimately culminating in a cry (an 
affective response that should not be overlooked as it is crucial to what I call an aesthesis 
of deep silence). Similarly, we witness Anzaldúa struggle with conceptual and linguistic 
frameworks too narrow and transparent to make sense of the opaque, complex, 
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ambiguous dimensions of her being, which are thus taken to be an indication of her 
inferiority, of her non-sense. In this sense, to use Maldonado-Torres’s words, coloniality 
is a “metaphysical catastrophe” (2016, 11–16). But how is this metaphysical catastrophe 
possible? 
As previously noted, the epistemic criteria upheld by sixteenth-century Europe 
served the cognitive needs of capitalism in which knowledge had to be conducive to the 
carving up, quantifying, and measuring of (external) reality for the sake of commerce and 
exchange. That is, the sixteenth century witnessed the proliferation of explicit discourses 
on method for the attainment of knowledge that resulted in not only the production of 
“objective,” “universal,” “dispassionate” knowledge, but also the sedimentation of 
ontological assumptions about what being should be like such that it could be known 
through the above-mentioned method. “What do I know?” and “what is there?” In the 
context of a modern/colonial world system, rather than calling for an examination of the 
idea of knowing itself, these questions are taken to be elucidations of the things that we 
know or can know, which is to say as questions of cognition wherein the only hesitation 
lies in how to “call entities—space, knowledge—which are taken as evident in 
themselves” (VI 128). 
As it turned out, the being that could be known through these epistemic criteria is 
limited to the field of presence. As Derrida suggests (following Heidegger) in Ousia and 
Grammē, Western metaphysics treats “the meaning of Being as parousia or ousia, which 
signifies, in ontologico-temporal terms, ‘presence’ (Anwesenheit)” (1982, 31). This 
means that it grounds determinations of the meaning of being in that which is—a move 
that produces, at once, being as “what is present,” as immediate self-presence or “pure 
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auto-affection” (Derrida 2016, 106) over and against nonbeing, which comes to be 
understood as “what is not present,” “not-there,” in sum, what cannot be known through 
immediate presence to consciousness. 
Not to be overlooked is the crucial role that voice plays in delineating the field of 
presence: logos, Derrida tells us, is assumed to be immediately present to consciousness 
only through voice because voice—or, as he specifies in Voice and Phenomenon, internal 
monologue (Derrida 2010, 35–37)—is (presumably) heard without external mediation. 
The West’s logocentrism is the mark of a metaphysics of presence that understands 
speech and voice as the immediate conduit of (the) meaning (of being). The ontological 
implication of the axis of “modernity,” then, is the reification of a Parmenidean—or, 
should I say, Manichean—ontology of being and nonbeing, presence and absence, light 
and darkness, whereby speech and voice are the mark of purity, presence, transparency, 
and the fullness of being, whereas its other, silence, is the mark of impurity, absence, and 
lack of being. 
The work done in this chapter, however, should alert us against taking concepts 
like “voice” abstractly and toward the necessity of attending to the power differentials at 
play when dealing with questions of coloniality and ontology, bringing to bear 
considerations about the differential and racialized distribution of being onto ones about 
the metaphysics of presence. Maldonado-Torres’s and Fanon’s remarks indicate that the 
field of presence is demarcated by the consciousness or, more precisely, the voice of the 
colonizer. Within a colonial context, the “voice” that stands for presence is not just any 
voice; the only voice that has uptake and is recognized as Language is that of the 
modern/colonial subject—a speech act uttered by a subject putatively unmarked by 
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cultural, ethnic, gendered and racialized differentials and that, thus, conforms to the 
(transparent) cognitive needs of capitalism. The exclusion of the colonized’s 
communicative functions as language, then, does not merely entail the erasure of non-
modern/colonial modes of communication, but also the relegation of racialized 
bodies/being to absence. In this sense, the metaphysics of presence is a racialized 
metaphysics of presence whereby the field of presence is the exclusive domain of the 
colonizer. 
In light of these considerations, I hear, in the “cries of those whose humanity is 
being denied” (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 257), the reminder to call into question not only 
the colonizing power of voice permeating uncritical appeals to “speak up!,” but also a 
world in which naming and language are power. That is, envisioning decolonial avenues 
of feminist insubordination cannot stop at questioning the conditions of possibility of 
reception of subaltern voices; it must venture beyond voice, recuperating the generative 
power of deep silence. Importantly, I contend, the latter requires displacing the 
mechanisms that reduce the complexity, polyvocality, and fecundity of deep silence to 
oppressive silencing, to epistemic and ontological absence, and uphold deep silence as a 
generative source of radical meaning-making, of a sense and a metaphysics that 
accommodate the mestizaje and complexity of (the) being (of the colonized). In this vein, 
it is time to repropose the questions raised at the outset of this chapter: Why is Martínez’s 
silent response read as an absence of sorts? What are the structures and motives such that 
silence is immediately perceived and conceived as silencing? There are instances of 
silence that are, in fact, oppressive, but why can’t we find, within a colonial matrix, a 
way to think or live silence otherwise than as oppression? And what does this 
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1 It should be noted that, as Carrillo Rowe and Malhotra point out, although the works of 
Glenn and Ratcliffe “productively bring silence more fully into focus by challenging the 
epistemological conditions of its annihilation, they remain bound to Western and 
modernist assumptions about completeness of understanding” (Carrillo Rowe and 
Malhotra 2013, 6). 
2 Later in the same paragraph, Maldonado-Torres says the following about decoloniality: 
“If coloniality refers to a logic, metaphysics, ontology, and a matrix of power that can 
continue existing after formal independence and desegregation, decoloniality refers to 
efforts at rehumanizing the world, to breaking hierarchies of difference that dehumanize 
subjects and communities and that destroy nature, and to the production of counter-
discourses, counter-knowledges, counter-creative acts, and counter-practices that seek to 
dismantle coloniality and to open up multiple other forms of being in the world” (2016, 
10).  
3 To this end, in “Resistant Silences,” Christine Keating works to recuperate silence from 
its equation with absence, distinguishing between enforced silences, which are oppressive 
and should be resisted, from three kinds of silences that serve as technologies of 
resistance: “silent refusal, silent witness, and deliberative silence” (Keating 2013, 25). In 
“The Silence in my Belly,” Malhotra speaks of her struggle with the “Western 
compulsion for voice and speaking … speak your position; take a stand; speak, speak, 
speak!”—a commitment that problematically equates agency with voice. Reflecting on 
her experience as a survivor of ovarian cancer, Malhotra reframes silence as a “space of 
unsettling possibilities” whereby words, ideals, thoughts, and explorations do not have to 
follow structured and linear regimens, but can hold “more than one thing at once” 
(Malhotra 2013, 220, 223, 225). She argues that agency is a pre-requisite for silence to be 
empowering, a space for possibilities—“silence without any agency is oppressive, 
particularly given the material conditions of the lives in question” (2013, 224). 
4 Note how “modernity” is the knowledge perspective at play in the universe inhabited by 
Rodolfo Kusch’s student discussed in the introduction of Indigenous and Popular 
Thinking in América. This is a universe grounded in the understanding of an external 
reality, the development of a knowledge or science to administer that understanding, and 
the modification of that reality through action (2010, 10). 
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5 Although Spivak takes issue with Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, her concern is 
applicable to feminism more broadly, raising difficult questions about the binary, 
Eurocentric logic regulating the dichotomy between “oppressive” silence/ing and 
“emancipatory” voice/speaking that remain endemic to feminist thinking writ large. In 
line with Spivak’s warning, in “On Ethnographic Refusal” (2007), Audra Simpson 
criticizes (cultural) difference “as the unit of analysis of cultural studies,” approaching it 
instead through “disaggregated narratives” (a method informed by those who are the 
“subject” of analysis), thus revealing that this differential approach has a bearing on the 
question of “voice” (of anthropological accounts, but also of the speaking subject). Her 
approach reveals a dissonance between the “voice” of the representations produced by 
anthropology (characterized by sovereignty) and that of indigenous peoples 
(characterized by refusal). 
6 Walter Mignolo presents this paradox in the following manner: to “assimilate means 
that you accept your inferiority and resign yourself to play the game that is not yours but 
that has been imposed upon you” (2013, 134). In “Choosing the Margins as a Space of 
Radical Openness,” bell hooks expresses a similar insight when, reflecting on the 
colonizing power of language, she depicts their relationship thusly: “[There is] no need to 
hear your voice, when I can talk about you better than you can speak about yourself. No 
need to hear your voice. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know your story. And 
then I will tell it back to you in a new way. Tell it back to you in such a way that it has 
become mine, my own. Re-writing you, I write myself anew. I am still author, authority. I 
am still [the] colonizer, the speaking subject, and you are now at the center of my talk” 
(1989, 22). 
7 As Sadie Graham points out in an October 2018 Broadly article, the ubiquity of 
reporting promoted by and characteristic of #MeToo fostered the belief that this 
journalistic form of reporting would “dismantle the oligo-patriarchy and save us all.” Yet 
many of the same problems persist. Not only “other kind of reporting—to human 
resources, to police—are so aggressively unsustainable for survivors” (Graham 2018); 
closer scrutiny shows how this platform amplifies the voices of white, middle-class 
women to the exclusion of others. 
8 As Patricia Hill Collins points out in Black Feminist Thought, knowledge claims must 
satisfy criteria upheld by the context in which they are presented. Ultimately, “because 
this enterprise is controlled by elite White men, knowledge validation processes reflect 
this group’s interests” (2000, 271). 
9 Although she does not present the concern in this manner, we can hear, in Lynn 
Phillips’s critique of the norms regulating sexual violence survivors in Flirting with 
Danger (2000), issues resonant with the coloniality of voice. In chapter 3, “What’s a 
Young Woman not to Think?” (33–78), Phillips identifies four sets of often contradictory 
discourses operative in shaping expectations regarding norms regulating heterosexual 
encounters. The third set of discourses deal with “what counts as victimization.” More  
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ought to be met in order to be recognized as a victim of sexual violence, a necessary 
condition to be effectively heard and granted respect and advocacy. The true victims, 
according to this discourse, “are those who were ‘clearly’ victimized through physical 
threat or violence, who did everything they could to avoid or prevent their victimization, 
and who used every socially acceptable channel available to them to cope, once their 
victimization occurred” (2000, 66). While the coloniality of voice challenges the 
normativity of voice, Phillips criticizes the normativity of (true) victim; while the norms 
at play in each are different, both “voice” and “(true) victim” presuppose a dichotomous 
thinking that privileges purity (the purity of the true victim and the purity of voice) at the 
expense of the complexity of lived experience. Moreover, the criteria that norm what 
counts as “voice” and “true victim” are constructed from the dominant perspective. What 
counts as a true victim, Phillips tells us, is determined in relation to what counts as 
normal or aberrant male behavior. This entails that “‘everyday violence,’ ‘little rapes’ 
[…], and insults to women’s hetero-relational autonomy—which the women who are 
targeted might consider street and workplace harassment, acquaintance rape, and 
battering—are cast as normal, because they are, unfortunately, so typical” (2000, 67). 
Lastly, “voice” and “(true) victim” reify criteria that disproportionally exclude the 
experiences of non-white women. As Patricia Hill Collins points out, the controlling 
images norming the appearance and lives of black women exclude them from the place of 
innocence; black women are understood as “Jezebels” (2000, 89) and, as such, 
promiscuous. The differential treatment of women (and men) of color in response to the 
current outbreak of sexual violence survivors’ testimonies attests to the weight of these 
controlling images in the current landscape. 
10 This is also true for vernacular expressions, which are not acquired through formal 
institutions and thereby are not “repressed by either grammatical rules, technical terms, or 
key words” (Trinh 1989, 16). 
11 As Veronelli argues, although these conditions can be granted at the abstract level (she 
criticizes MC exponents Enrique Dussel and Walter Mignolo for taking for granted the 
existence of these dialogical conditions of possibility by operating at the level of “ideas, 
of epistemic and political projects” (Veronelli 2016, 408)), these conditions of possibility 
do not necessarily exist at the level of the concrete lives and experiences of colonial 
subjects. Veronelli claims that the Modern/Colonial Research Program’s focus on “ideas, 
epistemic and political projects” (2016, 408) (rather than on lived experience) reiterates 
the colonial structures that it seeks to undermine; it does not take into account the ways in 
which coloniality structures the communicative conditions presupposed in the 
development of the aforementioned dialogical proposals putatively required for 
decolonization, ultimately missing the fact that the colonial difference remains invisible 
to the colonizer. With this insight, Veronelli departs from Modern/Colonial Research 
Program exponents Enrique Dussel and Walter Mignolo, for whom critical dialogues, 
more precisely, transmodernity (Dussell 1995, 138–39) and intracultural dialogue 
(Mignolo 2005, 160), are central to displace the West (and its monologism) from the 
enunciative center and begin decolonizing processes. While she agrees that there needs to 
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Mignolo’s appeals to dialogue; such approaches, which abstracts from the concrete lived 
experience of those who inhabit the colonial wound, assume that the communicative 
conditions of the colonial difference are ripe for decolonial communication. Veronelli 
claims that, when analyzed from the colonial wound, such conditions are not present; the 
CLS erects “natural” barriers to colonized-colonizer communication (but also to dialogue 
among colonized peoples), thus foreclosing projects and processes of decoloniality for 
which they would be the engine. For a fractured dialogical response to be heard both 
horizontally (by other colonized peoples) and vertically (by the colonized), the colonial 
difference needs first to become visible. 
12 At this juncture, it is telling to briefly turn to Linda Martín Alcoff’s Rape and 
Resistance, in which she puts forward a new epistemology of rape grounded in a more 
nuanced understanding of experiences of sexual violation as a way to reform and 
transform the condition of survivors’ reception. Although she deems survivors’ voices the 
critical force behind social revolution (on her account, speaking up is necessary, for 
example, insofar as it often is the catalyst for changing definitions, which affect the 
possibility of understanding and resisting sexual violation), Alcoff warns about the ways 
in which their testimonies echo in the public domain: testimonies are not only inscribed 
in frames that regulate the “criteria by which claims are interpreted and judged, what may 
be spoken of, what can come up for judgment itself” (Alcoff 2018, 10); they are also 
taken up in a domain in which the dominant understanding of sexual violation lacks 
complexity and nuance. To avoid the dismissal of “voices expressing complexity … as 
simply in denial, or as liars, or as deluded about their experience,” and “to make survivor 
speech as politically effective as possible,” it is paramount to complicate the 
understanding of the nature and dynamics of experiences of sexual violation to reshape 
the discourses norming the utterability and reception of such experiences (12, 17). In 
spite of her nuanced analysis of the challenges associated with public speaking, and her 
shift from individual responsibility to “speak up” toward transforming the discursive 
structures regulating uptake, Alcoff’s advocacy for voice as the privileged emancipatory 
tool prevents her from making visible the imbrication of coloniality and voice, or the 
ways in which the discursive formation of coloniality undermines the conditions of 
possibility of emancipatory dialogues, ultimately reiterating those discursive schemas that 
frame and dismiss subaltern resistances. 
13 In In-Between, Mariana Ortega argues that multiplicity and mestizaje are characteristic 
of all beings, not only of those who, because of their material, geopolitical existence, are 
forced to “travel” between cultural and linguistic norms and worlds of meaning (2016). 
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III. THE COLONIALITY OF SILENCE 
 
I concluded the preceding chapter by suggesting that a racialized metaphysics of 
presence is such that the colonizers’ is the only voice that is heard and stands for 
presence, which means that being (here limited to the field of presence) is the exclusive 
domain of the colonizer. Because the “voice,” “speech,” or “languages” of the colonized 
do not conform to Eurocentered, capitalist, modern/colonial criteria, they are not heard or 
recognized as such. This entails the reduction of the colonized’s voice to nonsense (or, as 
Veronelli calls it, “simple communication”) and their being to nothingness (or, as Fanon 
calls it, to a “zone of non-being”). In this shorter chapter, I first focus the implications 
that a racialized metaphysics of presence that excludes communicative forms and beings 
that are not normed by coloniality has for the phenomenon of silence itself. Specifically, I 
track the mechanisms that make invisible the polyvocality of silence. I call them the 
coloniality of silence. Then, I trace occurrences of silence that generate new meaning to 
open the phenomenon to tis fecund polyvocality.  
Within a colonial context, embodied responses that are not normed by colonial 
voice, like Martínez’s “Joto passivity” or the Ute/Paiute’s silences, fall through the cracks 
of a racialized metaphysics of presence; rather than being taken in their strangeness and 
allowed to displace usual expectations, what cannot be heard by and from the colonizer’s 
standpoint is marked as unintelligible and nonsensical, as nothingness—in sum, as mere 
or total silence. This is the logic outlined in the introduction of Part I and frequently at 
play in liberatory movements’ emancipatory efforts. But what does it mean for silence to 
be excluded from the domain of presence, being, and sense? This is also to ask, what 
does it mean, for sense, to be limited to (the) presence (of the colonizer’s voice)? 
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In “Cultural Alterity,” Ofelia Schutte takes up these questions by thinking through 
the paradox inherent to cross-cultural communication already discussed in relation to 
Spivak’s question, “can the subaltern speak?” Differently from Spivak, who deals with 
the untenable predicament of the subaltern from the standpoint of speech/voice, the 
lynchpin of Schutte’s argument is that there is a “lack of complete translatability” 
(Schutte 1998, 69, n. 4), a silence of sorts, between linguistic-cultural symbolic systems 
but, more broadly, within sense itself. As she puts it, “[t]here is always a residue of 
meaning that will not be reached in cross-cultural endeavors, a residue sufficiently 
important to point to what I shall refer to more abstractly as a principle of (cross-cultural) 
incommensurability” (56). Although modern/colonial epistemic theories of meaning may 
acknowledge this incommensurability and the fact that it may impede a perfect mapping 
of culturally different discourses, they regard incommensurability as “irrelevant to 
philosophical meaning and knowledge, and thus irrelevant to the operations of reason” 
(61). This is because they understand incommensurability quantitatively rather than 
qualitatively; incommensurability is approached as the residue of an equation whose 
balancing entails communicative transparency. Recall Lugones’s lover of purity, or the 
modern/colonial subject discussed in the preceding chapter. The modern/colonial subject 
operates under the assumption that the sense of a purportedly unified reality and subject 
can be grasped in its totality through reason alone, that is, by occupying an acultural and 
ahistorical vantage point. Lovers of purity split-separate reality, sanitizing it from 
anything “impure” like affective residues and (seeming) incompossibles. That is, they 
operate under the assumption that a culture’s, language’s, or subject’s meaning is 
perfectly available and accessible to another, that these meanings can be made available 
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through dialogical exchanges, and that the colonized can deploy colonial meanings and 
frameworks to express their experiences of oppression and resistance—assumptions that, 
as we have seen, make invisible the colonized’s communicative practices and being. In a 
word, the lover of purity casts sense and reality as transparent, thus skating over the 
“silence,” “opacity,” or “excess of meaning” that, on Schutte’s account, is inherent in 
sense and reality. 
This assumption regarding the nature of incommensurability/silence and sense 
informs strategies devised to reduce barriers to cross-cultural communication. Because 
sense is assumed to be transparent, cross-cultural incomprehensions or mis-
communications are taken to be direct results of a lack of information. The solution to 
this “lack,” then, is taken to be a “more”: comprehension and communication, this logic 
goes, are achieved by providing more complete, detailed, accurate information. Although 
these strategies, in some instances, may help reduce the incomprehensions or 
miscommunications, they mischaracterize the nature of incommensurability/silence and 
sense, which, in turn, leads them to mischaracterize the nature of the problem. Because 
they overlook the fact that “silence” or “excess of meaning” is inherent to sense and “the 
process of reasoning itself” (Schutte 1998, 61), they understand the problem of 
miscommunication to be a quantitative issue—addressed by providing more of the same 
kind of input—rather than a qualitative issue—the nature of sense and silence. In other 
words, both overlook the deep silence of sense and the sense of deep silence.  
Similarly, I would say, the imperative to “break the silence” relies on a binary 
conception of speech as expressive-repressive, as that which frees (by speaking truth to 
power or making visible) or as that which oppresses when institutional or 
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official/repressive truths are in circulation. While the former stance calls for more speech 
while the latter for less, both take recognition to be unproblematic when the testimonies 
are told. For both, freedom thus appears to be a quantitative, rather than qualitative, 
phenomenon. This discussion of Eurocentered theories of meaning points to the fact that 
the colonial, logocentric apparatus is not equipped to approach, dwell in, harken to 
occurrences of deep silence, or let deep silence open onto other dimensions of being and 
sense that are prior to and cannot be accounted for by a discourse that operates at the 
level of conceptual thinking. Instead, epistemically, silence is framed as the lack or 
insufficiency of more complete, accurate, detailed sense/information that could be 
provided by the colonized via speaking up and coming to voice. In sum, what is made 
invisible, by virtue of its not being recognized or acknowledged, is the sense of deep 
silence. Experiences of silence that can be negotiations of reality and fecund sources of 
radical meaning-making are vacated of their depth and thickness, of sense and being. 
That is, silences are eviscerated of their depth, polyvocality, and complexity such that the 
phenomenon of silence comes to stand for the opposite of voice and sense, as that which 
ought to be broken or overcome to convey meaning or to gain recognition. As such, 
silence is signified negatively, as the mark of ontological nonbeing and epistemic non-
sense or the index of oppression and displacement from the (purportedly universal but in 
fact colonial) subject position. These mechanisms are what I call the coloniality of 
silence.  The outcome is that silence is perceived, at best, as a phenomenon irrelevant to 
meaning-making, to communication, and to the disclosure of being, and, at worst, as an 
obstacle to be overcome if meaning, communication, and the disclosure of being ought to 
be attained. 
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But if sense is not transparent, and if silence is not a lack, why are rich 
experiences of silence like Martínez misheard? Why does the majority of testimonies 
about experiences of silence remain deaf to its polyvocality? Why are these “silent” 
responses read as negative phenomena, as absence, passivity, or nonresponsiveness?  
By emphasizing the why, I bring attention to the nonaccidental nature of this 
reading of reality, to the fact that the casting of deep silence as mere silence, that is, the 
coloniality of silence, is necessary to coloniality. In fact, because what is deemed as mere 
silence would open not only onto decolonial epistemic practices, but also onto a 
metaphysics or zone of being that is neither full presence nor nothing, taking seriously 
those experiences as deep silence would challenge usual assumptions central to 
coloniality itself. In this sense, the evisceration of deep silence to absence (and to 
oppressive silencing) is not accidental to coloniality, but, rather, a key process in the 
successful reification and legitimization of this historical formation. By reducing deep 
silences to the expression of natural inferiority or the exclusion from the subject position, 
the coloniality of silence makes invisible modes of knowing, communicating, and being 
that are otherwise than colonial modernity and that, by virtue of their existence, threaten 
to fissure the naturalization of coloniality so essential for its own justification. After all, 
the existence of complex/ambiguous modes of being and knowing challenges the 
operative assumption of coloniality, calling into question the “objective” and 
“transparent” qualities of Eurocentered, capitalist, modern/colonial epistemic and 
ontological schemas—features that are presented as natural and universal. To use 
language resonant with the previous chapter’s discussion, the racialized metaphysics of 
presence eliminates any “impurity” or in-between, reducing them to nonbeing.1 
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Coloniality thus preemptively dismisses on natural grounds as nonbeing or non-sense the 
locus from which one could contest the assumptions of coloniality. This erasure is crucial 
to coloniality in that it conceals the colonial difference as a generative source of 
subversion.2 After all, as experiences generative of radical meaning making, deep 
silences threaten to undermine the colonial logic whereby “knowledge and aesthetic 
norms are […] universally established by a transcendental subject” realizing instead that 
they are “universally established by historical subjects in diverse cultural centers” 
(Mignolo 2012, 5). 
1. Listening for Silences 
In “Toward a Decolonial Feminism,” María Lugones insightfully reminds us that 
decoloniality requires “resisting the epistemological habit of erasing” (2010, 754). In the 
context of the present project, this means resisting the tendency to strive for semantic 
transparency and subsume silence to familiar modern/colonial meanings. After all, 
although the coloniality of silence strives to eviscerate deep silences, occurrences of 
silence can be rich phenomena that operate according to decolonizing logics. Concretely, 
then, what would it mean not to dismiss the deep silence and the meaning it eventuates of 
experiences like Martínez’s and the Ute/Paiute tribes’?  
Martínez’s testimony points to the ways in which deep silence holds the promise 
of making sense of his situation otherwise than via colonial epistemic and ontological 
frameworks. If we hesitate, when listening to his testimony, and resist subsuming his 
experience to familiar schemas harkening to the silences of his narrative instead, 
Martínez shows us that his “joto passivity” opens onto practices of “radical meaning 
making” from which one can envision and bring about radically different gendered 
 
  79 
practices like nonmisogynist and nonhomophobic ways of practicing masculinity 
(Martínez 2014, 239).  
When we approach testimonies from the margins with an ear for the polyvocality 
of silence, we begin to notice its signifying and insurging reverberations. It is a radical 
meaning akin to the one operative in Martínez’s experience that we find in Fanon’s and 
Anzaldúa’s aforementioned experiences of not fitting within colonial norms and 
expectations. Although painful and disorienting, their experiences are not a defeat. 
Upholding the dismemberment brought about by a life in the “herida abierta,” and 
dwelling in these experiences of displacement from the language and the world of the 
colonizer not only reveals the fictitious nature of the logic regulating this exclusion; it can 
also be a fertile “ground” for the rereading and rewriting of reality, for the displacement 
of usual meanings and expectations.3 Although this colonial logic strives to reduce the 
damné and their multiplicity, opacity, and ambiguity to the dark side of the dichotomy (to 
nothingness), the materiality of their existence contextualizes and resists such 
annihilation. Recall that Fanon’s existential struggle to make sense of his being 
culminates in a cry: “I tried to get up but the eviscerated silence surged toward me with 
paralyzed wings. Not responsible for my acts, at the crossroads between Nothingness and 
Infinity, I began to weep” (Fanon 2008, 119). In this passage, we witness Fanon rejecting 
the split- separation imposed upon him by the logic of purity, a separation that present 
him with the untenable alternatives of “Infinity or Nothingness,” dismissing the 
emotional residue that makes up his difference (the specificity of his being) and 
eviscerating the depth of silence. Importantly, however, his rejection comes in the form 
not of statements, arguments, or speeches, but of a silent weeping, which suggests 
 
  80 
another way, another silent language of being in and making sense of the world—an 
embodied, affectively charged ethos. 
We find a more robust exploration of this affective sense-making in Anzaldúa’s 
writings. We discover, in the remarks from Borderlands/La frontera previously cited, 
that, although at times, when she gives in to colonial logic, Anzaldúa feels like she is a 
“zero, nothing, no one. A veces no soy nada ni nada,” her existence contests the logic of 
purity: “Pero hasta cuando no lo soy, lo soy” (Anzaldúa 2007, 85). The being that she 
“is” does not conform to usual expectations or familiar meanings; she “is” neither the 
plenitude of full being nor the absence of nonbeing: “But even when I am not, I am” (85, 
my translation). Resonant with Fanon’s predicament, Anzaldúa also finds herself (at) a 
cross-road, a bridge (it is not by accident that the edited collection she co-authored with 
Cherríe Moraga bears the title This Bridge Called my Back). When upholding her being 
and speaking from her experience, from that “eviscerated silence” or nada ni nada to 
which colonial apparatuses strive to reduce her, Anzaldúa is able to challenge the fiction 
of the racialized metaphysics of presence; “when not copping out,” she finds in that 
eviscerated silence a generative polyvocality and speaks with a tongue of fire rife with 
ambiguities, shaping a metaphysics of her own whereby she “is” a multiplicity: Mexican, 
mestiza, Chicana, Tejana, and so much more.  
Perhaps most starkly, we find the recuperation of the polyvocality of silence in the 
description of Marita Bonner, a celebrated writer of the Harlem renaissance, of black 
consciousness in “On Being Young, Woman, and Colored.” Departing from narratives 
that equate black consciousness with resistance and the public, in her writing—conveyed 
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both through her stylistic choices and content—Bonner emphasizes the voluptuousness of 
interiority and the strength of surrender: 
So—being a woman—you can wait. 
You must sit quietly without a chip. Not sodden—and weighted as if your feet 
were cast in the iron of your soul. Not wasting strength in enervating gestures as if 
two hundred years of bonds and whips had really tricked you into nervous 
uncertainty. 
But quiet; quiet. Like Buddha—who brown like I am—sat entirely at ease, 
entirely sure of himself; motionless and knowing, a thousand years before that 
white man knew there was so very much difference between feet and hands. 
Motionless on the outside. But inside? Silent. 
Still … “Perhaps Buddha is a woman.” (Bonner, 7–8, cited in Quashie 2012, 34) 
 
Quiet, stillness, and silence function in Bonner’s text as the catalyst for novel 
understandings of black identity that do not stand over and against the world, its 
expectations, and its limited imagination. Silence here figures as a location of insight and 
meaning; in this context, silence is not oppression, “not performative, not a withholding,” 
but instead, Kevin Quashie claims in The Sovereignty of Quiet, “an expressiveness that is 
not entirely legible in a discourse of publicness” (2012, 35).4 Testimonies like these are 
not isolated instances. Once we bring another interpretative aptitude—another 
sensibility—to the world and others, we being to hear the polyvocality of silence, of its 
senses.  
Although Part I has followed decolonial thinkers in challenging the authorial and 
colonial power of voice, it moved beyond them, inviting the reframing of Spivak’s 
question not in terms of voice—can the subaltern speak?—but in terms of deep silence—
can the deep silences of the colonized be generative of decolonizing sense-making? By 
attending to colonial patterns of power, chapter 2 revealed the imbrication of coloniality 
and voice, thus problematizing as naïve any abstract appeal to voice as emancipatory. 
Although survivors’ voices and testimonies like Nyad’s are a critical force behind social 
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change, as the #MeToo movement continues to promote “speak up!” and “break the 
silence” as the ubiquitous means of emancipation, it is paramount to contend with the fact 
that radical structural change is not achieved by merely making the platform more 
inclusive to include the voices of those who have traditionally been marginalized because 
of their social positionality. I proposed that the matter at hand is rather to question the 
structural conditions and assumptions undergirding the movement, that is, the norms 
whereby speech and naming are power, and the normative/regulative power of (colonial) 
voice. In fact, assuming that voice is a ubiquitous means of emancipation, that speaking 
up is beyond race, gender, class, and, most of all, historical structures class tacitly 
undermines the conditions of possibility of dialogical emancipation of those who do not 
conform to Eurocentered epistemic and ontological norms. Ultimately, it reifies colonial 
formations whereby the other and their communicative practices are cast as inferior. So 
long as liberatory movements championing the imperative to “speak up” do not critically 
call into question not only the guiding assumption norming what counts as reliable and 
correct speech, but also the fact that, in a modern/colonial world, that dialogical 
recognition is the material of power, testimonies of survivors whose expressive means do 
not conform to logical, clear, or persuasive speech will be reduced, yet again, to 
nothingness, their voices to mere silence. As such, they will continue to feed the 
structures these liberatory movements sought to starve.  
Martínez’s, Bonner’s, and Anzaldúa’s testimonies point us to an alternative to 
understanding incommensurability as well as sense and silence in terms of transparency; 
they ask that we resist the tendency to subsume opacity into modern/colonial frameworks 
or meanings, dwelling instead in that unsettling experience akin to when “another’s 
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speech, or some aspect of it, resonates in me as a kind of strangeness, a kind of 
displacement of the usual expectation” (Schutte 1998, 56). Withstanding this strange 
experience, this deep silence, is key to hearing the other in her uniqueness and 
difference, for new sense to emerge. As Spivak suggests in an interview with Jenny 
Sharp, perhaps, then, “we must … take a moratorium on naming too soon, if we manage 
to penetrate there. There is no other way for you and me to penetrate there” (Sharp and 
Spivak 2003, 619). Perhaps, openings to decolonizing sense and silence, to “rereading 
and rewriting of reality,” as Anzaldúa would put it, are not found exclusively through 
conceptual thinking or dialogical exchanges but via affective, sensuous harkenings to 
experiences of deep silence—through an aesthesis of deep silence (LDLO 40).  
Hence, in Part 2 and 3, I straddle the borderlands of the modern/colonial world to 
revisit the modern/colonial understanding of silence. I will interrogate intellectual 
histories, narratives, and experiences not defined by the desideratum of transparency and 
its corollary that silence is non-sense. Over the course of the next four chapters, I will 
listen for the polyvocality of silence and track the sense it eventuates by attending to the 
works of Latinx and Indigenous thinkers, including Chicana decolonial poet, writer, and 
activist Gloria Anzaldúa, but also of what may at first seem an unlikely ally for a 
decolonizing project like this one, French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty. As I 
will show, these thinkers not only provide robust methodological insights helpful to 
approach and express opaque phenomena like silence; each in their own way, also 
challenges the constitutive modern/colonial assumption that silence is an obstacle to 
sense-making. It is to considerations about the tools each thinker has to offer that I turn in 
the next chapter.  
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NOTES
1 As a place whose materiality refuses disappearance and erasure, the colonial difference 
threatens to undermine, in its resilience and concreteness, the colonial logic whereby 
“knowledge and aesthetic norms are…universally established by a transcendental 
subject” realizing instead that they are “universally established by historical subjects in 
diverse cultural centers” (Mignolo 2012, 5).  
2 Furthermore, as the discussion on the coloniality of voice indicated, the coloniality of 
silence inscribes silence as the natural expression of racialized and colonized subjects. 
The joint operations of the axes of “modernity” and “coloniality” are such that the 
racialized “other” is cast as naturally epistemically and ontologically inferior—as silent. 
Rather than being recognized as a colonial production, “silence as absence and nonsense” 
comes to be understood as the natural domain of the colonized—as the expression of the 
natural inability to fight back, the nonresponsiveness of queer Chicanos in the face of 
violence. 
3 Although I speak of a ground here, this ground is a “lugar no lugar,” what Anzaldúa 
calls Nepantla, “a Nahuatl word for an in-between space, el lugar entre medio. Nepantla, 
palabra indígena: un concepto que se refiere a un lugar no-lugar” (LDLO 28). 
4 See Evelynn Hammonds’s treatment of a politics of articulation and a politics of silence 
in “Black (W) holes” for a discussion of how the concept of silence figures in black 
women’s cultural work (1994). 
                                                 
 









PART II – THE VOICES OF DEEP SILENCE 
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[H]aunting was precisely the domain of turmoil and trouble, that moment (of 
however long duration) when things are not in their assigned places, when the 
cracks and rigging are exposed, when the people who are meant to be invisible 
show up without any sign of leaving, when disturbed feelings cannot be put 
away, when something else, something different from before, seems like it must 
be done.  
   —Avery Gordon, Ghostly Matters 
 
 
In Part I, I performed a recoil to a taken for granted aspect of liberatory (feminist) 
discourse and postmodern culture, i.e., the phenomenon of silence, interrogating it in its 
strangeness. Informed by Ernesto Martínez’s lived experience of “Joto passivity,” which 
he defines as the seeming non-responsiveness of queer Chicanos vis-à-vis violence, I 
began displacing the colonial logic that continues to guide much of modern/colonial 
theorizing and praxes whereby silence indexes lack of sense and being. Martínez’s Joto 
passivity pointed to a “more” inherent in silences, a “more” that is rendered invisible by 
colonial logic. Martínez’s words were especially telling; recounted in first person, 
Martínez spoke of silence (as experienced during Joto passivity) as an “embodied 
negotiation” that makes possible accounting for the contradictions of his situation. 
Although his silence was a response induced by fear and confusion, by postponing an 
otherwise familiar response to a violent attack, it allowed him not to play into dominant, 
misogynist, and homophobic ways of practicing masculinity; rather, it suspended usual 
expectations and meanings becoming a source of “radical meaning making” (2014, 239). 
Thus situated, I proposed that what I call “deep silence” is a critical tool for decolonizing 
projects. Listening for deep silences not only decolonizes the phenomenon of silence 
itself, revealing it in its polyvocality and plurality of signifying practices. In the 
concluding remarks of chapter 3, we saw how harkening to deep silences unsettles 
modern/colonial conceptual and temporal expectations that confine existence, sense, and 
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being to the presence/t of modern/colonial consciousness. In other words, listening for 
(deep) silences and letting them resonate in their strangeness is key to hearing the other in 
her difference.  
Part I’s discussion of the paradoxes at the heart of intelligibility made explicit by 
Spivak’s question, “Can the subaltern speak?”, raised crucial questions regarding the 
modality by which any critical phenomenology bears witness to experiences of 
marginalization. If I am correct in suggesting that current historical power structures 
conceal the polyvocality of the phenomenon of silence, how does the inquirer listen for 
the voices of silence? How is she to trace the significance of deep silence where 
coloniality hears none, which is to say, where silence is cast as a phenomenon that 
commands, by its very definition, the lack of words and sense?  
In chapter 3, I suggested that the first step toward listening for silences is resisting 
what María Lugones calls the “epistemological habit of erasing” (2010, 753). Rather than 
dismissing silences as non-sense or obstacles to meaning making, I invited the reader to 
dwell in them a while longer, hesitating before naming too soon, before subsuming 
silences, experiences, and phenomena to familiar concepts. The problem, however, is 
compounded by the fact that modern/colonial accounts of oppression as well as demands 
for equal normative treatment presuppose the deployment of conceptual and lexical 
resources that may not accommodate the complexity, liminality, and ambiguity of the 
subaltern’s experience. While “audible claims” would make visible some harms, their 
“entrenchment in cultural processes embedded in colonial legacies of domination and 
oppression” would render others invisible (Ruiz 2016, 442). So even if the philosopher 
learns to trace the polyvocality of silences, how is she to express them without subsuming 
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deep silences into modern/colonial schemas, thus reifying these very power structures 
that confine deep silences to silencing?  
I will take up these questions throughout the dissertation. In chapter 7, for 
instance, I will attend explicitly to the latter challenge to suggest that the mobilization of 
deep silence is central to bearing witness to colonial experiences without capitulating to 
the transparency and temporal trajectory of modern /colonial logos. Here, in Part II, I 
heed primarily to the former question, how do we listen for silences?, to then 
provisionally explore the latter. In so doing, I begin to show the decolonizing power of 
deep silences in bearing witness.  
To aid the task of listening to and expressing he voices of deep silence, I turn to 
Coyolxauhqui. Depicted as a huge round stone enclosing the dismembered limbs (see fig. 
1), Coyolxauhqui serves as the 
orienting image for Part II. 
According to Aztec mythic history, 
Coyolxauhqui is the Aztec moon 
goddess and the first woman 
warrior to become a human 
sacrifice (LDLO 49). The story 
narrates that, upon Coatlicue’s 
impregnation by a ball of feathers, 
Coyolxauhqui, who is Coatlicue’s 
daughter, persuaded her siblings to 
join her in killing her mother. Yet, 
Figure 1. Colored rendition of the Aztec monolith depicting 
dismembered Coyolxauhqui. The stone was rediscovered in 1978 
at the site of the Templo Mayor of Tenochtitlan, now in the Museo 
del Templo Mayor, Mexico City. 
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the fetus of her half-brother, Huitzilopochtli, sprang fully grown and armed from 
Coatlicue, killed the siblings, and decapitated Coyolxauhqui. Huitzilopochtli then flung 
her head into the sky and tossed her body down the sacred mountain, where it broke into 
a thousand pieces (LDLO 124).  
Coyolxauhqui is the orienting myth-image for the discussions to follow for at 
least three reasons. First, Coyolxauhqui represents the complex process whereby sense 
emerges, which, as we are about to see, both Merleau-Ponty and Anzaldúa describe as 
requiring the demolition of the ego, a dispossession necessary for the world to reveal 
itself as other than something said and the inquirer to hear the voices of silence. Second, 
Coyolxauhqui is instructive for the kind of thinking carried out throughout Part II. 
Although chapter 4 lacks the same grounding in concrete life events featured in chapter 5, 
both chapters display a taking apart and a coming back together anew. In chapter 4, this 
happens in the context of the insights the two main interlocutors of this dissertation, 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Gloria E. Anzaldúa, have to offer vis-à-vis silence. We will 
see how both thinkers rely on the aesthetics as the means to express phenomena like 
silence and colonial experiences that may otherwise elude communication. Yet, each 
thinker would not be able, on his/her own, to carry the weight of a project like this one. 
Merleau-Ponty falls prey of the coloniality of silences, while Anzaldúa seems to espouse 
a reductionist conception of silence as silencing. It by reading each thinker against (some 
of) their own explicit commitments, and by putting them in dialogue with one another, 
that we find useful tools to let silence resonate in its polyvocality.  
In chapter 5, on the other hand, I strive to enact this creative cycle. The 
fragmentary structure of the chapter is an attempt to perform the interruptions and 
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disjointedness provoked by the experience of loss and evoked by the symbol of 
Coyolxauhqui. Similarly, the interlacing of academic writing with testimony, poetry, and 
visual art is meant to operate at different registers, bringing about different openings or 
modalities of engagement for the reader. With each section, the fragments are reprised 
and woven together, offering new sense to the pieces and phenomena like grief or deep 
silence that, at first, may seem a senseless void. Third, Coyolxauhqui traditionally stands 
for “women as conquered bodies” (LDLO 49), of which the disappearing daughters of 
Juárez are a paradigmatic example. As we will see in chapters 4 and 5, Anzaldúa 
recuperates this and other figures from their colonial and hetero-patriarchal signification, 
mobilizing them as icons of feminist and decolonizing resistance.  
Coyolxauhqui is mentioned explicitly only in the final section of chapter 5. Yet, I 
invite the reader to let the myth-image of Coyolxauhqui orient their approach to Part II as 
it aids moving from naïve beliefs about silence and expression into the depths and 
polyvocality of silence, culminating into onto-temporal considerations that will be taken 
up in Part III. 
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IV. THE SILENCES OF MERLEAU-PONTY AND GLORIA ANZALDÚA 
 
 
[T]he interrogative is not a mode derived by inversion or by reversal of the 
indicative and the positive, is neither an affirmation or a negation veiled or 
expected, but an original manner of aiming at something, as it were a 
question-knowing, by which principle no statement or ‘answer’ can go beyond 
and which perhaps therefore is the proper mode of our relationship with 
Being, as though it were the mute or reticent interlocutor of our questions […] 
These questions call not for the exhibiting of something said which would put 
an end to them, but for the disclosure of a Being that is not posited because it 
has no need to be, because it is silently behind all our affirmations, negations, 
and even behind all formulated questions, not that it is a matter of forgetting 
them in silence, not that it is a matter of imprisoning it in our chatter, but 
because philosophy is the reconversion of silence and speech into one another.  
—Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible 
 
The white fathers told us: I think, therefore I am. The Black mother within 
each of us – the poet –whispers in our dreams: I feel, therefore I can be free. 
—Audre Lorde, Sister Outsider 
 
The main interlocutors in this project are Maurice Merleau-Ponty, a French 
intellectual writing from the “sheltering comfort and interpretive stability of historically 
privileged ‘home’ perspectives” (Ruiz 2014, 198), and Gloria E. Anzaldúa, a queer 
Chicana poet, feminist, and cultural theorist occupying and speaking from the fraught 
terrain of in-betweenness characteristic of life in the “borderlands.” As noted in the 
Introduction, although these two thinkers belong to different historical, geographical, and 
cultural contexts, they share a praxical commitment to the aesthetic as a key modality of 
meaning making beyond the presence of consciousness. The aesthesis of deep silence 
emergent by putting the two thinkers into conversation opens existence beyond the 
bounds of presence, letting the other and the world speak with the “voices of silence,” to 
play on Malraux’s expression. The works of Merleau-Ponty and Anzaldúa on aesthetic 
and mythopoetic language are thus instrumental to showing how the mobilization of deep 
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silences is key in opening the experience of existence beyond the present of modern 
Western consciousness and decentering linear chronology. Deep silences are a powerful 
tool for a decolonizing critical phenomenology because they make possible attending, 
even if indirectly, to the haunting presencing of the past, the ephemeral sense of silence, 
and colonial historias without capitulating to oppressive colonial matrixes. 
Yet, neither thinker, on their own, provides sufficient intellectual resources to 
tackle what I seek to accomplish in this dissertation. Although Merleau-Ponty has a lot 
“to say” about silence (pun intended) and the reciprocal openness of perceiver and 
perceived which, as we will see, provides a fecund starting point for critical 
phenomenology, he largely falls quiet vis-à-vis questions of coloniality. Although 
Merleau-Ponty is a thinker of silence, as Glen Mazis claims in Merleau-Ponty and the 
Faces of the World (2016), the material, cultural, and political sheltering he enjoys leads 
him to overlook others’ silences as significative.1 Conversely, while Anzaldúa forefronts, 
in her writing, concerns of mestizaje and marginality as they are imbricated with lineages 
of colonial conquest, her overt appeals to voice as emancipatory would seem to situate 
her within a tradition that conceives of silence as silencing. So what does each thinker 
have to offer visa—vis decolonizing silences? Let’s take a closer look starting with 
Merleau-Ponty’s methodological contribution to a critical phenomenology that strives to 
listen for and express silence.  
1. Beyond Phenomenology: Expressing Silences with Merleau-Ponty 
Merleau-Ponty’s sudden death in 1961 left us with a quandary not unfamiliar to 
the one at stake in this dissertation, a challenge that indirectly takes up concerns of 
silence, decolonizing, and critical phenomenology: If we understand the turn, in his later 
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writings, toward an ontology of the flesh as “a radical rethinking of the experience of 
belonging from within, [as] a phenomenology of being-of-the-world” (Landes 2020, 
141)—rather than a study of embodiment and being-in-the-world—how is the inquirer to 
bear witness to such an experience? What modalities are called forth to do justice to this 
silent belonging? And what kind of “words” are needed to express “silence” without 
assimilating its sense into familiar, modern/colonial meanings? Attending to some of 
Merleau-Ponty’s ontological and methodological advances allows me to identify 
apparatuses of deep silence that, although not decolonizing per se, begin to decenter 
modern/colonial sensibilities. 
Critical phenomenology owes to Merleau-Ponty the articulation of the reciprocal 
instituting openness of subject and world. Merleau-Ponty’s engagement with Husserl, 
specifically the latter’s insistence on rupturing our (often uncritical) familiarity with the 
world in order to return to the things themselves, prompted him to descend into things to 
investigate phenomena from the concrete in-between of their encroaching. It was this 
plunging that revealed to him the fundamental reciprocal openness of perceiver and 
perceived, which, for Merleau-Ponty, entails at least two considerations relevant for this 
project. First, the “impossibility of a complete reduction” (PhP lxxvii). Since reflection 
takes place in that same flow it seeks to capture, suspending what Husserl calls the 
“natural attitude” and grasping the eidos of phenomena is an impossible task.2 The world 
and phenomena are opaque to reflective analysis, which is necessarily finite, affected by 
the very same phenomena it strives to think. Analogously, phenomena are not stable 
entities, but dynamic processes in constant flux. 
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Second, this mutual solicitation takes place in “hiding,” to use Merleau-Ponty’s 
expression—at a silent, general dimension prior to the reflexive cleavage and its 
antonyms (VI 113). As Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions of color perception in both the 
Phenomenology and The Visible and the Invisible or of the development of natural 
phenomena in the Nature Lectures illustrate, this means not only that the articulation of 
this interlacing calls for a silence of sorts; it also implies that the way the perceiver 
orients herself through and toward the world—which includes sedimented socio-cultural 
and linguistic norms as well as sensory stimulants like colors, profiles, and sounds—is 
not a given, immutable, or determined in advance. Rather, the “perceiver” offers her gaze 
with the anticipation of the “milieu,” a bodily organization that is suggested (and only 
suggested!) by the “milieu” itself. Their intertwining is the accomplishment of a call-and-
response whereby the “milieu” calls forth a certain way of seeing or hearing, an 
orientation toward the vibrations of her surroundings that the perceiver assumes and that 
provides, e.g., a color “with the means to become determinate and to become blue” (PhP 
222).  
The bodily “response” to the vibrations of the blue is not in the indicative, i.e., 
determined by causal relations and, as such, certain. As we gather from Merleau-Ponty’s 
comments in the section on Animality in the Second Course on nature (1957–1958), the 
interlacing is like an “oneiric intentionality;” the “milieu” is not external to and 
independent from the “tick” like an idea or a goal, but it haunts it from within, latently 
inviting the other’s sens [sense and orientation]. Thus, the “indecisive murmurs” (EM 
172) that call forth the reciprocal orientation of beings should not be reminiscent of the 
indicative power of nomos or phonos (iterations of modern/colonial logocentrism). They 
 
  95 
do “not belong to any voice-consciousness,” as Spivak notes in the introduction to 
Selected Subaltern Studies commenting on “rumors” (1988, 23). Rather, in generality like 
in a dream, “the tick” and “the milieu” are inchoate, i.e., “poles that are never seen for 
themselves” in the fullness or certainty of indicative presence (N 178). At this level, there 
is no tick or milieu, but only yet-to-be-tick and yet-to-be-milieu. “Present” as the absence 
of oneiric or ghostly existence, each calls forth their hesitant interlacing and reciprocal 
blossoming from within one another. As we will see in more detail in chapter 5, murmurs 
thus evoke the circularity of sense, which eventuates in the in-between of perceiver and 
perceived, in the “absence” of deep silence (and an original source).3 
Insofar as a critical phenomenology is concerned and, more specifically, the task 
of devising tools that allow giving voice to deep silence, Merleau-Ponty’s struggles with 
the limits of phenomenology mean that, contra the widespread criticism of 
phenomenology as a subjectivist philosophy, i.e., as a discipline primarily concerned with 
providing an eidetic description of consciousness, Merleau-Ponty grounds his 
investigations into general structures of being far beyond the human subject into natural 
phenomena, language, and painting. Situating himself within the processes that he strives 
to think prevents him not only from falling back onto an ontology of the object; it also re-
orients Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy away from an ahistorical, apolitical, and solipsistic 
approach toward an onto-phenomenology keenly aware of the imbrication of social 
structures and structures of consciousness, and the challenges of giving full, transparent 
accounts of such conditions of possibility. In other words, Merleau-Ponty’s theoretical 
insights mark an important point of departure for critical phenomenology, which is now 
positioned to apprehend the “weight of the world” (Guenther 2020, 13).  
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Given the radical openness of world and conditions of possibility of experience 
(in other words, in light of the reciprocal instituting openness of subject and world), 
however, what does “apprehending” the weight of the world mean, exactly? How is 
critical phenomenology to express the interlacing of being(s)? How is it to put into words 
deep silence? After all, for a critical phenomenology that is cognizant of the finitude and, 
most importantly, the silence at the heart of reflection and being, this means that 
suspending the natural attitude won’t yield the operations of historical structures because 
such structures eschew direct analysis. Since reflection and, more broadly, beings are of 
the world, the world and its historical and social structures shape not only what we see, 
but how we perceive the world, our modality of existing in the world. In this sense, 
Merleau-Ponty’s recognition of the reciprocal instituting openness of subject and world 
entails a methodological shift; rather than advocating for a transcendental reduction and a 
thinking that strives to be a “total and active grasp, [an] intellectual possession” (VI 266), 
Merleau-Ponty suggests that the inquirer deploys “hyper-reflection” instead (VI 38).4  
Although a full account of hyper-reflection is beyond the scope of the present 
inquiry, it is worth noting that hyper-reflection—or, as Merleau-Ponty also calls it, the 
hyper-dialectic—is a modality of thinking that acknowledges a fundamental divergence 
at the heart of being and reflection such that any all-encompassing self-perception or self-
presence is impossible. In Merleau-Ponty’s words, it is a thinking that “does not possess 
its own premises; it is not a thought altogether present and actual; there is in its center a 
mystery of passivity” (EM 175). This acknowledgment matters to a critical 
phenomenology of deep silence because one of the critical features of hyper-reflection is 
that it opens onto reflexive opacities, onto modalities of existence that are not bound by 
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the presence of consciousness and the ideology of transparency that accompany it. That 
is, hyper-reflection does not re-present, but, rather, participates in the dehiscence of 
being, in the genesis of sense that emerges through “indecisive murmurs” of being. That 
is, hyper-reflection tracks sense as it eventuates from a silent logos that makes itself 
available in phenomena, as I will explain a little further on.5 Thus, it gives access to 
phenomenal depths whose sense is neither ineffable nor fully articulable, neither fully 
present nor fully absent; rather, the sense of the silent contact with being traced through 
hyper-reflection is bound to remain inchoate and latent, without, for this reason, lacking 
sense.  
It is important to stress that this open-ended, always-already elusive process of 
inquiry entailed by hyper-reflection should not be taken as an epistemic failure; akin to 
the incompleteness of the reduction, the opacity of reflection is not something that, on 
Merleau-Ponty’s account, can or should be overcome by deploying more adequate 
investigative tools or providing a more accurate translation. “The incompleteness of the 
reduction,” Merleau-Ponty adamantly stresses, “is not an obstacle to the reduction. It is 
the reduction itself, the rediscovery of vertical being” (VI 178). Hyper-reflection guides 
the interrogation through a being that is not transparent and fully accessible to the 
inquirer, but, rather, that carries, at its core, what I have been calling deep silence. 
Merleau-Ponty’s remarks in a passage to which I will return throughout the next chapters 
confirm this intuition: the philosopher’s “entire ‘work’,” he notes, “is this absurd effort. 
He wrote in order to state his contact with Being; he did not state it, and could not state it, 
since it is silence” (VI 125). This is to say that contact with being or the in-between of the 
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interlacing of phenomena is threaded with silence—what I call deep silence to emphasize 
its polyvocality and fecundity.  
2. Merleau-Ponty’s Silences 
Merleau-Ponty’s signature move of descending into things and investigating 
phenomena from the in-between of their encroaching, of interrogating being without 
seeking answers in the indicative (as the epigraph to Part II reminds us), leads Merleau-
Ponty to at least two fundamental re-conceptualizations regarding silence. First, he 
recasts the relation of speech and silence as a chiasmic intertwining, reconceiving speech 
and silence such that each is the “possible of the other,” always encroached/ing upon the 
other (VI 228).6 Concretely, this means that it is no longer possible to think of one 
without the other, of speech without silence. Claude Lefort’s remarks in the editor’s 
forward to the Visible and the Invisible speak of this chiasm. “[S]peech is between two 
silences,” he observes. “[I]t gives expression to an experience that is mute and ignorant of 
its own meaning, but only in order to make that experience appear in its purity” (1968, 
xxviii). Setting aside the problematic deployment of the term “purity” (which seems to be 
an unfortunate choice of vocabulary in that it contradicts the style not only of Merleau-
Ponty’s philosophy of ambiguity and opacity, but also of the present inquiry), in these 
remarks Lefort emphasizes the ongoing chiasm between language and silence.7 In fact, he 
continues, if we can “understand the silence that follows the word” it is because language 
does not abolish silence, but “leads beyond itself” to a silence that “constantly serve[s] as 
[discourse’s] ground” (1968 xxx). In this sense, it seems to me that the silence Lefort 
qualifies as “mute” is not an “inarticulate void” (Fóti 1988, 274) nor the “contrary of 
language” and signification (VI 179).8 Rather, it is a phenomenon that, albeit not 
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expressible through propositional language, statements, and the indicative mood, 
signifies. As such, it can be expressed. 
Second, in addition to the structural chiasm between language and silence, 
Lefort’s remarks bring attention to silence as a grounding figure, to Merleau-Ponty’s 
stance that linguistic expression and signification are grounded in the silence of 
perception or gestural expression. That is, although not fully fleshed out in his writings, 
we find, in Merleau-Ponty’s thought, the traces of the realization that deep silence 
bespeaks the hinge “prior” to and making possible the encroaching and eventuating of 
discrete differences, of speech and silence as discrete phenomena, considerations to 
which I will return in chapter 6.9 For now, the point I want to make is that the deep 
silences at the heart of being and reflection rehabilitated through hyper-reflection bespeak 
the condition of possibility of both the opacity or elusiveness and appearing of 
phenomena, of the non-coincidence of the meaning reflection produces with that which it 
attempts to designate and reflection itself (reflection “is” this impossibility of coinciding 
with its referent).10  
These two reconceptualizations of silence mean at least four things. First, they 
explain why the desideratum of self-coincidence sought after by a philosophy of 
reflection is bound to eternal imminence, always inevitably culminating in the écart of 
being—in a “dispossession” or “silence” (VI 266, 125).11 Second, they suggest that, 
through silences, reflection and being (like the “tick” and the “milieu”) essentially “are” 
present as absent. Third, they make possible not only the communion with being, as we 
will see in chapter 5, but also to think through and make sense of the mute contact with 
the world by giving room to being to manifest as concealment.12 Fourth, although this 
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silent contact cannot be stated, it nevertheless finds expression as silence and language 
are interlaced with one another.  
This last point is especially important for the inquiries that will follow in 
subsequent chapters. In Art and Institution, Rajiv Kaushik points out that Merleau-Ponty 
credits art (i.e., painting, literature, as well as indirect language) with the ability to 
disclose the silent contact with the world, that “very ground into which phenomenology 
must pass in order to accomplish itself as a phenomenology” (2011, 6). That is, art puts 
on display the silent logos of being(s). To be clear—the aesthetic (as an instantiation of 
hyper-reflection) rehabilitates the very ground of being, which, as Merleau-Ponty’s 
above-remarks highlight, is, in fact, deep silence. Expression of the sense borne through 
these silent, dynamic interlacing calls for an aesthetic rather than thetic or categorical 
language. Note that, by aesthetic language, I mean a mode of signification that does not 
signify propositionally, by saying “S is p,” but conveys sense via suggestion, by 
rearranging existing meaning and offering a certain “style” or, to use Merleau-Ponty’s 
language from the passage cited above, a “tendency,” according to which it is possible to 
approach the world anew. Characteristic of this modality of expression (of which the pink 
crosses I will discuss in the following chapter are an instantiation) is the fact it no longer 
“seeks to render fixity to the indeterminacy and polyvalences of the image,” and, I should 
add, of the world and being by subsuming it under concepts (Kaushik 2011, 25).13 
Rather, it makes room for the murmurs of silent being to reverberate. Through the 
aesthetic, in fact, the beholder is not engaged primarily via rational judgment or 
propositional knowledge (this approach would play into specularization and the 
coloniality of time), but also via affect, the sensuous, and the somatic. 
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Thus far, I have suggested that we find, in Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetics writings, 
resources to develop a modality of bearing witness attuned to the murmurings and 
tracings of existence. This is a critical phenomenology that mobilizes the aesthetic in and 
through its descriptions to liberate sensibilities beyond the transparency privileged by 
colonial modernity. In a way, Merleau-Ponty’s recurring interest in the aesthetic points to 
his striving to think beyond the presence (and present) of rational consciousness, to his 
resisting, in his writing, the tendency of postmodernity to evade contingency and “erect 
[sense] into a positive being, outside all points of view, beyond all latency and all depth, 
having no true thickness [épaisseur]” (EM 174).  
In my view, however, although a critical phenomenology that seeks to go beyond 
colonial epistemologies draws analytically from Merleau-Ponty’s later insights 
(especially his push beyond thought/knowledge and transparency as privileged sites and 
means of engagement), its decolonizing impetus requires taking seriously the kinds of 
mythologies and images that are mobilized throughout one’s descriptions. In fact, since 
power structures eschew direct analysis in general, and coloniality informs how we 
experience the world in particular, quasi-transcendental structures of existence need to be 
pulled up indirectly. This means that the kind of imaginary—as in of the image—one 
evokes in and through writing matters to the processes of repatriation of Indigenous land 
and life (tasks that Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang identify as central to the project of 
decolonization (2012, 7)) as images and myth have the power of situating the beholder in 
specific cultural landscapes and geo-political lineages.  
This move is especially important not only because of the contextual nature of 
sense, but also because, as we saw in chapter 3, the concrete historico-political formation 
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of the modern/colonial world system thrives on and promotes the concealment of the 
depth of silence. That is, the challenges raised by expressing the silent contact with being, 
the springing forth of the world that is beyond the presence/t of consciousness are not 
merely methodological. As the case of the three Native American shields example 
illustrated, the issue has much to do with power and normativity, specifically with the 
historical structure of coloniality, its desiderata of epistemic transparency, and how both 
advance narrow conceptions of silence. Because of the assumptions and sensibilities that 
permeate the historical formation of coloniality, “home perspectives” like Merleau-
Ponty’s likely may entail the evisceration of deep silence. Shielded from the arrebatos of 
a life in la frontera and experiences of silence that may, inf act, be powerful negotiations 
of sense and reality, another’s silence is likely to figure as either withheld sense (as when 
it safeguards sacred truths) or nonsense (as what does not fit within propositional theories 
of meaning and knowledge which are taken to be universal standards of intelligibility) 
(Stauffer 2015, 104).14 In spite of his methodological commitments to decenter what I 
call the coloniality of silence, in his late 1950s radio interviews with Georges 
Charbonnier, Merleau-Ponty falls prey of these pervasive assumptions. There, we witness 
first-hand the pervasiveness of the coloniality of silence in structuring fields of sense, 
specifically Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the colonized other’s silence. 
Commenting on his trips to French colonies in 1955 and 1957 radio interviews 
with Georges Charbonnier (the interviews were broadcast in 1959), Merleau-Ponty 
expresses his disappointment at the Malagasy he meets insofar as they refuse, upon 
Merleau-Ponty’s invitation, to perform a sociology of death rituals central to their culture 
(E). These remarks are telling for the purposes of the current analysis. In spite of 
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Merleau-Ponty’s methodological recognition that imaginative variation grounded in 
transcendental consciousness does not suffice in giving access to other modes of life and 
sense-making, requiring instead an indirect approach through empirical experience, when 
faced with the racialized other’s silence, Merleau-Ponty succumbs to familiar 
expectations15; rather than as a response required by the parameters of Malagasy culture 
whereby disclosing sacred details of death rituals would betray and dissolve that culture, 
Merleau-Ponty interprets the Malagasy silence as a failure to integrate French learning 
with their cultural practices and, thus, to yield recognizable meaning. In this sense, 
although Merleau-Ponty is willing to depart from traditional Western theories of meaning 
that cast silence as nonsense, and although he is aware of the challenges posed by cross-
cultural encounters, he nevertheless misses the “structuring effects and de-structuring 
affects of colonization” (Al-Saji 2019a, 14).16 Merleau-Ponty proves unable to listen to 
non-Western silences as generative of decolonizing sense-making, reading the 
Malagaches as “inscrutable in their difference,” as Alia Al-Saji explains (2019a, 15).17  
This case is a blunt reminder that the historical, cultural, and geographical 
landscapes within which Merleau-Ponty is situated matters to his thinking.18 In these 
encounters, we witness the coloniality of silence at work; Merleau-Ponty’s epistemic 
response to the Malagasy eviscerates the phenomenon of silence of its depth reducing it 
to non-sense. Merleau-Ponty’s colonial privilege is flaunted through his assuming the 
transparency of his own positionality (assuming the reciprocity of his own position and 
that of the Malagaches) and that of sense (assuming and demanding that the sense of 
Malagasy rituals can be grasped by a European subject). These reflections on the ways in 
which power structures institute fields of visibility, i.e., modalities by which the inquirer 
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approaches the world and the phenomena that appear as sensible in the first place, lead us 
to the other major interlocutor of this project is Gloria Anzaldúa. 
3. Beyond Merleau-Ponty: Anzaldúa’s Mythopoetics 
Like Merleau-Ponty, Anzaldúa deploys a poetic language of liminal figurations 
and sense, of images, and of affect that gives access to what cannot be said or perceived 
directly and effects the decolonizing of sensibilities central to this project. Yet, 
accomplishing a task well beyond what Merleau-Ponty’s onto-phenomenology could 
achieve (and one that should really be informative for many critical phenomenologists at 
work today in North America), the imaginary nature of Anzaldúa’s mythopoetics 
historicizes her writing, challenging key tenets and methodologies of coloniality, while 
remaining grounded in cultural and land-based dimensions of the colonial context she 
seeks to reclaim. Through her myths and images, she bears witness to her fraught 
relationship with the colonial past and present, including the lineages of colonial 
violence, dispossession, loss, as well as of indigenous ancestry, culture, and resistance as 
they play out on the land she continues to inhabit.19 This kind of imaginary is a 
dimension that is missing from Merleau-Ponty, and that ultimately makes him and, likely, 
his readers less aware of the operations of quasi-transcendental, modern/colonial 
structures in shaping his experience and conceptualizations of silence. After all, the 
pockets of opacity that he mobilizes resonate with the audience differently depending on 
the constellation of symbols, cultural values, and images summoned in the affective 
responses his writings elicit. In this case, they are bereft of colonial resonances. 
The sensible world with its sendimented values and histories summons the two 
philosophers onto different paths, lamenting lineages of Aztec iconography, violent 
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colonial legacies, resilience, and existential precarity, on the one hand, and murmurs of 
Greek mythology, French imperial conquest, and existential sheltering, on the other. As 
someone who experienced the “weight of inarticulacy flood [her] voice” (Ruiz 2014, 
196) and who lacks the privilege of taking existence for granted, Anzaldúa “thinks” the 
sensible-sense bond by contextualizing her mythopoetic writings within historias—and 
here I use the Spanish intentionally to underscore the double valence of historia, which 
means both history and story—of conquest, trauma, and colonization, but also resilience, 
solidarity, and ancestral lineages. As she observes, her mythopoetics is rooted in the soil 
and soul of the North American continent—not that of Greek mythology and “despot 
dualities” (B 86).  
Throughout her corpus, Anzaldúa appeals to several figures central to Mexican 
and Aztec mythology—like those of Coatlicue, la Llorona, la Chingada, la Virgen de 
Guadalupe, and Coyolxauhqui that “are used against women and against certain races to 
control, regulate, and manipulate us” (I 219). She rewrites these myths, whose figures 
thus function as hinges between the lineages of colonial conquest and decolonial 
insubordination, collective trauma and healing, “trace[ing] how we go from victimhood 
to active resistance, from the wailing of suffering and grief to the grito of resistance, and 
onto the grito of celebration and joy” (I 229). In chapter 5, we will see how Anzaldúa 
recuperates the myth of Coyolxauhqui to shed light on the processes of healing and 
creation, which, in that context, helps making sensible the sense of the mothers of 
Juárez’s grief. In chapter 7, I will turn to Anzaldúa’s recuperation of la Llorona to 
reclaim lost Indigenous and Chicana identity. In this sense, Anzaldúa’s style—her 
historically-situated mythopoetic writing—diverts the West’s rationalism while also 
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evoking the legacy of colonial violence felt in its quotidianity by those who do not enjoy 
the sheltering comfort of home perspectives. This makes her a formidable interlocutor for 
this project, offering resources to recuperate silence from the long tradition of Western 
philosophy that casts it as obstacle or irrelevant to meaning making.  
4. Anzaldúa’s Silences 
But what to make of her explicit remarks about emancipation, voice, and silence, 
which may suggest that she unapologetically espouses a narrow conception of silence as 
silencing? Consider, for instance, a 1996 interview in which, in response to Andrea 
Lunsford’s question about the relationship, in her work, between writing and activism, 
Anzaldúa brings attention to the importance of finding one’s voice as a decolonial 
practice of resistance. “Because I am a writer,” she writes,  
voice—acquiring a voice, covering a voice, picking up a voice, creating a voice—
was important. Then you run into this whole experience of unearthing, 
discovering, rediscovering, and recreating voices that have been silenced, voices 
that have been repressed, voices that have been made a secret—and not just for 
me, but for other Chicanas. (I 277)  
 
These remarks would locate Anzaldúa within the long tradition of feminist activists and 
academics for whom voice is associated with empowerment and is juxtaposed to silence, 
which comes to be equated with the silencing of oppression. In my view, however, 
Anzaldúa’s “tongue of fire” decenters the voice versus speech binary and the equation of 
silence with oppression in at least two ways. First, the “voice” she deploys does not 
conform to colonial expectations of what voice and speech look like. As scholars have 
observed, Anzaldúa “speaks” through code-switching and, importantly, from her body 
and experience such that her writing is infused with “passionate rationality” (Keating 
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2000, 12). Second, through her mythopoetics, Anzaldúa brings attention to the necessity 
of mobilizing deep silence to yield decolonial sense-making. 
Central to her project of rethinking life in la frontera, Anzaldúa devotes a 
considerable amount of time to the question of language. Specifically, in “How to Tame a 
Wild Tongue” or “Speaking in Tongues,” she takes up the question of language as a site 
of both oppression and resistance. Speaking from the perspective of a Chicana whose 
native tongue is a Tex-Mex—a mestizaje of Spanish and English that, qua “impure” 
mixture, is frowned upon by both the Spanish and English-speaking communities—
Anzaldúa carefully reflects on the oppressive effects of linguistic misrecognition. “If you 
want to really hurt me, talk badly about my language. Ethnic identity is twin skin with 
linguistic identity—I am my language” (B 81). The recurrent experiences characteristic 
of and central to colonial subjection of having been made to feel ashamed of her native 
tongue wounded her at an intimate level, constituting what she calls “linguistic terrorism” 
(B 38).20 It seems to be, then, that we should read Anzaldúa’s push to find her own 
“voice” with caution. Yes, Anzaldúa reclaims her mestiza voice—which had been used 
against her by the colonial apparatus to subjugate her—as an emancipatory tool. “I will 
no longer be made to feel ashamed of existing. I will have my voice: Indian, Spanish, 
white. I will have my serpent’s tongue—my woman’s voice, my sexual voice, my poet’s 
voice. I will overcome the tradition of silence” (B 81). By speaking up, she develops a 
sense of self and reality grounded in the concrete experiences of living in the margins and 
speaking in “tongues.”  
As the passage above indicates, however, her “voice” is far from the abstract/ing 
voice of the colonizer. Rather than homogenous, unified, and pure, Anzaldúa’s “voice” is 
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an impassioned mestizaje, expressing the concrete contradictions and multiplicity of a life 
in la frontera. Concretely, Anzaldúa expresses her mestiza voice by, first, deploying 
code-switching as a form of resistance. “Until I am free to write bilingually and to switch 
codes without having always to translate, while I still have to speak English or Spanish 
when I would rather speak Spanglish, and as long as I have to accommodate the English 
speaker rather than having them accommodate me, my tongue will be illegitimate” (B 
81). This form of linguistic expression developed by los atravesados—i.e., those who, 
like Anzaldúa, are forced by patterns of power and domination to live in the in-betweens, 
shifting from one cultural context to another while never feeling completely at home in 
any given cultural formation—does not respect borders (B 84). This is a language 
“capable of communicating the realities and values true to themselves—a language with 
terms that are neither español ni inglés, but both” (B 77).21  
Second, Anzaldúa’s “voice” breaks from the normative power of colonial voice in 
that it is far from being sanitized from emotions, passions, or values. “There is no need 
for words to fester in our minds…through rhetoric,” she points out. Rather, words should 
come alive through the body, “through blood and pus and sweat. Write with your eyes 
like painters, with your ears like musicians, with your feet like dancers…write with your 
tongues of fire” (LDLO, 171). In the introduction to Interviews/Entrevistas, AnaLouise 
Keating invites the reader to think of Anzaldúa’s style—her “voice”—as infused with 
“passionate rationality,” i.e., a pathos Patricia Hill Collins associates with Black women’s 
struggle for social justice. As Collins explains, “this type of passionate rationality flies in 
the face of Western epistemology that sees emotions and rationality as different and 
competing concerns” (Collins, Fighting Words, 243 cited in Keating 2000, 12). By 
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reaching her audience through the affective plane, by “writ[ing] from the body” (I 63), 
Anzaldúa’s stylistic approach turns the traditional injunction of Western rationality and 
theory on their heads. Rather than leading the theorizing “through the head with the 
intellectual concept,” her deployment of images, stories, and myth “come in through the 
backdoor with the feeling, the emotion, the experience” (I 263). Note that this is a method 
that does not privilege the irrational or the emotional over rationality or theory. Rather, it 
is an approach that starts from experience and the affective to then reflect upon them and 
get “back to the theory” (I 263). In this sense, Anzaldúa does not simply invert the binary 
characteristic of much of Western thinking, privileging the traditionally underappreciated 
sensuous pole of the dichotomy, but undermines the dichotomy altogether, upholding its 
in-between—a “passionate rationality” or an order of non-positive signification—instead.  
Thus, Anzaldúa’s “wild tongue” breaks the tradition of silence in a more 
traditional sense; it gives voice to the material and creative experiences of those who had 
been excluded from representation and the subject position. Thus, I here deploy “the 
tradition of silence” as Anzaldúa (and the feminist tradition) intends it in the quote above, 
i.e., as the materially enabled patterns of exclusion from what counts as legitimate forms 
of expression of languages and voices that do not conform to Eurocentered norms or 
standards of justification. Silence, then, figures as the outcome of oppression, i.e., of 
being prevented from speaking or saying something.22 Anzaldúa breaks this silence by 
calling into question, rather than upholding, the logic of purity and transparency central 
to Eurocentered theories of meaning. As noted, Anzaldúa “speaks” through code-
switching infused with “passionate rationality.” 
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But Anzaldúa also breaks the “tradition of silence” in a perhaps more subtle and 
insidious way; the mythopoetic language she deploys manifests what I earlier referred to 
as the “voices of silence.” “Let me show you a little graph, a little visual,” she tells the 
interviewers, “so that you can understand what I’m saying, because a lot of times it’s 
hard for me to say everything in words” (I 254). Importantly, “it’s hard to say everything 
in words” not because of Anzaldúa’s lack of skills or dedication. Rather, “it’s hard” 
because the meanings she strives to express, the reality that is created through her 
writing, exceeds propositional language and the rigid boundaries ascribed to words in that 
context. Throughout her corpus—both written and oral—Anzaldúa turns to images, 
stories, and myth, in sum, to mythopoetic language to express ideas that cannot be 
articulated through language alone because sense is not transparent, but opaque. Hence, 
Anzaldúa overcomes the tradition of silence in another way; through her style, she 
“present[s] another way of ordering and composing, another rhetoric” (I 261), which is to 
say that she resignifies the phenomenon of silence away from the silencing upheld by the 
liberatory and feminist traditions toward deep silence as central to giving access to the 
sensible world. In this latter sense, performatively, i.e., at the level of her carefully 
stylistic choices (and without explicitly speaking of it), Anzaldúa brings attention to the 
necessity of mobilizing deep silence to yield decolonial sense-making. 
In conclusions—Merleau-Ponty and Anzaldúa offer invaluable tools to learn how 
to let resonate the sense of the sensible, to express the experience of what traditional 
philosophy tends to cast as mute, ineffable, or senseless silence. For both authors, the 
aesthetics is the means through which deep silences make sense, the “means for being to 
manifest itself without becoming positivity” (VI 214). In spite of their shortcomings at 
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the level of their explicit commitments, when their texts are read carefully, with an eye 
and ear for the style each deploys, we see that Merleau-Ponty and Anzaldúa accomplish 
the expression of the silent sense of the sensible not as a way of resolving or bypassing 
opacity, ambiguities, and aporias, but through and by virtue of a fundamental darkness or 
obscurity—the opacity of time, sense, reflection.  
 
NOTES 
1 With such claim Mazis brings attention to an aspect of the philosopher’s work that, with 
few notable exceptions such as Bernard Dauenhauer’s (1980), Veronique Fóti’s (1988; 
2013), and Stephen Noble’s (2014) works, has largely gone unnoticed. 
2 As Glen Mazis points out, Merleau-Ponty puts forth, in the EM and in the Third Chapter 
of the VI, a powerful critique of what he calls the “operational thinking” of the West, i.e., 
a calculative linguistic and reflective approach to the world that severs the tissue that 
connects us to things. While in the Phenomenology Merleau-Ponty recognized the 
violence entailed by reflection vis-à-vis the perfectively perceived world, but deemed it 
necessary to “grasp the sense of the world or of history in its nascent state” (PhP, lxxxv), 
in his later thought, Merleau-Ponty distinguishes between different modes of linguistic 
expression, some that stive to affirm the human-world enlacement, others that minimize 
it. The former approach, Mazis stresses, embraces silence, thereby promoting renewal, 
becoming, and transformation. The latter screens us from interweaving with the world in 
its openness and fecundity (2016, 13–15). 
3 The murmurs of deep silence are, to borrow Spivak’s words, “primordially (originarily) 
errant, always in circulation with no assignable source. This illegitimacy makes it 
accessible to insurgency” (1988, 23). 
4 “What we call hyper-dialectic,” Merleau-Ponty observes, “is a thought that, on the 
contrary, is capable of reaching truth because it envisages without restriction the plurality 
of the relationships and what has been called ambiguity. The bad dialectic is that which 
thinks it recomposes being by a thetic thought, by an assemblage of statements, by thesis, 
antithesis, and synthesis; the good dialectic is that which is conscious of the fact that 
every thesis is an idealization, that Being is not made up of idealizations or of things 
said… but of bound wholes where signification never is except in tendency” (VI 94). 
5 In The Resistance of the Sensible World, Emmanuel Alloa points out that Merleau-
Ponty sets out to establish “a critique of any ideology of transparency” (2017, 12), 
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rejecting the position of the transcendental Cogito for whom “the world spreads out in an 
absolute transparency” (PhP, lxxiv), which is to say of a philosophy that forgets “the 
constitutive corporeal mediatedness of any relationship to the world” (Alloa 2017, 13). 
6 In his early 1950s writings on language, Merleau-Ponty focuses on the reconversion of 
sensuous sense and linguistic sense, arguing that this latent or silent sense grounds and 
haunts linguistic sense. In “la chiar comme diacritique incarné” (2009), Emmanuel Alloa 
points out that by positing an ontological continuity between sensuous and linguistic 
expression, Merleau-Ponty suggests that the diacritical processes of differentiation that 
structure linguistic signification are also operative in and regulate the sensuous. In this 
sense, the emergence of meaningful differentiations is to be sought in the sensuous; as I 
will discuss in chapter 6, it is immanent to Nature. Casting ontology as diacritical 
fundamentally challenges any localizable or substance ontology, calling, as anticipated, 
for the development of a non-Parmenidean ontology that displaces the agential/logical 
place of the metaphysical subject (conceived as either a constituting consciousness or 
social discourse). 
7 The logic of purity that strikingly seems to inform Lefort’s thinking leads his to 
inadvertently reinstate the problematic dualism between the muteness of silence and the 
eloquence of speech. Letting go a thinking of purity helps coming to terms with the fact 
that Nature (as well as deep silence) is not mute in the sense of being vacated of meaning. 
Although Natural processes may be ignorant of their meaning in that they lack the ability 
to reflect upon their sense (in a working note dated 1960, Merleau-Ponty differentiates 
between the flesh of the human body and that of the world by suggesting that the latter is 
not sentient, “not self-sensing (se sentir) as is my flesh”), this does not mean that Nature 
lacks sense. Rather, for Merleau-Ponty, Nature is the autoproduction of a meaning that is 
not posited by thought, which is to say that its sens differs from that of the logos 
proforikos, the proffered language (VI 250). As we are starting to see, the dynamics 
generating sense and being are intimately tied to deep silence. This sens of deep silence is 
the subject of the next chapter. 
8 I should also note that, differently from what Leforte seems to indicate, the silence that 
gives expression to an experience that is mute is not, on my account, “ignorant of its own 
meaning.” Although this meaning is of a different order than that of symbolic language, 
deep silence signifies latently, by calling forth or inaugurating certain ways of being and 
making sense of the world—as we have seen in the preceding section. To better 
understand the signifying operations of deep silence, it is necessary to attend to the 
second reconceptualization of silence brought about by the shift in perception. 
9 Concretely, this means that by reframing the question of the Being-nothingness or 
speech-silence relation as one of mutual diverging, Merleau-Ponty interrogates the 
ground “prior” to their division, the openness, opacity or resistance of being, which, 
effectively, means that he is asking questions of deep silence. Thus far, we have gathered 
that deep silence as an a priori condition is a peculiar kind of origin: while it in fact 
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priori, which is undetermined by temporality. As Leonard Lawlor observes, in 20th 
century France, “a priori conditions must be experiencible” (2003, 54), without therefore 
being reduceable to experience or a positive, fully graspable origin. This is to say that, as 
an originary ground or the “circulus vitiosus deus” (VI 179) of the becoming-sense of the 
sensible and the becoming-sensible of sense, deep silence manifests in concrete 
phenomena without being reducible to them; it is there and not-there, present in absence, 
or disclosing in its concealing.  
10 Recall Merleau-Ponty’s language of fecund negativity to qualify the possible or, as he 
puts it in reference to the fold, this “‘central’ nothingness is like the point of the 
stroboscopic spiral, which is who knows where, which is ‘nobody’” (VI 264). 
11 When philosophy seeks to coincide with Being, “then language is a power of error” (VI 
123). In fact, coincidence with this “silent,” pre-given immediacy is impossible. As 
Véronique Fóti observes, philosophy’s “adequation” to the advent of truth 
(to originary silence) is “rather a wakeful and thematized participation in the ‘dehiscence’ 
of Being” (1988, 280), which is to say that it is a creative process that requires the 
harkening to deep silence. 
12 It would be interesting, at this juncture, to reflect on the role that key figures in the 
continental tradition have ascribes to silence in the disclosure of being. For instance, in 
Zarathustra, in an aphorism titled “On Great Events,” Nietzsche writes that “the greatest 
events are not our loudest but our stillest hours. Not around the inventors of new noise, 
but around the inventors of new values does the world revolve; it revolves inaudibly” 
(2003). 
13 Apparent from these remarks is Merleau-Ponty’s indebtedness to Ferdinand de 
Saussure’s conception of language as a diacritical system, of meaning as the outcome of a 
play of differences. In the opening of “Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence,” 
Merleau-Ponty observes that signs do not have inherent meaning but acquire their 
signification “negatively,” i.e., via a (synchronic and diachronic) play of differences with 
other signs. Within this diacritical framework, signs do not express a meaning, but mark a 
divergence of meaning between other signs. In Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy (2008), 
Lawrence Hass argues that Merleau-Ponty’s expressive theory of language provides a 
viable alternative to the dominant theories of language, representationalism and 
structuralism (2008, 172). Merleau-Ponty puts forth a new theory of language by shifting 
the focus exclusively from sedimented language/spoken word—la langage parlé—to the 
process of expression/speaking word—le langage parlant—language “which creates 
itself through its expressive acts” (PW, 17). In “Dialogue at the Limit of 
Phenomenology” (2009b), Beata Stawarska further elaborates on the ambiguous status of 
speech in phenomenology to challenge the individualist bias of classical phenomenology. 
Charging Derrida with phonophobia, Stawarska argues that Husserl was right to privilege 
speech. In fact, the move from the conversational and polycentric context to the 
transcendental and monocentric domain forces the “I” into a “universe of speechless 
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upon and responds to a potential interlocutor” (2009a, 144/145). That is, when the “I” is 
transposed in the written text, its meaning becomes divorced from the context of its 
utterance, thus silencing the importance of context in meaning creation. In Between You 
and I (2009a), Stawarska develops the insight that the mutual relation that gives meaning 
to pronouns “I” and “you” through conversation also plays out in silent writing and 
thinking. Her discussion brings attention to the ambiguity of the subject: the speaking “I” 
is always already an “I” that is spoken with, who listens. It is important to note that, 
differently from Saussure, Merleau-Ponty resists the temptation of reducing the 
diacritical to an immaterial mechanism, to an abstract difference, thinking it instead as a 
hinge or “sensible juncture” (Alloa 2017, 59). This means that, in his later ontology, 
Merleau-Ponty thinks the logic that governs the organization of the visible/sensible (of 
perceived sense) in terms of linguistic dynamics (linguistic sense), thus developing a 
diacritical ontology, or, as Renaud Barbaras calls it, “a diacritical structure of the thing” 
(2004, 181). As scholars have argued, this reconceptualization matters insofar as, first, it 
undermines the nature/culture dichotomy, opening the space to think the latent emergence 
of sense in/through the sensible (For a discussion of how the shift toward ontology in 
Merleau-Ponty’s later writing matter for the development of a non-anthropocentric 
ontology and the decentering of traditional dualisms, see Barbaras 2001; Toadvine 2009a; 
Morris 2010a; Hamrick and van der Veken 2011;). In other words, thinking diacritics as 
sensible junctures means that sense does not originate in a constituting consciousness nor 
does it lie in the referent. Rather, meaning is borne in/through the process of le langage 
parlant, in/through the sensuous. In this sense, as William Hamrick and Jan van der 
Veken point out in Nature and Logos, Merleau-Ponty gestures toward the existence of a 
logos endiathetos—or “logos before language which will perhaps help us to better 
understand the expressed logos” (2011, 7).  
14 As Doris Sommer observes, this attitude of dismissal vis-à-vis the fecundity of silence 
is often adopted in ethnographic interrogations, within which “uncooperative 
gestures…are generally deleted from the scientific reports as insignificant ‘noise’” (1996, 
135). 
15 In Signs, Merleau-Ponty notes that there is “no immediate access to the universal by 
reflection alone,” calling forth an indirect approach instead (S 135). Moreover, as Mazis 
observes, on multiple occasions Merleau-Ponty remarks that silence plays a crucial role 
in giving human beings access to the depths of the world and meaning (2016). 
16 Reflecting on the “insurmountable difference” of cross-cultural encounters and, in 
Signs, Merleau-Ponty asks, “how can we understand someone else without sacrificing 
him to our logic or it to him?” (S 144). 
17 As these remarks make explicit, Merleau-Ponty reveals his colonial privilege not only 
by assuming the transparency of sense and his own positionality (expecting that the sense 
of Malagasy rituals could be grasped by a European subject as well as the reciprocity of 
his own position and that of the Malagaches). We also witness Merleau-Ponty’s white 
ignorance at work through the operations of what in chapter 1 I call the coloniality of  
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silence; Merleau-Ponty’s epistemic response to the Malagasy eviscerates silence of its 
depth.  
18 It is only by remaining grounded in and thinking from the concrete that we can be 
begin a description of “existence as marked by virtuality,” by which Denise Ferreira Da 
Silva means “matter imagined as contingency and possibility”—a formulation to which I 
will return in chapter 3 (2014, 92). 
19 Note the resonance with Foucault’s claim that the conditions of experience are not 
formal, but contingent to a “field of historically changing practices and games of truth” 
(Oksala 2016, 6). 
20 The normative power of colonial languages put Anzaldúa in a double bind: since 
colonial languages, as Nelson Maldonado-Torres points out, “already been shaped by 
understandings of the world as a battle field in which [the colonized] are permanently 
vanquished” (2007, 249), the means by which Anzaldúa would pursue self-understanding 
do not do justice to her felt sense of self, casting her as illegitimate and inferior. 
Conformity with colonial languages, then, would entail not only shunning dimensions of 
her mestiza identity, sanitizing, so to speak, her “impure” or ambiguous (linguistic) 
identity. It would also entail that she expresses a logocentric apparatus within which 
people like her do not enjoy logos, resulting in the linguistic terrorism mentioned above. 
21 As Helen Carol Weldt-Basson theorizes in Subversive Silences, the use of bilingualism 
by Latin American authors like Esmeralda Santiago or Sandra Cisneros is a form of what 
she calls “cultural silence,” i.e., the creation of linguistic gaps that, she argues, “help 
facilitate feminist messages linked to Chicana ethnicity and the plight of the working 
class” (2009, 35). 
22 In this sense, silence is conceived relative to speech and signification and when, e.g., 
one had something to say but was forced into silent submission, when one was silenced. 
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V. AN AESTHESIS OF DEEP SILENCE: RE-MEMBERING THE 
DISAPPEARING DAUGHTERS OF JUÁREZ 
 
Siempre al borde 
Al borde de un camino 
Al borde de la historia 
Cortadas entre los bordes 
Las mujeres de ciudad 
Juárez 
Al borde de la muerte 
A las orillas del miedo 
Pueblan a una ciudad amordazada 
Al borde de la sombra 
Al borde del tiempo  
Una voz sin cuerpo 
Nadie.1 
—Marjorie Agostín, Secrets in the Sand 
 
In this chapter, I attend to the power of the aesthetic to call forth sensibilities that 
offer a different kind of access to the sensible world—that feel beyond presence—and 
express the “silent” contact with being. Finding guidance in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 
aesthetic writings—essays spanning from “Cezanne’s Doubt” (CD 1945) to “Eye and 
Mind” (1961)—and Gloria E. Anzaldúa’s mythopoetics, especially her invocation of 
Coyolxhauqui in Light in the Dark/Luz en lo Oscuro, I suggest that the aesthetic 
eventuates a “conceptless opening onto things” (EM 172). I call this sensuous modality of 
encountering the world an aesthesis of deep silence. It is this sensibility, I propose, that 
positions the beholder to listen for silences, for the reverberations, echoes, and hauntings 
of existence, opening the space-time of possibilities to sense and communicate beyond 
the verbal.  
To think from and through deep silence, thus avoiding a thinking that surveys 
phenomena from above and that, as such, objectifies them and forecloses the affective 
 
117 
dimension required for deep silence to make sense, in this chapter, I ground my analysis 
in experiences of grief, loss, and resilience, moving between the testimonies of the 
mothers of the disappearing daughters of Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, and the artistic 
expressions of such grief and grito like the pink crosses scattered throughout Juárez. 
Attending to first person testimonies of the mothers’ grief and their defiant erecting of the 
crosses makes explicit how deep silences are at play in giving human beings a different 
access to the sensuous world, in making sense of and denouncing phenomena like the 
disappearing daughters that, in their shattering singularity, would otherwise seem to leave 
behind a “senseless void” (Chin and Schutz 2020). I propose that the meaning conveyed 
through the aesthetic makes sense via pockets of opacity, deep silences that open onto the 
circularity or trans-spatiality of sense, eventuating through the interlacing of the mothers 
(the artists) and their surroundings (the geography of Juárez), the spectators and the 
crosses (the work of art).  
The intent of this chapter is thus twofold, both original and interpretative; it is, at 
once, an inquiry into the laboring of deep silence as it is disclosed by experiences of loss 
and grieving and a study of Merleau-Ponty’s and Anzaldúa’s notions of the aesthetic as a 
different modality of access to the sensible world. The chapter is divided into three 
sections, connected by interludes that introduce the reader to the testimonies of the 
grieving mothers, the “ephemeral art” (Driver 2015, 8) blossoming from Ciudad Juárez, 
and the challenge of making sensible disappearing women. The first section is a meta-
reflection on the challenges posed by thinking through phenomena such as silence or 
loss—“absent” phenomena that seem to command ineffability and senselessness. I 
suggest that Merleau-Ponty gives us resources to “think” through—which turns out to be 
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more like an auscultation—the paradoxes at the heart of intelligibility, specifically how to 
listen for and put into words phenomena that cannot be stated or grasped through 
propositional language, including deep silences and grieving a loss. In his aesthetic 
writings, Merleau-Ponty turns to literature and painting to find a way through the 
challenge of giving voice to a “‘Being’ […] which never fully is” (EM 190) that upholds, 
rather than resolves, paradoxes. 
In the second section, I attend to Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the aesthetic, 
especially painting, and claim that the aesthetic effects a different modality of 
engagement with the sensuous world. This aesthesis of deep silence recovers a 
fundamental openness to the originary operations of being, to a “logos that,” as Merleau-
Ponty observes, “pronounces itself silently in each sensible thing” (VI 207–08). This is 
the logos that, in the preceding chapter, I referred to as “silent logos.” As the close 
engagement with the sense-making effected by Juárez’s ecotestimonios reveals, art gives 
access to a mode of givenness, i.e., a modality of existence, that is what Rajiv Kaushik 
calls a “non-conceptual transcendence” (2011, 13). The pink crosses scattered throughout 
Ciudad Juárez open onto the spacing opened by the interplay of the artists (the mothers), 
place (both the local geography and collective memory), and the beholders without 
appealing to concepts or categories of thought. As such, this conceptless joining is not a 
grasping, but a being grasped. The beholder, beckoned by the vibrations of the sensible 
world, comes to see according to or with the sensible and silent logos onto which art 
opens (EM 164). In Juárez, being’s transcendence concretizes through the orienting work 
the local memorials effect upon the city’s geography and its inhabitants.  
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As discussed in the preceding chapter, in spite of their shared commitments, the 
historical, cultural, and geographical landscapes within which Anzaldúa and Merleau-
Ponty are situated matter to their thinking; it matters when at stake is not only the deep 
silence of sense but the sense of (or eventuating through) deep silence, which, in this 
case, is the sense of the disappearing daughters of Juárez. For this reason, in the last 
section of this chapter, I turn to the image of Coyolxauhqui (dear to Anzaldúa’s later 
writing and Chicana writers more broadly) to, at once, denounce the at times unspeakable 
violence of feminicide while elaborating on the insight that the making sensible of art 
“is” a dispossession. Coyolxauhqui makes explicit the dismemberment so essential to the 
process of creation—of re-membering—while also giving a new life, i.e., not forgetting, 
to the colonial context within which the grieving mothers strive to make sense of their 
disappearing daughters.  
1. Interlude – “More or Less Dead”: On the Disappearing Daughters of Juárez 
“I lost my daughters, and there is no name for that.” These are the words of 
Ernestina Enriquez Fierro, who lost her youngest daughter, 15-year-old Adriana, to 
feminicide in 2008. Enriquez Fierro is one of the mothers who participated in the 2020 
Seattle Times’ “Disappearing Daughters” Project, an initiative that combines visual 
journalism and visual poetry to bring attention to the feminicide that has been taking 
place for nearly three decades in the border town of Ciudad Juárez, in Chihuahua, Mexico 
(fig. 2). Since 1993—the year that marked the first recorded feminicide in Juárez—
thousands of women have been murdered or disappeared (see fig. 2). As is the case with 
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other instances in which violence targets women in general and women of color in 
particular, reliable statistics on feminicide are difficult to find. The 2018 Alternative 
Report on Violence against Women in Ciudad Juárez records that “between 1985 and 
2014, more than 47,178 women were killed due to their gender in Mexico” (CEDW 
2018). Over the last few years, the epidemic has worsened; between 2015 and 2017, 
registered feminicides increased by 72%, resulting in two feminicides on average per 
day.2 The majority of women and girls affected by feminicide are Indigenous. The 
available data, however, is likely a gross underrepresentation of cases due to the lack of 
adequate filing and tracking of circumstances surrounding women’s deaths, resistance on 
the part of the authorities to adopt the term feminicide to categorize such deaths, and 
outright mishandling of evidence. Even today, the available feminicide data have been 
gathered and published by independent activists and researchers—not public officials—in 
Figure 2. A pink cross with the sign “Ni Una Más” stands at the Paso del Norte International Bridge, which connects 





an attempt to resist the cultural apathy and indifference of authorities vis-à-vis 
feminicide. 
Since the events in Juárez reached global awareness in the mid 1990s, the issue 
often has been framed in the media by a “who”—as in, who kills these women? As 
professor of gender and sexuality studies at New Mexico State University Cynthia 
Bejarano argues, however, this framing does not help make sense of what is happening at 
the Juárez-El Paso border. On her account, the more critical question is, why? Why are 
women being killed with impunity? “‘Why is it that it’s ongoing? Why is it that it’s 
happening in every community, in every corner of the world?’ That should be the issue,” 
Bejarano says (cited in Chin and Schutz 2020). Feminicide, i.e., the killing of women on 
the basis of gender and gender performance and the broader relations of power that 
enable this kind of violence, is often invoked as a causal explanation for the deaths of 
women in Juárez.3 There would be much to say about the whys of the Juárez’s 
feminicide: geo-political events like global industrialization and the 1994 implementation 
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which prompted the 
proliferation of maquiladoras, i.e., U.S.-based manufacturing companies like IBM or 
Johnson & Johnson, in the region leaving women economically disempowered; the 
geographical location of Mexico between countries of the Andean region that produce 
cocaine and the U.S. that is the largest consumer of cocaine, which makes Mexico a 
fertile ground for illegal activity at the border that in turn exposes women to cartel 
violence; the cultural attitude of machismo prevalent in the country, which results in 
gender politics enabling and, to a large extent, condoning violence against women as law 
enforcement and government authorities continue to fail to adequately respond to the 
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epidemic; or the rampant cultural and state sanctioned racism, which contributes to the 
precarity of indigenous women, who make up the majority of victims of feminicide in 
Juárez.  
These brief remarks on Juárez’s struggles with feminicide point to the undeniable 
causal relation between gender-based violence and colonial policies and practices. To 
address the crisis, Mexico’s United Nations Women Representative Belén Sanz Luque 
urged NGOs, government (at every level), and general society to put an end to official 
policies of territorial extraction, sexual exploitation, and linguistic/cultural erasure that 
contribute to the feminicide crisis (Eagan 2020). The issue, however, is compounded by 
the fact that, in Mexico, the social and economic marginalization of Indigenous women 
and girls not only makes them prey of violence, but it is also used by officials as a 
justification for failing to protect them. In spite of international organizations’ and local 
activists’ demands for justice, the government often strives to keep the issue quiet. 
Feminicides in general and of Indigenous women in particular are often absent from 
public conversations about gender-based violence.  
What is striking about Enriquez Fierro’s words, however, is that they seem to 
suggest that these whys do not mitigate the “senseless void” left behind by Adriana, her 
disappearing daughter.4 As a critical phenomenologist grounded in the testimonies and 
experiences of the mothers of Juárez, I am haunted by her words: differently from when 
she lost her parents or her husband—instances in which language would at least provide 
the conceptual resources to name her experiences as “orphan” and “widow”—Enriquez 
Fierro tells us that “there is no word to describe [the loss of my daughter]” (Chin and 
Schutz 2020).5 Note that I am not suggesting that only the bereavement of someone who 
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has disappeared struggles to find expression in language or takes place in a temporal 
modality other than the indicative.6 Over the past two decades, an abundance of literature 
indicates that grieving is a process that is never fully finished or accomplished; one does 
not “get over” loss. Rather, the peculiarity of Juárez makes explicit the haunting of loss, 
the tracing of its fragile sense expressed through grief.  
Enrique Fierro does not specify what “this” refers to. Yet, the generality of the 
indexical is nevertheless contextual. Given her story—one which is shared by so many 
other women in Juárez—her saying that there are “no words” points not only to the 
absence of a name to designate a parent who loses her child, the fact that there are “no 
words” to describe the experience of having one’s daughter murdered with impunity, or 
that there is no language to express the paradoxical experience of living in the wake of 
one’s daughter’s death—in the presence of her absence—raises existential questions of 
sense and non-sense. Given the colonial context of her testimony, to me, her words 
resound also as a warning that although naming the reasons why one’s daughter is 
murdered and dismembered may help the local and international communities to rally 
around the cause and adopt a shared legal terminology to track and record the violence—
and I want to be clear, both efforts are essential to the fight against feminicide—linguistic 
and conceptual resources may be insufficient to bear witness to feminicide, to the 
experience, as we will see, of being haunted by another’s absence. This is especially true 
in a colonial context when existing linguistic, conceptual, and legal apparatuses through 
which bearing witness is possible often reify those same colonial structures, policies, and 
frames responsible for the cultural apathy and institutional impunity vis-à-vis the 
violence waged against women and Indigenous women in particular. 
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In Juárez, it is commonplace for politicians and news outlets to deploy tactics of 
divestment to keep the issue quiet. As Melissa Wright argues in “Necropolitics, 
Narcopolitics, and Femicide,” since the bodies of the victims are a reminder of 
institutional failures to prosecute crimes, media and political elites strive to divest 
women’s bodies of their denouncing power by reducing them to sexualized objects, to the 
sum of their parts (2011). To this end, when feminicides appear in public discourse and 
the media, women’s bodies are represented naked, violated, and dismembered—a 
representation facilitated by the fact that, when found, the bodies of the victims often are 
mutilated, disjointed, and scattered in the sand of the Chihuahuan desert. Moreover, just 
as often, the bodies are never recovered. In this concrete sense, the “disappearing 
daughters” are neither fully gone, absent in the material finality of death, nor fully 
present, in spirit or body. As the use of the gerund, “disappearing,” emphasizes, many of 
the daughters of Juárez exist in this suspended and haunting modality of existence that 
escapes representation. As such, they are consigned to the oblivion of official and public 
discourse, which finds itself unwilling and ill equipped to remember women who, in 
Chilean author Roberto Bolaño’s words, are “more or less dead” (2004, 779).7 
The tactics of divestment operative in Juárez are not an isolated phenomenon. 
Over the decades, feminist and critical race scholars have painstakingly articulated the 
cultural, linguistic, and political processes whereby the lives of racialized, gendered, and 
colonized others are rendered, to quote Judith Butler, “ungrievable,” that is, lives “that 
cannot be mourned because [they] ha[ve] never lived, that is, [they] ha[ve] never counted 
as a life at all” (2009, 38). Recently, decolonial feminist scholars like María Lugones 
(2003; 2010), Elena Ruiz (2014), and Mariana Ortega (2019) have denounced colonial 
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tactics of divestment theorizing from the lived experience of those subjected to colonial 
power structures. This methodological shift matters insofar as it positions the scholars to 
denounce the alienation, objectification, and fungibility that characterizes “spectral 
dwellings,” as Ruiz calls it, while also taking note of the affective and poetic avenues of 
resistance it makes possible—tactics to which I will return in what follows. That is, 
attention to the lived experiences of those subjected to colonizing tactics of divestment 
retains the ambiguity, opacity, and pathos of existence, thus resisting capitulation to a 
totalizing colonial logic whereby the colonized’s existence does not exceed the colonial 
epistemic frame norming intelligibility, but, rather, is fully visible and intelligible through 
them. Let me explain.  
In “Boomerang Perception and the Colonizing Gaze,” María Lugones argues that 
the colonizing gaze denies independence to the objects of its perception by rendering 
experiences of racialized and gendered others specular to the colonizing gaze’s 
interpretative paradigms and, as such, spectacular, or readily available for dissection and 
inspection by it. (In chapter 7, I will refer to this phenomenon in terms of 
specularization.) “The white gaze,” Lugones explains, “imagines its object to be … a 
mere but distorted image: image both in the sense of imagined and in the sense of a 
reflection, an imitation. … In both cases it construes us as dependent on the seer for its 
existence, and lacking an independent history because lacking an independent 
subjectivity” (2003, 157–58). This deeply narcissistic, nonreciprocal, colonizing 
perception produces what she calls “ghostly subjectivity.” As these remarks indicate, on 
Lugones’s account, the production and projection of the other as a specular image of the 
colonizing observer/inquirer is brought about by a specific perceptual disposition 
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characteristic of the modern/colonial world system. This disposition strives for full 
epistemic transparency and perceptual visibility, which entails treating, as we saw in 
chapter 3, the “residue of meaning” that exists between linguistic-cultural symbolic 
systems as “irrelevant to philosophical meaning and knowledge, and thus to the 
operations of reason” (Schutte 1998, 56, 61). In fact, presupposed by this colonizing 
perceptual disposition is an understanding of sense and reality as transparent, as sanitized 
from affect, ambiguities, and the lacunae of existence, and instead bound to what can be 
clearly and linearly conveyed through the conceptual and propositional paradigms of 
European modernity.  
These considerations bring us to the heart of the problem. We should hear, in 
these remarks, the echoes of the aporia of representation highlighted by postcolonial 
feminist critiques. Adriana’s haunting expresses a complex phenomenon whereby 
memorializing her absence and denouncing gendered colonial violence seem to be, at 
once, “unspeakable” and “unrepresentable,” that is, unable to be conveyed via words or 
images without further relegating them to anonymity. And yet, mothers of the victims 
and activists-artists vehemently demand that feminicide resists the oblivion to which 
official discourse consigns it.8 This, for them, is one step toward justice. To repropose 
Drucilla Cornell’s warning, then, the inquirer “must confront how [she is] shaping others 
through those representations so as to reinforce the images and fantasies of the colonial as 
well as the not-yet-decolonized imaginary” (2010, 100). That is, a decolonial feminist 
account is faced with the ethical moment arising from the question of how to bear witness 
to violence and haunting absences. A ghosting account, one that swallows or denies the 
aporiae, ambiguities, and lived dimensions of a phenomenon like disappearing 
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transforming the object of perception into mere images, makes the other’s experience 
specular to and consumable by the colonizing gaze, thus undermining the very possibility 
of bearing witness to the non-colonial other in her difference.9 
The work of grieving and denouncing—which requires re-membering—the “more 
or less dead” and often dis-membered daughters with which memory is tasked is 
especially arduous. As Driver observes, “haunting is a seemingly unquantifiable 
phenomenon, for how can one prove that it exerts influence on the living?” (2015, 90). 
Such a phenomenon cannot be conveyed by forms of expression that seek to represent, 
i.e., to make present, facts; in their memorializing, they would not only miss the fragility 
of events that were and are never fully present like the disappearing daughters of Juárez; 
they would also partake in colonizing tactics of divestment. And yet, as Avery Gordon 
observes in Ghostly Matters, “death exists in the past tense, disappearance in the present” 
(2008, 113). As the testimonies of the grieving mothers suggest, disappearing is a 
phenomenon that cannot be sealed off, relegated to the past, as one does not simply “get 
over” loss. As Laguna Cabral remarks about remembering her daughter, Idalí Juache 
Languna, who disappeared in 2010 and whose body’s fragments were found two years 
later in the Navajo Arroyo, the pain she experiences “never goes away” (Chin and 
Schultz 2020). Remarkedly, then, albeit not in the indicative mood, i.e., a modality of 
existence that conveys the certainty that something is the case and that can be expressed 
through modern/colonial logos, the disappearing daughters continue to “be present,” to 
haunt their mothers, families, and community. This “presence,” however, takes place in 
that peculiar modality of existence that Ruiz refers to as “spectral dwelling” and 
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characterized by state of estrangement or not belonging resulting from processes of 
historical and cultural divestments.10  


















—Claudia Castro Luna, 
“María Luisa Ark of the Covenant” 
 
2. Toward a New Intelligibility: The “Absurd” Effort of Speaking Silence?  
Although not concerned with grieving or with the violent complex processes of 
colonial exploitation, one of the central questions that guided Merleau-Ponty’s inquiries 
was locating new resources for the renewal of sense of human and non-human life. In 
more than one occasion (it suffices to think of the 1951 Geneva lecture, “Man and 
Adversity,” or the introduction to the “Eye and Mind,” written a decade later), Merleau-
Ponty expressed his concern that the postmodern world he lived in would foreclose the 
possibility of transforming ontological, epistemological, ethical, and aesthetic beliefs. 
Resonating with Heidegger’s Memorial Address (1966), in the opening of the “Eye and 
Mind,” Merleau-Ponty expresses the worry that Western culture, by renouncing to live in 
the phenomena it strives to understand and encouraging “operational thinking” instead, 
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would overlook fundamental “sources of meaning” required for said transformation (EM 
159). That is, the fear and evasion of contingency characteristic of the lived metaphysics 
of his time entailed thinking on “the model of human machines” (EM 160), as also he 
makes clear in the conclusion of “Man and Adversity” (MA). The risk, he warns, is that 
human beings would “enter into a cultural regimen … a nightmare, from which there is 
no awakening,” a nightmare that would foreclose the renewal of sense (EM 160).  
Merleau-Ponty’s concern should sound eerily familiar, like a prescient warning of 
sorts. In fact, it is possible to think of the foreclosure of the depth of silence brought 
about by the modern/colonial world system discussed in the preceding chapter in terms of 
the “coloniality of silence” as one of the historical processes precluding the 
transformation of ontological and aesthetic beliefs. Not surprisingly, in Merleau-Ponty 
and the Face of the World (2016), Glen Mazis acknowledges that silence is mentioned at 
key junctures in Merleau-Ponty’s writing where it plays a pivotal role in giving human 
beings access to the depths of the world and new resources for the renewal of sense (xv). 
If professor and practicing psychologist Robert Neimeyer is right to say that “the 
reconstruction of a world of meaning [shattered by loss] is the central process in 
grieving” (1999, 65), and if deep silence is somehow involved in the process of meaning 
renewal, then, perhaps, Merleau-Ponty has something to tell us, even if indirectly, about 
silence, grief, and sense.  
Consider the remarks from “Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence,” where, 
couched within a discussion of expressive language, Merleau-Ponty tells us that to 
understand language as an “originating operation,” i.e., language that “teaches us to see” 
anew, “we must pretend to have never spoken” (IL 46, 77, 46). These remarks suggest 
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that, for Merleau-Ponty, the creative power of language and, more broadly, of expression 
is somehow tied to silence. But how does deep silence function as an originating 
operation? And, even more pressing, if thinking through creation, novelty, and new 
meaning requires silence, what is the philosopher to do? How is she to speak of a 
phenomenon that, by its very definition, seems to command the absence of words? While 
I will return to the former question in the second part of the chapter, the latter question 
touches upon one of the central challenges left to us by Merleau-Ponty’s sudden death in 
1961. If we take his elaboration of an ontology of the flesh as “a radical rethinking of the 
experience of belonging from within, [as] a phenomenology of being-of-the-world” 
(Landes 2020, 141), how is the philosopher to bear witness to such an experience?11 If 
contact with being remains elusive and silent, how is the philosopher to express it 
through language and concepts, whose fixity and decidability partake in the reification of 
becoming into what is fixed, universal, and stable, as Nietzsche famously reminds us in 
the preface of Beyond Good and Evil (1989, 1–3)? What modalities are called forth to do 
justice to this silent belonging, to an account of life that is “not an argument” (Nietzsche 
2001, 117)? 
These questions may seem, at first, to point to an impasse.12 Yet, Merleau-Ponty 
is a thinker of becoming, ambiguity, and difference, which means that, on his account, 
aporias are not obstacles to “put[ting] into words a certain silence” (VI 125) but, rather, 
the very means to draw “the things themselves […] from the depths of their silence” into 
expression, to “plunge into the world […] to make it say, finally, what in its silence it 
means to say” (VI 4, 39). Rather than purifying ideas, concepts, and sense by ridding 
them of their “confusions” (the move predilected by Descartes as well as the Husserl of 
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Ideen II), Merleau-Ponty takes this “inextricable confusion” (PhP 518) as the starting 
point to put forth a “new type of intelligibility” (VI 268) that upholds entanglements.13 
As he eloquently notes in the Visible and the Invisible, “the idea of chiasm and 
Ineinander is […] the idea that every analysis that disentangles renders unintelligible—
This bound to the very meaning of questioning which is not to call for a response in the 
indicative—It is a question of creating a new type of intelligibility (intelligibility through 
the world and Being as they are—‘vertical’ and not horizontal)” [sic] (VI 268). The 
seeming impasse presented by the paradox to give voice to an ineffable phenomenon 
turns out to disclose something central to the phenomenon itself; the aporias of speaking 
silence are, in this sense, “the rediscovery of vertical being” (VI 178)—of deep silence—
to play on Merleau-Ponty’s expression. But what does it mean to “think” and “express” 
without disentangling, without seeking an answer in the indicative? What is this “new 
type of intelligibility” required to speak silence, including the silence of grief?  
These questions bring us to the heart of the present difficulty. In my view, the 
challenge raised by Merleau-Ponty goes beyond creating new concepts like “chiasm” and 
“Ineinander” to express the world. The task at hand is to give voice to phenomena—like 
deep silence but also grief—that cannot be stated, i.e., translated into propositional 
language. As Merleau-Ponty observes the philosopher’s effort of putting into words 
coincidence with being is an “inexplicable weakness” (VI 125):  
The philosopher should keep silent, coincide in silence, and rejoin in Being a 
philosophy that is already ready-made. But yet everything comes to pass as 
though he wished to put into words a certain silence he harkens to within himself. 
His entire ‘work’ is this absurd effort. He wrote in order to state his contact with 




From these remarks we begin to see that silent contact with being, the world, and others 
takes place on an order other than that of transparent signification, at a “vertical” or 
“deep” dimension that is prior to “the reflexive cleavage” (VI 130), as we will see in 
more detail in chapter 6. As such, deep silence cannot be approached directly, which 
means that it cannot be grasped fully, stated, or subsumed under concepts. There is no 
name for the depth of experiences like Enriquez Fierro’s grief for her disappearing 
daughter, Adriana; no words to convey the indignation and outrage provoked by the 
complacency of state officials vis-à-vis feminicide.14 Turning silence or grief into 
positive concepts (by stating them) would undermine their vertical, deep, and opaque 
character transforming them into their verbal and conceptual substitutes, into “something 
said” (VI 4). In this sense, what is required is hesitation in speaking too soon, “in 
impos[ing] well-worn labels of sense on what is encountered” (2016, 24), as Mazis 
reminds us. 
And yet, it would be a mistake to take Merleau-Ponty’s caution as suggesting that 
this silent contact with being is ineffable, unintelligible, and, as such, non-sensical. In 
spite of Chinn’s and Schutz’s remarks that the “missing and murdered women of Juárez 
are … beloved daughters who have left behind an unimaginable and senseless void” 
(2020), and although, at first and at times, it may be felt that way, Enriquez Fierro’s grief 
is not non-sense—a “senseless void”—and silence is not ineffable, absence, or lack. 
Conceptions like these would treat silence—but also the world’s and the other’s 
alterity—as a positivity conceived, yet again, over and against the fullness of 
signification, which is to say that it would operate within an ontology of the in-itself and 
a philosophy of reflection (transparency/purity) that Merleau-Ponty puts into question 
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(Alloa 2017, 54).15 Importantly, it would treat bereavement as the radical interruption or 
suspension of a fully coherent system of meaning within which the errancy, uncertainty, 
and contingency of experiences like loss do not have a place.16 It would condemn (the 
denouncing of) feminicide to oblivion.  
On the contrary, for Merleau-Ponty, silence is different in kind from silence as 
postmodern culture is accustomed to think it, i.e., as the contrary of language or 
signification. What I call deep silence is neither full presence nor full absence, but of “an 
order where there are […] non-language significations, but they are not accordingly 
positive” (VI 171). That is, deep silence is a hollow; it opens up depths and dimensions 
within being that, although “resist the operations of free subjectivity” (NMS), institute 
fields of sense that orient the sensible perceiver in space and time, making possible 
publicly expressing the outrage without turning feminicide into a spectacle. Deep silence, 
then, appears to be, at once, key to effecting communion with being (contact with being 
is silence) and that which ensures a necessary distance or divergence (écart) from 
immediate coincidence with being (contact with being is silence, which is to say that the 
silent contact with being cannot be stated). As such, deep silence signifies even though 
this signifying occurs laterally, through temporal and spatial gaps, and latently, always 
only ever suggested in and through the sensuous orientations, habits, and modalities of 
exiting it makes possible, like artistic expressions. As we will see, the deep silence of 
feminicide signifies through the affective rearticulations the crosses effect upon the 
beholders and the local geography.  
Concretely, this means that although the inquirer is warned of the impossibility of 
stating this silent contact with being—this deep silence—she is not thereby told to remain 
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silent (as in silently mute) either. Grappling with the paradoxes posed by creative 
language and the challenges of speaking the silent contact with being reveals to Merleau-
Ponty an in-between path that calls for neither mute silence nor statements, but rather, 
that dispossesses the agential subject letting the world “speak” for itself. As he observes, 
expressing contact with being—which includes making sense of loss—requires 
suspending familiar expectations to develop a “new type of intelligibility” foreclosed by 
postmodern and colonial Western culture. This new type of intelligibility—as we will see 
in section II—is an aesthesis (here to be understood in terms of its Greek root, aisthèsis, 
i.e., the sensible access to the world) of deep silence—a modality of approaching the 
world that brings about what Merleau-Ponty calls a “conceptless opening” (EM 172) onto 
the world whereby the process of inquiry, communion, and expression are not subsumed 
within a teleological question-and-response model whose end goal is obtaining answers 
in the indicative, but keep the process of sense-making open.  
3. Interlude– The Murmuring of Images 
How to makeup with yourself 
After each self breakup? 
How to cuddle under a broken wing 
The girl of you? 
Or how to explain 
That deep inside the sea 
sister wind tries on her dress? 
Snails leave their homes when no one is looking 
And birds sometimes are afraid to fly 
who is going to tell you 
what you only know? 
Whose fool will tell spider 
to spin less? 
… 




In the introduction to the 2006 photography exhibit World Class City, 
photographer Julián Cardona writes that “Juárez blows like cold wind through the 
windows of our soul and demands our attention. We embrace its images as if they could 
fill our own empty spaces but we cannot hold on” (cited in Driver 2015, xi). Cordona’s 
words bring attention to the fact that, not unlike words and concepts, images are not 
always suited to give voice to the silences of grief, to “track down ghosts and to listen to 
the mysteries that surround them,” as Lourdes Portillo puts it in the opening of her 
documentary, Señorita Extraviada (2002). In More or Less Dead: Feminicide, Haunting, 
and the Ethics of Representation, Driver claims that Cardona’s words expose a deep-
seated human hunger for voyeuristic graphic imagery, like the one we find in Juárez local 
newspapers El Diario or Notre, to fill “the void that threatens to engulf us all, 
accompanied by the knowledge that such images will never be able to satisfy us” (2015, 
xiii). While I agree with Driver, to me, Cardona’s words are also a reminder of the 
“power of error” (VI 125) that concepts and (certain kinds of) images become when they 
strive to stabilize the uncertainty and errancy of existence, to impose meaning upon what 
is at times felt as a senseless void. While graphic images and words may provide 
temporary relief by filling the “empty spaces” left behind by loss, they cannot “hold on” 
to the memory of the disappearing daughters to a meaning that stretches overtime and 
across space (that is, transtemporally and transspatially), to the ephemeral meanings the 
process of grieving seeks to eventuate.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, images are central to these colonizing tactics of 
divestment. In “Spectral Perception and Ghostly Subjectivity,” Mariana Ortega argues 
that colonial images make racialized and gendered bodies overly visible (they make them 
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“spectacular”), thus exposing them to the dissecting colonizing gaze, while also rendering 
them “utterly spectral in the sense of their transformation into mere images in the minds 
of the colonizers” (2019, 404). As we are learning to see, a verbal or visual account that 
strives, in its descriptions, for full visibility risks objectifying the experiences and bodies 
of racialized and gendered subjects; it confiscates the lived and affective dimensions of 
experience, reducing them to spectacles, that is, to still photographs spread out in full 
display, readily available to be surveilled, scrutinized, and measured by the colonizing 
spectator. Problematically, as Alia Al-Saji reminds us and we will see in more detail in 
chapter 7, this scrutinizing apparatus reproduces the “logic of racialization that fixes and 
dissects the body …, cuts instantaneous cross-sections its experience, making it again the 
slave of an appearance” (2019b, 8). 
It is this ghosting that we see at work in the politics of representation of Juárez, 
where the colonizing gaze of news outlets and politicians, “aided by photographic 
technologies turns what is real into ghostly, what is human into specter” (Ortega 2019, 
404). Although the disappearing women have already been robbed of their vitality 
through feminicide, the graphic representations of their dismembered bodies printed in 
the local newspapers like El Diario, partake in ghosting practices whereby, as Mariana 
Ortega would put it, “flesh and blood selves became disposable beings, appendages to 
machines, and ghostly subjects” (2019, 404).17 (Local newspapers often feature sections 
called la nota roja, which print photos of the dismembered bodies.)  
While we may not be surprised that these kinds of graphic images expose 
women’s bodies to the colonizing gaze, in my view, ghosting is also operative in 
aesthetic productions intended to counter official tactics of divestment (i.e., official 
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silences and graphic representations) by inscribing the absences of disappearing women 
in official memory. Take, as two examples, Elina Chauvet’s well-known Zapatos Rojos 
(Red Shoes) exhibit (see fig. 3) or 
Celia Alvarez- Muñoz’s collection 
Fibra y Furia (Fiber and Fury): 
Exploitation is in Vogue (see figs. 4 
and 5). Although Benita Heiskanen is 
right in suggesting—as she does in 
“Ni Una Más: Not One More”—that, 
“given the disempowering nature of 
the massive censorship machinery silencing feminicide, such a participatory process in an 
art exhibition may provide an important site for personal reflection or public 
intervention” (2013, 7), it seems to me that we need to proceed with caution when 
representing disappearing women. In The Femicide Machine, Sergio González Rodríguez 
argues that, in the absence of investigations, and although family members have personal 
photos and memories, the public often judges the victims of feminicide in Juárez by the 
position of their bodies, the color of their painted fingernails, and their clothing (2012, 
153). Because of this forced association, the display of disappearing women’s clothes, 
even when the intent is to combat cultural repression of their memory, unintentionally 
plays into the ghosting of coloniality that reduces women to objects to be looked at, to 
spectacles. The gendered and colonial politics of representation are such that Chauvet’s 
and Muñoz’s attempts to highlight and make present the bodily absence of the women by 
Figure 3. Elina Chauvet, Zapatos rojos (Red Shoes), each pair 
of shoes symbolizes a woman who vanished from the streets of 
Ciudad, red representing their spilled blood. 
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displaying their shoes and garments risks to further eviscerate the disappearing women of 
life, transforming them into anonymous and sexualized images. 
When we situate our analysis 
within the specificities of Juàrez’s 
colonial context, we see how this 
kind of art positions the beholder as 
a spectator vis-à-vis an archive of 
data (hundreds of shoes and items of 
clothing) that stores, accumulates, 
classifies, and scrutinizes files from 
the past in a static and spread-out 
present. In this context, art functions 
Figure 4. Celia Álvarez Muñoz’s Fibra y Furia (Fiber and Fury): Exploitation is in Vogue, contextualizes femicide 
within the transnational dynamics of the U.S.-Mexico border region. Her installations displaying a range of women’s 
garments without bodies are a critique of the fashion industry, with subtle cues linking the Juárez femicides with the 
surrounding transnational economic affairs. 
 
Figure 5. Celia Álvarez Muñoz’s Fibra y Furia (Fiber and 
Fury): Exploitation is in Vogue, detail of the “sequined crotch” 




as archival objectivity that transforms what it represents into a soulless carcass, a mere 
image. And looking at these images does not, as Heiskanen naïvely concludes, 
“necessarily entangle the viewer in them,” but, rather, risks partaking in the tactics of 
divestment (2013, 7, emphasis added). So how to inscribe in public, official memory 
disappearing women whose existence and whose death are rendered spectral by material 
and cultural tactics of divestment? How to remember when, as Enriquez Fierro and 
Mariana Ortega remind us, there are “no words” that can represent this grief and images 
can harm by further exscribing these phenomena and experiences out of official history 
and narratives? How to inscribe in official memory disappearing women whose existence 
is spectral without succumbing to the tactics of divestment that produce ghostly 
subjectivities? (Although I will return to the question of artistic expression and memory-
work in chapter 7, for now it suffices to note that artistic forms that memorialize, i.e., fix 
or capture, phenomena like the disappearing daughters unavoidably fail at their self-
imposed task of “giving voice to [the oppressed’s] laments” (Carpenter 2018).18) 
Efforts to reclaim the victims’ memory from the oblivion of official discourse and 
the violence of colonial logic and apparatuses, however, does not stop at gathering data or 
brining visibility to the feminicides through speaking up or visual representation.19 The 
politics of representation is Juárez inspired a global activists-artists movement to take a 
stand not only on official silences, but also on the tactics of divestment deployed by 
officials to keep the issue quiet. While certain kinds of images, speech, and concepts may 
fail to attend to and denounce the crevices and opacities of phenomena like disappearing 
and feminicide, partaking instead in the ghosting of coloniality, others do not. It is 
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precisely through art—through what Driver refers to as “ephemeral art such as graffiti 
and local memorials” (2015, 8), including the black crosses on pink backgrounds painted 
across Juárez (see fig. 6)—that many grieving mothers and activists across the globe 
express this paradoxical modality of existence, striving to make sense of—make 
sensible—this spectral dwelling.20 As we will see in what follows, it is the crosses’ 
ephemeral nature that makes them well suited to remember and denounce without 
capitulating to specularization. Their fragility, in fact, exposes the beholder to an 
experience of loss, which undermines the possibility of re-presenting the disappearing in 
its full visibility, without visual or auditory lacunae. As such, the crosses do not position 
the disappearing as a spectacle and the beholder as a spectator. Rather, they denounce the 
disappearing—including the life of the victims and the colonial and gendered violence—
affectively by transforming beholders into witnesses.  
It would seem, then, that an 
aesthetics that “holds on”—i.e., 
that remembers and denounces 
feminicide without partaking in 
tactics of divestment—is one that 
straddles a precarious line between 
presence and absence, finding 
ways to convey the experience of a 
loss that is not a full absence—the phenomenon of being “more or less dead.” To use 
Merleau-Ponty’s expression, “holding on” would entail the seeming paradoxical task of 
“forget[ing] origins and giv[ing] to the past not a survival, which is the hypocritical form 
Figure 6. Pink cross being painted on a city wall in Juárez by a 
woman in memory of the victims of feminicide. 
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of forgetfulness, but a new life, which is the noble form of memory” (IL 59). As we are 
about to see, works of art like the crosses “forget origins” not by re-presenting the 
disappearing daughters, i.e., making them present, spread out as mere images vis-à-vis 
the spectator. Rather, they give the disappearing daughters “a new life” through the 
transformation of the beholders (the city, the passerby, and the mothers) into witnesses. 
4. “Conceptless Opening”: On the Aesthesis of Deep Silence 
Perhaps one of Merleau-Ponty’s most exciting contributions is the recognition 
that bearing witness to the springing forth of the world, to phenomena that cannot be 
fixed through concepts like silence or grieving the disappearing of a loved one, calls for 
modalities of expression that do not strive for transparency, but, rather, that push 
phenomenology beyond itself toward the aesthetic. Merleau-Ponty’s recognition of the 
reciprocal instituting openness of subject and world entails a methodological shift from a 
transcendental reduction and a study of being-in-the world to hyper-reflection and a study 
of being-of-the-world. That is, the modality by which one bears witness to the springing 
forth of the world matters. Since reflection and, more broadly, beings are of the world, 
Merleau-Ponty was forced to grapple with the fact that the world and its historical and 
social structures shape not only what we see, but also how we perceive the world, i.e., our 
modalities of existing in the world. It is in light of this consideration that we witness, 
more and more prominently as the philosopher’s thinking matures, the cultivation of 
sensibilities that give the beholder a different access to the sensible world than that 
privileged by modern and postmodern custom. It is at this juncture that Merleau-Ponty 
turns to aesthetics, a modality of expression that concretizes hyper-reflection.  
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We find, in Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on art, the recognition that, differently 
from logocentric renderings of being and phenomena—but also from design or 
extension—secondary qualities like color give the artist, through their “indecisive 
murmurs,” a “deeper opening upon things”—a “conceptless opening” to be precise (EM 
172).21 Recall Merleau-Ponty’s rich descriptions of color perception, which he mobilizes 
to spell out the mutual solicitation of milieu and perceiver. In chapter 4, we saw that the 
perceiver’s orienting through and toward the world is not in the indicative or determined 
in advance. Rather, it is an “oneiric interlacing,” i.e., the accomplishment of a call-and-
response taking place in hiding whereby the milieu calls forth a certain way of seeing or 
hearing that the perceiver assumes and that provides the milieu with the means of 
becoming determinate. This is to say, first, that there is a “logos before language” (PC II, 
29), an implicit and inchoate logos—a silent logos—beyond subjectivity that inhabits the 
sensuous and calls forth the beholder’s orientation.22 This silent logos, Merleau-Ponty 
tells us, is the “vibration of appearances which is the cradle of things” (CD 15). This 
ontological dimension is pre-reflective; the distinction between subject and object, being 
and nothingness, perceiver and perceived has yet to be made.  
Second, the power of art is to “recover a fundamental openness to this implicit [or 
silent] logos”—to the eventuation of being and sense—that “refuses to be a foundational 
principle” (Kaushik 2011, 5, 11). As Merleau-Ponty remarks, “in the painter’s stroke—
the flexuous line—or the sweep of the brush is the peremptory evocation [of a] logos that 
pronounces itself silently in each sensible thing” (VI 207-08). In Art and Institution, 
Kaushik attributes this power of the aesthetic to its “auto-referential” nature by 
explaining that the work of art points to its own origins (i.e., to this silent logos that is its 
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conditions of possibility) from within itself, without appeal or reference to a “wholly 
other category of existence” (2011, 1, 13). It is in this sense that art is a “conceptless 
opening onto things”; it reveals a being that “is” conceptless, a mode of givenness that 
“is” a transcendence prior to thought, which, as we will see, concretizes through the 
orienting work the local memorials effect upon the city’s geography and its inhabitants 
(Kaushik 2011, 13).  
In other words, the “originating” power of the aesthetic lies precisely in giving 
access and expression to—in making sensible—this oneiric fabric of existence beyond 
presence, this “order where there are […] non-language significations, but they are not 
accordingly positive” (VI 171). Art provides a conceptless opening beyond the presence 
of consciousness wherein the lines between imaginary and real, essence and existence, 
visible and invisible are blurred.23 After all, on Merleau-Ponty’s account, the silent 
contact with and expression of the world—the indecisive murmurs or laments—offered 
through painting are not locatable on a Cartesian grid of objective space or translatable 
into propositional language. “Art,” he reminds us, “is not construction, artifice, 
meticulous relationship to a space and a world existing outside. It is truly ‘inarticulate 
cry,’ as Hermes Trismegistus said, ‘which seemed to be the voice of the light’” (EM 
182). As such, it is not the making present or the representation of “prosaic things which 
are absent” (EM 164). Rather, the “imaginary”—here understood as that “of the 
image”—  
is much further away from the actual […] because it does not present the mind 
with an occasion to rethink the constitutive relations of things; because, rather, it 
offers to our sight [regard], so that it might join with them, the inward traces of 
vision, and because it offers to vision its inward tapestries, the imaginary texture 




In this sense, the aesthetics offers the perceiver the opportunity to sensuously and 
affectively “join”—rather than “think”—the relation of things, this “non-linguistic order 
of signification”—or silent logos.  
Note how this “joining” is not a capitulating to the immediacy of self-presence, a 
pre-cognitive coincidence with, for example, Ledezma Ortega’s grief for the death of her 
16-year-old daughter, Paloma Angélica Escobar Ledezma, in March 2002. The sense of 
these non-linguistic dimensions of meaning is not a (literally) mute coincidence with the 
world, a Bergsonian coincidence-through-direct-intuition of sorts.24 Such an 
understanding would simply displace, rather than decenter, the dualism of sense versus 
non-sense from the linguistic/natural dichotomy to a less recognizable binary within the 
realm of the pre-thetic. As noted, the silent logos inhabiting the sensuous is not a 
foundational principle. Rather, “this being breaks the solidity of a semantic order” 
(Kaushik 2011, 11) revealing itself to be a fundamental dispossession (as you may recall 
from the preceding chapter), a fecund void (as we will see in the chapter that follows). 
This is to say that the sensible makes sense diacritically, trans-spatially or through gaps—
in sum, “within the convergent space between gesture and surface” (Kaushik 2011, 18).  
In Merleau-Ponty and the Faces of the World, Mazis elaborates on the 
transspatial and transtemporal originating of the sense of the work of art by observing 
that the image is not “anywhere specific, not ‘in’ the painter, not ‘on’ the canvas, not at 
the geographical location of Mont Sainte-Victoire, not at the time he painted, not at the 
time each person looked at the painting, but in an unlocatable time-space interplaying 
among all these appearances…it is in their circulation” (2016, 245). Thus, to the previous 
remarks about the power of the aesthetic, we should add that art discloses the fact that the 
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sense of the sensible eventuates through the pockets of opacity of being’s interlacing, 
which, rife with affective charge, make sense by “transport[ing] the reader in time and 
place, without being epistemically decipherable” (Al-Saji 2019b, 3). The sensuous 
fragility and hesitancy of the aesthetics’ gestures makes visible the pockets of deep 
silence at play in the eventuation of sense, in effecting an aesthesis of deep silence. 
Through his careful descriptions of Cézanne’s relation with Mont Sainte-Vitorie in 
“Cézanne’s Doubt” or of the slow-motion film of Matisse painting in “Indirect Language 
and the Voices of Silence” and “Eye and Mind,” Merleau-Ponty illustrates the 
transspatiality of sense. We learn that it is the wavering of Matisse’s brush before it 
strikes the canvas that opens onto the affective and deeply silent space whereby Matisse 
harkens to and is reoriented by the “indecisive murmurs” of the world (EM 172). And the 
brushing resumes as if animated by the landscape’s summons, painting the world 
“according to its own wishes” (VI 133). Thus, it is precisely through these knots that the 
aesthetic makes sense; deep silences at once are and open a space of interplay between 
the fleeting traces animated within the perceiver and a certain shading of the landscape, a 
shimmering of the world that is always already summoned by and summoning of the 
“carnal relationship[s] of meaning, the halos of signification” sedimented in the perceiver 
and her cultural-historical lineage (MA 234).  
While I will elaborate in more detail on transtemporality in the following chapter, 
for now, notice how Matisse’s hesitation also reveals that deep silence lines expression in 
all its temporal figurations: the sense and scope of his paintings are not known, by 
Matisse, in advance. Rather, the sense that he seeks to express only exists once it is 
expressed, painted; it eventuates according to a paradoxical movement of the future 
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anterior such that “Matisse’s women [who] were not immediately women” will have been 
once Matisse’s Standing Nude with Downcast Eyes or Head of a Recumbent Figure are 
painted (PrP 184). Until then, the sense eventuating through Matisse’s gestures is not 
possible. Notably, what precedes and lines expression is not nothing. That is, saying that 
the sense of Standing Nude with Downcast was not possible prior to its realization should 
not be taken as indicating that expression comes into the world ex nihilo. As Cézanne’s 
obsessive return to the same-yet-always-already-different landscape suggests, his 
affective and silent contact with the world is a deep silence that is pregnant, that calls 
forth new ways of making sense. It is this silent logos. And this silent logos is not left 
behind as the painting is completed. Rather, it continues to line present expression, being 
carried with(in) it. Referring specifically to Cézanne’s works, Mazis observes that “the 
sense of Mont Sainte-Victoire being made and remade from one end of the world to the 
other is only an expression that all of existence has a lining of dreamlike depths that 
potentially interconnect in transformation and contribute to its identity as much as the 
more stable, determinate properties articulated by reflection” (2016, 246). The new 
meaning expressed through the work of art is not a meaning fully possessed, finally 
articulable by the presence of modern/colonial logos. Instead, it continues to be felt like a 
strangeness, a haunting presence. In Donald Landes’s eloquent words, that which is 
expressed is thus an inscription which also “exscribes” (2013, 9); it brings along, but also 
keeps at a distance—that is, it makes present as absent—its own sense. It is this 
transtemporality and, more explicitly, transspatiality of sense eventuating through deep 
silences that the pink crosses of Juárez make sensible.  
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5. Interlude – “Ephemeral Art”: On the Trans-Spatiality of the Pink Crosses of Juárez 
In the wake of official authorities’ indifference toward the violence and 
unwillingness to investigate the murders, mothers of the victims and local activists have 
taken it upon themselves to seek justice for the crimes through various grassroot 
measures, including the reclaiming of public spaces through the production of ephemeral 
art like graffiti, posters, and local memorials like the black and pink crosses. In regards to 
the latter, since the 1990s, the victims’ mothers have been painting telephone poles across 
Juárez in pink, with a black cross symbolizing the lost life, as well as erecting wooden 
pink crosses to mark the disappearings and denounce their daughters’ spectral dwelling.25 
Erected in the Campo Algodonero, a cotton field where the bodies of eight women were 
found in 2001 (see fig. 7), but also at the Juárez-El Paso border crossing (see fig. 2), and 
in the city’s peripheries on walls 
and rocks (see fig. 8), the 
crosses have become part of the 
city’s iconography, marking 
sites of historical memory and 
serving, as Rosa-Linda Fregoso 
writes, as “silent witnesses to 
symbolic and experiential 
instances of violence” (2007, 54).26  
As the qualifier “ephemeral” suggests, however, the crosses’ standing is far from 
lasting. Differently from artistic productions exhibited within the shielding and, often, 
sanitizing walls of a museum, the crosses are works of ecotestimonios—which Driver 
Figure 7. The pink crosses mark Campo Algodonero, a cotton field where 
the bodies of eight women were found in 2001.  
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defines as informal and nomadic “projects that link art, memory, and geography to 
demonstrate the persistence of memory” (2015, 131). Ecotestimonios are distinctive 
because of the peculiar relationship with the spatial surroundings they institute. The 
crosses accrue meaning through the community’s ritual practices centered around them, 
the public discourse that their erection and sight ignite, and the geographical site they 
commemorate, while also imbuing the sites and local geography with collective, 
historical memory. As Louis Bickford notes in discussing institutional acts of memory-
erasure such as the replacing of mass grave sites with shopping malls and airports in 
Argentina, “[b]y themselves and isolated from their context, monuments, memorials, and 
museums have little effect. Their power is generated by place, by the meaningfulness of 
their location […], and 
perhaps even more 
importantly by the 
meaning brought to them 
through the public 
discourse they inspire 
and provoke” (2005, 
102).  
Ecotestimonios resist tactics of divestment by enlisting the local geography and 
beholders as witnesses, whose interplay with the artists (the mothers) and collective 
memory gives the crosses meaning.27 Through the enduring and repeated acts of painting 
and erecting of the crosses, the city surface comes to bear witness to the disappearing 
daughters. This not only means that the city’s geography harbors collective memory by 
Figure 8. Pink crosses painted on rocks at the outskirts of Juárez. Many of the 
women’s bodies are found abandoned at the peripheries of town. 
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which the disappearing daughters become sensible, re-membering, on behalf of the 
mothers and the local and international community, the disappearing women’s spectral 
dwelling. It also means that these ecotestimonios summon those who traverse the city to 
re-member. This re-membering takes place through the re-orientations that the crosses 
elicit within the beholders. By orienting them differently through space, the city’s 
geography is not alone in “holding on.”28 The crosses transform beholders (passerby, 
grieving mothers, and Ciudad Juárez) into witnesses such that ephemeral art becomes a 
means not only to make sense-sensible the loss and disappearing, but also, as Michelle A. 
Holling puts it, “to produce witnesses” to the violence, grieving, and resilience (2014, 
316).29  
The crosses’ dynamic sense-making means that their sens—meaning and 
orientation—varies at the register of the material alterations to their spatial and temporal 
arrangements. As “ephemeral art” (Driver 2015, 8), the crosses’ relationship with their 
surroundings is especially tenuous. This is so not only because of the geography’s 
propensity for erasure, but also because their material existence is continuously 
threatened by city officials. The tracts of desert, empty lots, and abandoned spaces that 
litter Juárez make inscribing memory via ecotestimonios especially difficult. The desert is 
a geography of forgetfulness that aptly conceals and erases not only dismembered bodies, 
but also ecotestimonios like flyers and crosses. But ecotestimonios are also threated by 
the fact that unofficial memorials like the crosses and murals are often painted over or 
taken down by city officials in an effort to smother the denouncing power of the symbols 
of the antifeminicide movement. Over the years, the crosses have been the target of 
repeated attempts on the part of city officials to repress the memory of the disappearings. 
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As Paula Flores recounts in the film La carta (2010) while standing next to a government 
building, “here we had put a cross as a symbol of justice like the crosses that were 
[painted] on the [electric and light] poles. Last September, when they opened these new 
offices, they removed the cross.” Similarly, in 2011, the city of Juárez built a hotel in the 
Cotton Field of Campo Algodonero where pink crosses marked the memory of the eight 
women whose bodies were recovered there, thus replacing a “memory site with a generic 
nonplace. (Ironically,” as Driver observes, “the hotel is named Conquistador Inn” (2015, 
128).30) Notwithstanding the injunctions by the mayor of Juárez to the contrary, the 
mothers persist on painting the crosses across the city, defying what Alicia Schmidt 
Camacho characterizes as a “second wave of gender crimes” through which the mothers 
also became targets (2005, 275) (see fig. 9). In this sense, and although the mothers 
tirelessly and defiantly repaint and rebuild the crosses, the local geography and the 
meaning that it accrues in relation to its interlacing with the symbolic markers, the 
moths/artists, and the beholders is never 
fully accomplished. Rather, it inevitably 
changes with its surroundings, reprised 
over and over again. Importantly, this 
also means that unofficial memorials 
like the crosses continuously undergo a 
cycle of disappearing and reappearing.  
It is in this latter sense that ephemeral art like ecotestimonios expose the beholder 
to an experience of loss, or, to be more precise, of absenting through which the 
disappearing itself can be apprehended without partaking in the ghosting of coloniality. 
Figure 9. Woman painting a pink cross on the pole of a 




By withholding the full visibility sought after by the colonizing gaze and operative in 
artistic expressions like Muñoz’s Fibra y Furia, the crosses’ ephemeral nature 
undermines the presuppositions (of visibility and transparency) that give ethical support 
to re-presentation.31 Through the showing of loss, of absenting, and disappearing, the 
crosses display “an immediacy of the unidentifiable, or a showing of remoteness itself,” 
that, as Rajiv Kaushik explains speaking of art’s power to signify, “grasps [the 
beholder…] and usurps [her] power to grasp or appropriate it” (2011, 25). That is, 
ephemeral art’s power is that of offering the beholder the opportunity to sensuously and 
affectively “join”—rather than conceptually or visually grasp—the experience of loss and 
disappearing. And this joining does not take place via an appeal or reference to a wholly 
other category of signification, but, rather, via the beholder being grasped or moved, 
affectively, by the work of art; it takes place through a sensuous modality of existence 
that refuses conceptual and visual representation, re-orienting the beholder in space and 
time instead.32 For the sake of the present inquiry on the role of deep silence in 
expressing meaning negated by speech or images within a colonial context and 
denouncing a seemingly unspeakable violence, this means that the crosses’ fragility 
undermines the possibility of colonializing tactics of divestment, which means, on the 
one hand, that the beholder grasps them as spectacles and , on the other hand, that the 
beholder turns into a spectator vis-à-vis crosses-as-an-archive of data to be recoded, 
catalogued, and sealed off.  
Implicit in these remarks is the fact that the fragility of ecotestimonios bears 
witness to the events without fixing and memorializing them in time and space. Yes, 
through geographical testimony, ecotestimonios counter official narratives of oblivion 
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inscribing feminicide in historical memory and the national imaginary long before any 
official monument. Yet, the crosses’ spatial precarity also means that the crosses do not 
sanction a temporal closure of the disappearings. The past that the beholder comes to 
apprehend via her joining with the crosses is evoked in its spectral presence—it endures 
through fleeting traces, nested within the ephemeral present of the crosses, while also 
calling forth the future projected onto the local geography and the beholders’ own 
orientation. As Bickford would put it, the crosses “represent in the present a wound 
opened by a historical act. But they bear the promise of a future scar when the healed 
wound is remembered” (2005, 102). Even when/if the wound is healed, it continues to 
make sensible the trauma, pain, and resilience of the disappearings, existing as a trace of 
a past that is never sealed off, of grief and memories that dwell in the present as violent 
bursts of pain, quiet weeping, or resilient demands for justice. That is, the past is not 
obsolete, a matter of antiquity. Rather, it is carried with-in the present, affectively 
operative within the beholder’s experience of loss and outrage. In this sense, the past is a 
living past whose oblivion is prevented through the materiality of disappearing itself.33 
As we saw in the preceding section, the intersubjective and mutually-affecting 
relationship between perceiver and perceived means that the orientation of the perceiver 
through and toward the world is not a given, i.e., determined in advance; rather, it is the 
accomplishment of a call-and-response whereby the milieu calls forth a certain way of 
seeing or hearing, an orientation toward the vibrations of her surroundings that the 
perceiver assumes and that provides the milieu with the means to become determinate. 
The work of art recovers this interlacing or silent logos that, in Kaushik’s words, allows 
the “space of reversibility itself to come into the world as such” (2011, 12). Thus, in 
 
153 
Juárez, the crosses open onto a non-conceptual transcendence whereby the beholders are 
oriented differently across the local geography. And the act of imbuing has ontological 
significance34: The beholder’s encounter with the crosses, her harkening to the affective 
and opaque landscapes they evoke, allows the perceiver to be more than just a spectator 
and “join,” through a spatio-temporal re-orientation, the opaque relations of histories, 
memories, pain, and resistance.35 This joining is not a grasping, but a being grasped; it 
takes place through a sensuous modality of existence—through an aesthesis of deep 
silence—that remains conceptless. The beholder comes to see according or with the work 
of art and the silent logos onto which it opens (EM 164).  
In conclusion, not only “informal, nomadic memory sites that change with the 
landscape can and do shape discourse about feminicide in Juárez” (Driver 2015, 130). It 
is the crosses’ ephemeral character that prevents sealing and cataloging the 
disappearances into the archives of memory. The disappearings are apprehended through 
an experience of their passing, which does not solve the violence, but denounces it, which 
is to say that it keeps the act of mourning and the memory of the disappearing alive, 
present not in their absence (as in Muñoz’s representation of the absent bodies), but in 
their absenting, in their disappearing. Thus, differently from the specularization of 
graphic images that confiscate the lived and affective dimensions of existence, seal them 
off, memorializing them once and for all as spectacles and soulless carcasses in the fixity 
of archival memory, the crosses transform the disappearings into a living past that echoes 
and takes form time and again. They allow the past to exist in the present by haunting it, 
specifically by haunting the city and spatially re-orienting the passerby, transforming 
them from spectators to witnesses. 
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6. Putting Coyolxauhqui Together: Making Sensible the Disappearing Daughters 
From the work done in this chapter, we know that, for Merleau-Ponty, silence 
marks the difference between language as “a power of error,” i.e., as “lexicon” that 
strives to grasp or attain immediate coincidence with the world (VI 125, 4), and language 
as an “originating operation” (IL 46).36 We are now beginning to see that deep silence’s 
originating or creating power has something to do with displacing usual expectations, 
with effecting a suspension of not only familiar concepts but also modalities of 
approaching and apprehending the world. The aesthetic offers a “new type of 
intelligibility,” a sensuous “joining” the relation of things that remains elusive—
“conceptless,” so to speak. Specifically, as the previous discussion regarding the pink 
crosses suggested, the making sense-sensible of art “is” a dispossession, it opens a space 
in which “there is an immediacy of the unidentifiable, or a showing of remoteness itself. 
It is this showing that grasps us, the beholders of the text, and usurps our power to grasp 
or appropriate it” (Kaushik 2011, 25). That is, the existential suspension at play in the 
encounter with the crosses at once calls for and effects a committed passivity—a “being 
grasped”—toward the still inchoate yet haunting sense—this silent logos—emergent in 
one’s sensuous encounter with the world.  
This is not to say that the beholder remains utterly passive, or literally mute vis-à-
vis the outrage evoked by the sight and grasping of the crosses. Rather, it means that the 
meaning the crosses (qua ephemeral art) eventuate operates first and foremost at a level 
prior to the conceptual. The beholder, as we have seen, is grasped and moved by the 
crosses, reoriented toward the past of feminicide and a future of activism. This is what 
happens to many of the mothers, whose withstanding of loss and indignation—this 
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ineffable experience—has the power to turn them into “warrior mother[s].” And yet, the 
point I want to stress here is that for this kind of activism—this kind of metamorphosis to 
be possible—and, more broadly, for the sense of deep silence to eventuate there needs to 
be a demolition of the ego.  
A version of this demolition, of this non-conceptual transcendence is, for 
Merleau-Ponty, the painter’s accomplishment: 
In the immemorial depths of the visible, something moved, caught fire, and 
engulfed [the painter’s] body; everything he paints is in answer to this incitement, 
and his hand is ‘nothing but the instrument of a distant will.’ […] ‘[A] certain fire 
pretends to be alive; it awakens. Working its way along the hand as conductor, it 
reaches the support and engulfs it; then a leaping spark closes the circle it was to 
trace, coming back to the eye, and beyond.’ (EM 188) 
 
It is the artist’s propensity to live in wonder or “fascination” that allows her to “see 
according to [the work of art], or with it” (EM 164)—i.e., it allows the world to disclose 
itself “like the patterns of the constellations” and call forth “those gestures, those paths 
which he [the painter] alone can trace and which will be revelations to others” (EM 167). 
By lending her body to the world, by letting her eyes be “moved by some impact of the 
world,” the painter taps into this unfamiliar world, this “fabric of brute meaning” (EM 
165, 161). Painting thus figures as a “central operation contributing to the definition of 
our access to Being” (EM 171).  
In Juárez, however, it is not wonder, but grief and the desire to denounce the 
gendered, racialized, and colonial violence, to demand justice, that brings about 
arrebatos [interruptions], including the suspensions of customary modalities of existence 
and the demolition of the ego. Disoriented, wounded, and outraged, many of the mothers 
recount facing the task of not only re-membering their daughters, but also of putting 
themselves back together in the wake of their daughters’ disappearing. Albeit not the kind 
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of literal carnal dismemberment of the victims of feminicide in Ciudad Juárez, the 
mothers withstand an analogous process of affective and ontological dis-membering and 
re-membering as they strive to make sense of an denounce their daughters’ impune 
murders. It is only so far that Merleau-Ponty’s insights can take us. The colonial context 
brings about violence that is more than conceptual/linguistic and that, in his own way, 
Merleau-Ponty seeks to eschew. To make sense of the suffering and resilience of the 
mothers of Juárez, I turn to Gloria Anzaldúa’s work, especially her treatment of 
Coyolxauhqui, the Aztec diosa de la luna. Coyolxauhqui can help us make sense of the 
centrality of dispossession to this process of remembering, of eventuating new sense, 
while also reinscribing with new meaning the colonizing context within which the 
grieving and denouncing take place.  
  Coyolxauhqui is the symbol deployed by many contemporary Chicana writers to 
index feminicide.37 “Her bones jutting from sockets call to mind the dominant culture’s 
attempts to tear U.S. Mexican culture apart and scatter the fragments to the winds” 
(LDLO 49). As Anzaldúa explains, the U.S. first took away the land (the actual bodies) 
and then appropriated culture through commercialization and language. Specifically, the 
symbol of Coyolxauhqui is relevant in the context of the gendered violence we witness in 
Juárez because, as cultural critic and poet Alicia Gaspar de Alba notes, “Coyolxauhqui is 
the first femicide victim in Mexico, her ritual beheading and dismemberment reenacted 
on the tortured female bodies on the U.S.-Mexico border, such as the victim found in a 
public place in Ciudad Juárez in October 2009, with her head inside a plastic bag beside 
her torso” (2014, 132).38 In Coyolxauhqui’s Tree of Life (see fig. 10), for example, 
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Chicana artist Alma López depicts Coyolxauhqui’s dismembered body hanging from a 
cross, which specifically symbolizes Juárez’s feminicides.  
But Coyolxauhqui evokes 
more than dismemberment. In Light in 
the Dark  / Luz en lo Oscuro and 
numerous interviews, Anzaldúa 
reclaims this mythological figure to 
think through both the circularity of 
meaning—the straddling of the 
spiritual, ancestral, earthly/natural, and 
imaginal dimensions of existence—
and the cyclical process of 
disintegration and re-integration, of 
grief and healing, fragility and 
resilience essential to the processes of 
creation and sense-making.39 Traumatic events, chaotic disruptions, violence, and death 
catapult us into a state of fragmentation. “Every arrebato,” Anzaldúa observes, 
… rips you from your familiar “home,” casting you out of your personal Eden, 
showing that something is lacking in your queendom. Cada arrebatada (snatching) 
turns your world upside down and cracks the walls of your reality, resulting in a 
great sense of loss, grief, and emptiness, leaving behind dreams, hopes, and goals. 
You are no longer who you used to be. As you move from past presuppositions 
and frames of reference, letting go of former positions, you feel like an orphan, 
abandoned by all that’s familiar. Exposed, naked, disoriented, wounded, 
uncertain, confused, and conflicted, you’re forced to live en la orilla—a razor-
sharp edge that fragments you. (LDLO 125) 
 
Figure 10. Coyolxauhqui’s Tree of Life, by Alma López. In 
the Poster for “The Maquiladora Murders Or, Who Is 
Killing the Women of Juárez?” International Conference. 
UCLA, October 31–November 2, 2003. 
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We hear echoes of confusion and disorientation in Enriquez Fierro’s testimony upon the 
disappearing of her daughter Adriana. Abandoned by the State and the authorities, which 
she previously trusted, she begins questioning many of her previously held cosmological 
beliefs. This entailed letting go of familiar presuppositions, including her own sense of 
self.  
Yet, in trying to make sense of the events—or, better yet, in letting the events 
make-sense—a pulling together happens. As Ricardo Vivancos Pérez argues in Radical 
Chicana Poetics, “arrebatos mark our early stages of conocimiento or transformation. 
They agitate us into action by compelling us to write our story anew” (2013, xviii). In this 
sense, the image of Coyolxauhqui invokes more than a mere coming undone or 
scattering; it also stands for a resilient coming back together into a new, unified whole 
through a series of re-memberings, through acts of “calling back those pieces of the 
self/soul that have been dispersed or lost, the act of mourning the losses that haunt us” 
(LDLO 2). Reflecting on her daughter’s murder, Norma Ledezma Ortega explains that 
“something changed in me that night… I was born again that day: the woman, wife and 
factory worker was buried next to Paloma, and a warrior mother was born—a daring 
mother, a lioness” (Chin and Schutz 2020).40  
Although I agree with Pérez that wounds, disruptions, and fractures are necessary 
for the process of creation—that, as Anzaldúa puts it, “to be healed, [I had to] be 
dismembered, pulled apart” (LDLO 29)—it is important not to overlook or skate over too 
quickly the role that dis-memberment plays in this process of creation/transformation. 
The life shattering event of the loss/murder/disappearance of one’s daughter brings about 
a recoil of sorts, the inability to covey the depth of one’s experience through conceptual 
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or propositional language. And this deep silence is not nothing; it is also not a falling 
back onto the stereotype of the devastated, grieving, and silent mother. Rather, the 
process of dispossession of the agential or authorial power of the ego can be a fecund, 
albeit painful, seed for rebirth, sense-making, and activism.41  
It seems to me, in fact, that the process of healing, sense-making, and denouncing 
implicated by the Coyolxauhqui imperative and witnessed through the aesthetic 
production blossoming from the wounds of Juárez is not ego-centric. The Coyolxauhqui-
like process we hear in the mothers’ testimonies is suggestive of a specific kind of dis-
membering and re-rembering—that of the dismemberment of the ego. “The healing,” 
Anzaldúa tells us, “occurs in disintegration, in the demotion of the ego as the self’s only 
authority” (LDLO 29). The power of Coyolxauhqui lies in relinquishing the authority of 
the self, letting go of the authorial ego opening oneself to a conceptless communion with 
the world. Like in painting, where “‘the painter must be penetrated by the universe and 
not want to penetrate it’ (Charbonnier, op. cit., p. 34)” (EM 167)—as Merleau-Ponty 
reminds us citing André Marchand—the appeal to the aesthetic of the mothers in Juárez 
make concrete that for the sense of deep silence to eventuate, for them to make sense of 
the murders of their daughters, there needs to be the quieting of the clamoring voices of 
the ego. This is what Anzaldúa, in Speaking in Tongues, seems to invite her fellow to 
women of color writers to do. She writes: “I say mujer mágica, empty yourself. Shock 
yourself into new ways of perceiving the world, shock your readers into the same. Stop 
the chatter inside their heads” (ST 170).42  
As the rational and egocentered consciousness is set aside in grieving but also in 
the encounter with the aesthetic, and one harkens to deep silence, one is given another 
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kind of access to the world whereby one could see the world anew, hear the world and the 
disappearing daughters murmur with the voices of silence. Following Avery Gordon, 
then, we can say that the pink crosses remind us that “‘invisible things are not necessarily 
not-there’, [as Toni Morrison observes, but] encourage the complementary gesture of 
investigating how that which appears absent can indeed be a seething presence” (2008, 
17). The work of the pink crosses is that of “conjuring up [but not of representing, I 
should specify] the appearances of something that is absent” (Gordon 2008, 25)—of the 
daughters of Juárez, of feminicide in official discourse, and, more broadly, of deep 
silence. The pink crosses give a different access to the world, making possible to “feel the 
loss and […] understand it without falling prey to sensationalism” (Portillo 2002). 
Referring to Claudia Castro Luna’s collection of poems about the women murdered in 
Juárez, Killing Marías: A Poem for Multiple Voices (2017), LA Times writer Tyrone 
Beason observes that poetry—but, we may add, art more broadly—is “especially useful 
when the depths of the human experience leave us feeling as if there’s nothing we can 
say” (2020). 
… 
It turns out that it is possible 
to mend the crevices inside yourself 
without silk threads and silver spoons 
it is possible to tell the truth 
and not burn in hell 
to win wars without shooting a rifle 
and without a rifle to write a poem. 
 
—Claudia Castro Luna,  





In this chapter, I suggested that, although phenomena like the silent contact with 
the world or grief cannot be stated, this seeming impasse does not entail expressive 
paralysis. We find, in Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetics writings and Anzaldúa’s mobilization 
of Coyolxauhqui resources to develop a modality of bearing witness that mobilizes deep 
silences, that “murmurs” deep silences and phenomena like grief and outrage in ways that 
do not capitulate to transparency. The mobilization, rather than erasure, of deep silences 
through artistic expression or mythopoetics makes sense-sensible dimensions of being 
and sense that are annihilated in a move to transparency and logos.43 This aesthetic 
modality of engagement with the world whereby the inquirer does not “concoct concepts 
from within [her] thinking,” but, rather, learns “to think [her] way through things” 
(Morris 2018a, 126) entails, first and foremost, the suspension of familiar expectations.44 
Second, this aesthetic sensibility entails the dismembering of the ego. As we learned from 
Anzaldúa’s description of the Coyolxauhqui imperative, second, this coming undone 
gives access to existence beyond presence. An aesthesis of deep silence thus dispossesses 
the agential subject, calling forth a thinking (and a living) that does not start from how I 
come to myself and the world, but, rather, with how being happens—in the double sense 
of taking place and contingently occurring—in “me.” This is an aesthesis of deep silence.  
This aesthesis of deep silence is not only the means through which the 
philosopher as well as the artist can express elusive phenomena like deep silence. The 
aesthetic makes sensible, in its conceptual/discursive elusiveness, the imbrication of 
creativity and silence, the silent logos that subtends all expression, thinking, and being. 
Importantly, as the Juárez case makes explicit, it is the ephemeral character of art that 
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makes possible bearing witness to violence, resilience, and outrage without playing tonto 
tactics of divestment operative in Juárez and the colonial context more broadly. The 
crosses bear witness by making present the experience of disappearing itself, which 
refuses the full visibility that could introduce the position of a spectator. The aporiae of 
decolonial representation are thus not swallowed, but upheld in this presentation that 
keeps open this process of remembering. As such, an aesthesis of deep silence allows to 
bear witness to the other and the world not as a positivity, but as a cavern, an openness, to 
paraphrase Merleau-Ponty, where something will take place (VI 263).  
As I will discuss in more detail in chapter 7, bearing witness spectrally makes 
possible attending to the haunting sense emergent in the sensuous encounter with the 
world and the other, thus undermines presuppositions central to a philosophy of reflection 
that reduces silence to nothingness (VI 44) and surveys phenomena from above, 
transforming them into something said, devoid of their affective and sensuous 
dimensions. Instead, this modality of bearing witness demands that the listener dwell in 
that unsettling experience of deep silence akin to when, as Schutte puts it, “another’s 
speech, or some aspect of it, resonates in me as a kind of strangeness, a kind of 
displacement of the usual expectation” (1998, 56). Importantly, because the silences and 
opacity are not elided, but, rather, let resonate in a foreign key, the sense of the world is 
not eviscerated of its depths, subsumed into familiar schema. Rather, a critical 
phenomenology of deep silence lets the other, the world, and phenomena speak in their 
difference, without subsuming them under familiar categories existence. That is, it lets 
the world and the other speak with “the voices of silence,” to play on Malraux’s 
expression. Beyond postcolonial critique as an academic exercise, then, bearing witness 
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without making fully visible is a decolonizing intervention because it operates at a 
different register, exposing the beholder to a sensuous experience of disappearing. As 
such, it resonates with the calls of many feminist and indigenous thinkers for more than a 
“logocentric and nominalist version of decolonization,” as Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui 
observes (2012, 102).  
 
NOTES
1 The English translation by Celeste Kostopulos-Cooperman reads, “Always at the 
edge/At the edge of the road/At the edge of history/Severed between the borders/The 
young women of/Juárez/At the edge of death/At the edge of fear/Populate a gagged 
city/At the shadow’s edge/At the edge of time/A disembodied voice/No body” (Agostín 
2006, 35). 
2 Several state-sponsored initiatives have taken place since 2013 to raise awareness about 
feminicide in Juárez and abate the rates of disappearance. In 2013, for example, the local 
government started a campaign called the “Disappearances in Juárez have to Disappear” 
against disappearance which entailed posters around the city featuring images of the 
clothes of women whose bodies were missing (Driver 2015, xvii). In 2017, the city 
released a smartphone app called “No Estoy Sola” [“I am not alone”] which allows 
women to trigger a distress call in the event of an attack (Swenson 2017). Overall, the 
preventative measures taken by the city entailed warnings to women not to be out at night 
or dress provocatively, placing the burden of responsibility to prevent feminicide on 
women and suggesting that they are responsible for the violence, as scholars have noted. 
In spite of these measures, as the 2018 report on violence against women in Juárez states, 
“preventative measures, investigations, and prosecutions in Ciudad Juarez have been non-
existent, totally lacking, or ineffective when dealing to violence against women” (CEDW 
2018). 
3 It is worth noting that I use the relatively new term “feminicide” over the related term 
“femicide” because the former takes into account the broader relations of power that 
enable the kind of gender-based violence that the concept of femicide tracks. While 
femicide names the murder of women on the grounds of their gender and gender 
performance, feminicide takes into account the broader power structures that create 
inequalities for women as well as “impunity for the perpetrators because the state is 
implicated, either explicitly or implicitly,” as Nancy Pineda-Madrid observes (2011, 12). 
It should also be noted that the murder and disappearance of indigenous women in North 
America, for instance, could arguably fall within the category of feminicide. In “Violence 
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and Transvestite/Transgender Sex Workers in Tijuana” (2010), Debra A. Castillo, María 
Gudelia Rangel Gómez, and Armando Rosas Solís are among the first ones to link the 
issues of feminicide with violence against transgender subjects. 
4 I will return to some of the whys in the concluding chapter of this project where I will 
take up the role that deep silence plays in social justice initiatives in a political context of 
“absolute lack of institutional justice” like Juarez (Driver 2015, 5), especially as it is 
mobilized through aesthetic memory-work. 
5 It is also worth noting that there are also no words or concepts to account for “justice” 
in the wake of the disappearance of one’s daughter, as Norma Ledezma Ortega’s remarks 
remind us: “As a lawyer, I have a certain concept of justice ... but as a mother, I believe 
justice means a lot more. I know I don’t have it, and I know I’ll never have it” (Chin and 
Schutz 2020). 
6 Enriquez Fierro’s testimony evokes the common mention of speechlessness vis-à-vis 
loss. Expressions like “there are no words to express the depth of my despair”; “mere 
words won’t do justice to the devastation I experienced”; “words fall short of expressing 
my sorrow for your loss;” and “words can’t express how saddened we are” are just a few 
common phrases recounted by those who either experienced loss first-hand or meant to 
convey their heart-felt condolences. 
7 Bolaño introduces the notion of “more or less dead” in his novel, 2666, which narrates 
the murders and disappearances taking place in the city of Santa Teresa, a fictional 
Ciudad Juárez. One of the victims is referred to as “more or less dead,” an expression that 
emphasizes how the disappearing forces these women into eternal anonymity, denying 
them the right of death, as journalist Alice Driver points out (2015, 60). 
8 Speaking of artist Brian Maguire’s portraits of Brenda Bernice, Erika Perez Escobedo, 
and Guadalupe Verónica Castro Pando—three of the many disappearing daughters—Ed 
Vulliamy observes that there are two ways to represent events such as the Juárez 
feminicide: “One is to convey some distant horror, exotic in its way, in places or 
circumstances separated from our own by Manichaean morality; some evil in Mexico, 
against which our legitimate society, appalled, campaigns or crusades” (2014). Ortega 
would likely agree that echoes of this Manichaean morality resonate through the 
colonizing gaze, crystalized in the photographs’ captions that label the disappearing 
women as promiscuous sex workers. The other way, Vulliamy continues, “is to insist […] 
that these atrocious narratives are integral to our own routines; that the blood stains our 
everyday lives.” Art and representation, on this account, are meant to remind the 
audience of the responsibility that we bare as consumers. After all, the violence to which 
the women in Juárez are exposed is, in large part, the result of global exploitative 
economy.  
9 A specularizing and ghosting account, one that swallows or denies the aporiae, 





                                                                                                                                                 
ethically dangerous impasse. It makes pressing the inadequacy of simply reproducing the 
other’s non-normative experiences by reference to verbal and visual significations that 
strive for full visibility and transparency. Such a representation makes the other’s 
experience specular to and consumable by the colonizing gaze, thus undermining the very 
possibility of bearing witness to the non-colonial other in her difference. 
10 Note how “dwelling with specters” is defining of another figure central to Aztec 
mythology, Chicana culture, and Anzaldúa’s mythopoetics: la Llorona. I will return to the 
figure of la Llorona in chapter 7.  
11 That is, following the Phenomenology in which Merleau-Ponty carried out a study of 
embodiment and being-in-the-world, he is now performing a “phenomenology of being-
of-the-world” (Landes 2020, 141). 
12 If these questions may seem, at first, to point to an impasse, this is because of the 
longstanding prejudice of Western thinking of “confusing being with determinate being,” 
which David Morris defines as “a tendency to reason that because the beings we 
encounter are manifest as more or less determinate, being itself [but also sense, I would 
add] must be determinate” (2018b, 15). The outcome of this prejudice is that sense and 
being are modeled on familiar conceptual posits, which are appealed to ready-made to 
found sense (Morris 2018b, 125). We can trace the roots of this ontological prejudice to 
being’s own concealing movement by extending to being the logic that Merleau-Ponty 
sees being operative in expression, i.e., the “meta-paradox of expression” or the 
phenomenon whereby accomplished expression conceals its rootedness in what is not 
accomplished or determinate. It is this prejudice that harbors the “operational thinking” 
Merleau-Ponty warns us against above and forecloses the renewal of sense. When 
thinking through deep silence and its sense and being, then, it is paramount to remember 
that sense and being are more than determinate being and sense, more than what our 
concepts can make explicit. 
13 It is Merleau-Ponty’s confrontation with Descartes’s recognition, in “Meditation IV,” 
that body and soul are mixed with each other that prompts him to formulate a way to 
think through ambiguities, opacity, and, as we will see, silence. Since “we are the 
compound of soul and body,” he writes, “there must be a way to think it” (EM 58). 
14 In a study called “The Dual Process Model of Coping with Bereavement” (1999), 
Margaret Stroebe and Henk Shut put forth a theory of grief called The Dual Process 
model, which recognizes the limits of facing one’s grief head-on. As a response to the 
‘grief work hypothesis,’ which promotes “working through” or “facing the grief head-on” 
as the best methods for “getting over” a loss, Stroebe and Shut propose a method of 
oscillation between loss-oriented and restoration-oriented processes that the griever 
undergoes. The former entails confronting the reality of loss and the emotions associated 
with it like sadness, loneliness, and anger by attending to thoughts, memories, or photos. 
The latter is the process of coping with secondary losses, which include developing new 





                                                                                                                                                 
dies, not only is their grief for the deceased person, one also has to adjust to substantial 
changes that are secondary consequences of loss… a myriad of emotional reactions can 
be involved in coping with these tasks of restoration, from relief and pride that one has 
mastered a new skill or taken the courage to go out alone, to anxiety and fear that one 
will not succeed or despair at the loneliness of being with others and yet on one’s own.” 
The dual process model acknowledges the dynamic aspect of grief and the fact that that 
loss is not something one “gets over.”  
15 At this juncture, it would be interesting to explore the connection between Merleau-
Ponty and Nietzsche. Perhaps not surprisingly, in the note following the one cited in the 
text, Merleau-Ponty turns to Nietzsche’s notion of the eternal return (VI 179). Although 
unrelated, the transition from one note to the other invites a conception of history as non-
linear, but circular. Note the interesting connection between circularity/return and 
opacity/silence: as Kamen MacKendrick claims, “the return demands this affirmation of 
loss because every possible variant will recur in the temporally-indefinite shuffling of 
matter. It demands that we affirm forgetfulness, because each thought of the eternal 
return will come to us as new, meaning—because it is itself recurrence—as already 
forgotten. Thus this cycle, which we might more readily see as a movement that 
guarantees, if not persistence, at least predictable sameness of movement and thus a sense 
of preservation, becomes for him a becoming caught up in utter loss” (2001, 8). 
16 This kind of understanding of grief would resemble outdated theoretical framework 
such as that upheld by “grief work” model whereby grief is something to “get over” or 
“relinquish” by working through stages, a progressive “letting go” geared at restoring 
normal functioning (Thompson and Neimeyer 2014).  
17 Also consider the pictures of missing women’s clothing hanging around the city, which 
were part of a 2013 campaign launched by the local government against the 
disappearings, titled “Disappearances in Juárez have to Disappear.” 
18 For instance, in “Art that silences and art that speaks” (2018), Colleen Mary Carpenter 
argues that memorials like the fountain built at Campo Algodonero following the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights’ injunction to the Mexican government silence, rather 
than express, the grief of the mothers and the laments of the dead.  
19 When it is the only vehicle of contestation, data often partakes to the anonymizing of 
the victims; speaking up, as we saw in the preceding chapter, faces its own risks of 
reifying the colonial apparatus it seeks to contest. 
20 For example, consider the work of Argentine photographer Gustavo Germano. In his 
project, Absent (2013), Germano portrays the grief of family members who have lost 
loved ones during the military rule in Argentina by pairing two photographs staged to 
resemble one another via their background and composition, with the exception that one 
of the two portraits includes the missing loved one. Also consider the theoretical and 
activist work of Maria Acosta Lopéz (2014), whose writing I will discuss in chapter 4.  
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21 In Tracing Expression in Merleau-Ponty (2013), Fóti argues that Merleau-Ponty’s 
thought on aesthetic expression shifts from an account of expression still indebted to the 
subject (in “Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence”)—and thereby one that 
privileges literary to artistic expression—to one that dethrones the subject, 
acknowledging the opacity or incompleteness or all forms of expression (linguistic and 
non-linguistic) in Nature and “Eye and Mind.” We find partial confirmation of Fóti’s 
claim in Merleau-Ponty’s own remarks in The Prose of the World, where he argues that 
“painting as a whole gives itself as an aborted effort to say something that always 
remains to be said. Here we see what is proper to language” (PW, 140). This claim is 
repeated in an essay from 1953, which confirms the priority accorded to language: “the 
arts of language go much farther toward true creation” (S 128), Merleau-Ponty observes. 
22 This is the logos Hamrick and van der Veken call “logos endiathetos” (2011). 
23 In “Eye and Mind,” Merleau-Ponty observes that painting reaches “beyond the ‘visual 
givens,’ open[ing] upon a texture of Being of which the discrete sensorial messages are 
only the punctuations or the caesurae” (165). He continues by observing that painting 
mixes all categories “essence and existence, imaginary and real, visible and invisible…in 
laying out its oneiric universe of carnal essences, of effective likenesses, of mute 
meanings” (EM 169). 
24 In other words, it would be yet another mistake to take Merleau-Ponty’s invitation to 
uncover “speech before it is spoken, the background of silence which does not cease to 
surround it,” or the “threads of silence that speech is mixed together with” (IL 46) as a 
return to a philosophy of purity or transparency, to a conception of silence as a pure 
supporting framework for linguistic expression and signification—as Emmanuel Alloa 
claims (2017, 54). In a working note dated 1959, Merleau-Ponty makes explicit that mute 
coincidence with the world is unattainable: Not only “is” being a generative and dynamic 
matrix of lateral relations, a primordial “Offenheit of the Umwelt” (VI 176). Coincidence 
as direct intuition is unattainable also because the articulation of this adequation calls for 
linguistic expression; “it’s very description of silence rests entirely on the virtues of 
language” (VI 179). In turn, the interlacing of speech and silence is such that “no 
language ever wholly frees itself from the precariousness of mute forms of expression, 
reabsorbs its own contingency, and wastes away to make the things themselves appear” 
(IL 78). Linguistic expression’s indebtedness to the sensuous makes the articulation of 
this “world of silence” necessarily partial, turning it into an obligation to put this 
adequation into words over and over again. In this sense, Merleau-Ponty brings attention 
to the chiasmus between linguistic expression and the world of perception, between 
speech and silence, that is, to the inexhaustible circularly with which they envelop one 
another and that makes direct intuition is impossible. Véronique Fóti elaborates on this 
impossibility in The Evidence of Painting. Originary silence is “always already broken, a 
disclosure/concealment or presence/absence,” as states (1988, 281). Both perceptual 
experience and (linguistic) meaning resist clarity of expression because they essentially 
involve latency and opacity. On the one hand, sedimented language’s opacity, Fóti 





                                                                                                                                                 
experience, on the other hand, is an “inchoate logos,” the “locus of the primary silence 
but, as inscription into openness, it is also inaugural genesis, the matrix of all creation” 
(1988, 277). This inaugural genesis entwines activity and passivity. 
25 The group Voces sin Eco [Voices without Echo] was primary responsible for painting 
pink crosses on telephone poles to draw attention to the gender-based violence. See 
Amnesty International, Intolerable Killings (2003). 
26 The names of the eighth women whose bodies were found in Campo Algodonero are 
Claudia Yvette González, Laura Berenice Ramos Monárrez, Esmeralda Herrera Monreal, 
María de los Angeles Acosta Ramírez, Mayra Juliana Reyes Solís, Verónica Martínez 
Hernández, Merlín Elizabeth Rodríguez Sáenz, María Rocina Galicia. 
27 In 2009, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights found the government of Mexico 
responsible for the murders of three of the eight women whose bodies had been found at 
Campo Algodonero in 2001. The government demonstrated a lack of intent to 
commemorate the victims; it sold the land of Campo Algodonero, which resulted in the 
taking down of the eight pink crossed that served as historical memory and the building 
of a hotel on the site. After much public protest, the government built a memorial, which 
remains incomplete. As Carpenter observes, the memorial deliberately avoid history; it is 
not only intentionally set apart from the community, surrounded by walls and lacking 
adequate parking structures, but it depicts a woman in her youth and radiance. Since the 
feminicides have not ended, Carpenter argues, the memorial erases the historical truth of 
feminicide (2018).  
28 The beholders’ spatial dwelling summoned by the crosses are what Merleau-Ponty 
would call “paths to follow” (IP 66). 
29 That said, it is important to note that the murmurs of the milieu resonate differently 
depending on the constellation of symbols and cultural references they summon in the 
beholder. As Bickford points out commenting on sites erected in place of memorials, 
“through time, they form part of the memory of the past for individuals and communities 
traumatized by the authoritarian regime’s repressive apparatus. Their meaning often 
proves opaque to passersby” (Bickford 2005, 101). In this sense, the sense the crosses 
imbue upon their surroundings differs depending on the beholder’s social positionality, 
which includes their lineages, sedimented memories, and values. While the pink crosses 
scattered throughout Juárez affectively signify space, orienting the perceivers spectrally, 
their tracings transport the perceiver onto different cultural and political horizons; the 
halos of colonial, gendered, and racialized violence summoned by the crosses resonate 
differently for Enriquez Fierro and myself.  
30 The covering over of ephemeral art by government officials is reminiscent of the 
scrubbing of the names of feminicide victims painted on the streets of Mexico City on 




                                                                                                                                                 
31 Ephemeral art refuses university, transparency, and full visibility, the notions 
presupposed by concepts like (Kantian) aesthetic judgment, the public sphere, or 
common sense. As Ferreira Da Silva notes, university is contested by decolonial critique 
as the sire of exclusion and violence, which is, however, often presupposed in textual, 
postcolonial critiques (2015).  
32 It is this showing of remoteness, this refusal of publicity and appeal to something like 
(Kantian) aesthetic judgment that, on Denise Ferreira Da Silva’s account, pushes 
postcolonial performance art beyond mere postcolonial critique and into praxis. As she 
explains in reference to postcolonial artist Yasmine Eid-Sabbagh’s On Violence (2013), 
“the art of making visible without making public corrupts the neat web of conceptual 
methodology that the postcolonial critic learns during academic training” (2015, 4). 
Differently from postcolonial critique, which, at once, critiques notions like university 
and publicity while also relying on them because of their reliance on conceptual and 
methodological declarations, which appeal to universality as the condition of possibility 
of their reception, performance art refuses such universality, visibility, and transparency 
“that could introduce the position of a spectator” (2015, 4).   
33 This is very different from the kind of memorializing effected by Ciudad Juárez in the 
aftermath of the 2009 Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ ruling. When the Court 
found the government of Mexico responsible for the murders of three of the eight women 
whose bodies had been found at Campo Algodonero in 2001, the shared hope among the 
mothers of the victims and activists was that the field would be turned into a public 
memorial park. As previously noted, however, the government showed little interest in 
inscribing the murdered women and a condemnation of feminicide within public 
memory. The land where the bodies were found was sold and, in 2011, the hotel 
“Conquistador Inn” was erected. After much public protest, the government did build a 
memorial, which, as of 2018, remained incomplete. In “Art that Silences and Art that 
Speaks,” Colleen Mary Carpenter claims that the memorial deliberately avoids history, 
“silenc[ing] the past, separate[ing] from the present, and distanc[ing] viewers from 
victims” (2018). This is because the memorial is not only intentionally set apart from the 
community and inaccessible, surrounded by walls and lacking adequate parking 
structures; it also obscures historical truth by depicting a woman in her youth and 
radiance, while the victims of feminicide are simply missing. Especially because the 
feminicides have not ended, Carpenter argues, the memorial erases the historical truth of 
the violence of feminicide. It seems to me, moreover, that a memorial that seeks to 
exercise justice and bring the “truth” of what has and continues to happen cannot fix and 
memorialize past events and relegate the disappearings to a past that can be, at best, 
forgiven, and, at worse, forgotten. In either case, the closure of the events marked by the 
fixity imparted to them by something like a statue displayed in isolation and full 
visibility, sanctions a definite resolution and closure of a past that seems to leave nothing 






                                                                                                                                                 
34 Grief is a phenomenon affecting more than the ontic aspects of one’s existence. This 
pain that “corta una parte de tu Corazón,” as Enriquez Fierro observes, fundamentally 
restructures the conditions of possibilities of existence (Chin and Schultz 2020). In other 
words, it seems that grief entails learning to live with the presence of their daughters’ 
absence or, following from the discussion in preceding sections, to dwell with specters.  
35 In More or Less Dead, Alice Driver points out that the “symbol of the cross has proved 
a difficult image for some victims’ mothers. Juana Rodríguez Bermúdez, mother of 
Brenda Berenice, for example, contributed to Ciudad Juárez: de este lado del puente 
(Ciudad Juárez: On This Side of the Bridge), a volume of spoken word poetry that 
collected the experiences of five mothers of feminicide victims. She expressed, ‘I took 
down the crosses, I took down everything that had to do with God / . . . I became very 
angry, I took down the crosses, / I didn’t want the crosses, I didn’t want anything’ 
(Vericat 39)” (cited in Driver 2015, 128). 
36 As we will see in more detail in the following chapter, for Merleau-Ponty, silence and 
language are structurally intertwined (Fóti 1988, 275–76).  
37 In Radical Chicana Poetics, Ricardo Vicanos Pérez observes that the shift from 
Coatlicue to Coyolxauhqui within the Chicana artists’ collective marks the transition 
from the 1980s to the 1990s and a search for new referents (2013, 46).  
38 Gaspar de Alba may have been inspired, in her observation that the women in Juárez 
are modern day Coyolxauhqui, by Jane Caputi’s appeal to Coyolxauhqui to theorize 
“gynocide,” offered at a 2003, UCLA conference on the Juárez feminicide, titled “The 
Maquiladora Murders Or, Who Is killing the Women of Juárez?” (Vivancos Pérez 2013, 
166). 
39 “The Coyolxauhqui imperative is to heal and achieve integration. When fragmentations 
occur you fall apart and feel as though you’ve been expelled from paradise. 
Coyolxauhqui is my symbol for the necessary process of dismemberment and 
fragmentation, of seeing that self or the situations you’re embroiled in differently. It is 
also my symbol for reconstruction and reframing, one that allows for putting the pieces 
together in a new way. The Coyolxauhqui imperative is an ongoing process of making 
and unmaking. There is never any resolution, just the process of healing” (LDLO 19–20). 
40 Norma Ledezma Ortega’s testimony makes explicit how the disappearing and grieving 
affects the day-to-day activities. At the time of the death of her 16-year-old daughter, 
Paloma Angélica Escobar Ledezma, in March 2002, Norma had an elementary school 
education and worked in a local factory that manufactured parts for airplane. Upon her 
daughters’ murder, she vowed to get justice for Angélica and other missing women. She 
founded the organization “Justicia para Nuestras Hijas” or “Justice for Our Daughters” 
and, in 2016, earned a law degree. “With this legal weapon, I can fight for all the other 
victims as well,” she says. Today, she works on cases related to kidnapping, feminicide 
and corruption.  
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41 To use Anzaldúa’s poetic expression, that “sometimes what accretes around an irritant 
or wound may produce a pearl of great insight, a theory” (LDLO 2). 
 
42 Through the mobilizing of deep silences, the aesthetic opens the artist and the observer 
onto the silent beckonings of the world; it “allow[s] oneself as perceiver to be taken in the 
world, as the moment of the flesh, in a silent ‘being-at’ whatever is the focus of 
perception,” as Mazis puts it (2016, 27). 
43 These deep silences, when harkened to rather than translated into available schemas, 
often interrupt familiar expectations, dis-orienting one’s corporeal arrangement within the 
world, and inaugurating a re-organization around new emerging centers. 
44 From Merleau-Ponty’s remarks on the creative power of the “tacit language” of 
painting, we gathered that painting is creative insofar as it “dwells and makes us dwell in 
a world we do not have the key to”; it “introduces us to unfamiliar perspectives instead of 
















Unlike other words, the word to be is not a sign to which one could find a 
corresponding “representation” or object: its meaning is not distinct from its 
operation, which is to make Being speak in us rather than us speak in Being. 
For how would we speak of Being, since those beings and shapes of Being, 
which open to us the only conceivable access to it, at the same time hide it 
form us by their mass, and since every unveiling is simultaneously a 
dissimulation? What has been called the “mystique” of Being […] is the effort 
to integrate truth with our capacity for error, to relate the incontestable 
presence of the world to its inexhaustible richness and consequent absence 
which it recuperates, to consider the evidence of Being in the light of an 
interrogation which is the only mode of expressing this eternal elusion. We 
have tried to show how a philosophy oriented in this way leads us to a 
complete reworking of the concepts ordinarily used in the analysis of 
language (such as those of sign, meaning, analogon, metaphor, symbol) and 
how it leads to the notion of an “ontological history.”  
—Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Philosophy as Interrogation 
 
In Parts I and II, I showed how thinking through deep silence from the standpoint 
of concrete lived experiences such as that of sexual violence and grief reveals silence as 
more than a lack relative to a pure speech or signification; it gives us the tools to think 
beyond the logic of transparency that remains largely operative in Western theorizing 
whereby phenomena can be grasped and accounted for fully by an inquirer who is 
external to the process of inquiry. Specifically, thinking through the pink crosses of 
Juárez, I proposed that ephemeral art makes sense-sensible of phenomena like grief and 
outrage that may otherwise seem ineffable and senseless. Importantly, it does so without 
capitulating to colonizing tactics of divestment. Through their mobilization of deep 
silences the crosses make explicit the circularity, i.e., the transspatiality and 
transtemporality, of sense, which eventuates through the interlacing of the artist, the past, 
the geography, and the beholder. Thus positioned, I proposed that art makes sense 
through a fecund dispossession; deep silence effects a “conceptless opening” onto silent 
logos by bringing about an epistemological suspension of the familiar and the 
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dismemberment of the ego. These disorienting and dispossessing processes make it 
possible to set aside the overly rational consciousness and let the world speak in the 
voices of silence. In this sense, I proposed, harkening to deep silences effects an aesthesis 
of deep silence, i.e., a modality of existence (of perceiving, thinking, loving, imagining, 
etc.) that dispossesses the agential subject, that does not start from how I come to myself 
and the world, but, rather, with how being and sense happen—in the double sense of 
taking place and (contingently) occurring—in “me.”  
As the crosses illustrate, experiences of deep silence call forth the articulation of a 
sense that breaks with modern/colonial expectations. Far from being conceptually and 
propositionally articulable, arrebatos open onto the world ‘speaking’ with the voices of 
silence, onto a that, as you may recall from Diana Nyad’s words, that carries “emotional 
significance” (2017) As we strive to express this sense, we would reach an impasse if we 
were to begin with ready-made concepts that disentangle the mélange of mind and body, 
ourselves and the world, and ourselves and others. Traditional Western epistemic and 
ontological frameworks that operate within a Being versus nothingness paradigm and 
that, thereby, conceive of truth as coincidentia rerum et intellectus and cast silence as a 
lack relative to a pure speech or signification are not equipped to hear—let alone make 
sense of—the silent logos that subtends and is interlaced with speech and phenomena. 
The insight we gather from Merleau-Ponty’s and Anzaldúa’s philosophical approaches is 
to being with the very entanglement, ambiguity, and intricacy of concrete phenomena (N 
122). After all, for Merleau-Ponty, “truth is not what abolishes the Cartesian ‘confusions’ 
and breaks through to clear and distinct thought, but what appears in and through those 
‘confusions’—the world that we inhabit” (Hamrick and van der Veken 2011, 66–67).  
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To make sense of these voices of silence we need matrices of thought that allow 
joining the operations of being conceptlessly, which is to say, thinking ambiguity, 
opacity, and seeming incompossibles without resolving them. These matrices would 
speak of the world “not according to the law of the word-meanings inherent in the given 
language, but with a perhaps difficult effort that uses the significations of words to 
express, beyond themselves, our mute contact with the things, when they are not yet 
things said” (VI 38, emphasis added).1 As the passage suggests, an inquiry that begins 
from entanglement and the mute contact with the world, and that strives to express the 
sense of silence without undermining its constitutive opacity, calls also for the 
elaboration of ontological matrices that do not conform to a Parmenidean schema of 
Being versus nothingness characteristic of much of modern/colonial ontology. Such 
frameworks of thought (especially a philosophy of reflection), in fact, cast silence as 
nothingness. “Reflection,” Merleau-Ponty reminds us, is an inexpugnable philosophical 
position, every obstacle, every resistance to its exercise being from the first treated not as 
an adversity of the things but as a simple state of non-thought, a gap in the continuous 
fabric of the acts of thought, which is inexplicable, but about which there is nothing to 
say since it is literally nothing” (VI 44). Instances that cannot be accounted for by a 
philosophy of reflection and propositional thinking such as the resistance, opacity, and 
ambiguity of the sensible, grief, or the mute contact with the world are deemed as 
nothingness. And nothingness, in turn, is equated with silence, with that “about which 
there is nothing to say since it is literally nothing.” Thus, we witness the simultaneous 
preemptive disavowal of non-logocentric or conceptless openings onto the world, on the 
one hand, and the reiteration of a conception of silence as non-sense and nothingness, on 
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the other hand. In sum, silence is cast as unthinkable wherein its unthinkability is due not 
to the limitations or inadequacy of current matrices of thought, but to silence’s (lack of) 
being, i.e., its nothingness or non-being, and the thus-inevitable absence of something to 
think or say about it.  
Experiences like the signifying of the crosses or Martínez’s Joto passivity, 
however, suggest that silence is neither a “zone of non-being,” i.e., a lack relative to a 
pure speech, nor “something,” as both conceptions would treat it as a positivity. As more 
than nothing and less than something, the questions become: how are we to think the 
being of deep silence that is inexorably inscribed and relentlessly exscribes itself through 
the mute contact with the world, through existence and expression? And how is deep 
silence such that it accounts for the fecundity of being, for creation and novelty? 
Specifically, what are the temporal dynamics of the eventuation of its sense? 
In the following two chapters, I heed to these questions, directing the inquiring to 
the onto-temporal dynamics of deep silence. In chapter 6, I work closely with Merleau-
Ponty’s later ontological writings from The Visible and the Invisible and Nature Lectures 
to suggest that the onto-temporal dynamics that accounts for the generativity of deep 
silence (and of being!) is precession, i.e., a retroactive signification of being and 
instituting of possibility. In chapter 7, I primarily engage Gloria Anzaldúa, especially her 
mobilization of the myth of la Llorona in her writings. Deploying deep silence in one’s 
narratives, as Anzaldúa does in her re-telling of the myth, makes possible resignifying 
colonial historias. Interlaced with silences, its retelling undermines key tenets of 





1 Taking these “confusions” as the loci of doing philosophy calls forth a sense that does 
not conform to modern epistemic criteria of transparency or clarity, but, rather, that 
upholds opacity and silence not only as its inherent components, but as its ground. Recall 
the discussion of the “principle of incommensurability” from chapter 2. Following Ofelia 
Schutte, I suggested that Western theories of meaning treat silence and semantic 
incommensurability as “irrelevant to philosophical meaning and knowledge, and thus 
irrelevant to the operations of reason” (1998, 61). This is because they presuppose 
transparency as the desiderata and guiding principle of meaning and signification. Once 
reality is sanitized from any impurity such as affective residues and (seeming) paradoxes 
or incompossibles—the story goes—its silences can be overcome and its meaning 
becomes graspable in its totality through reason alone, i.e., by occupying an a-cultural 
and a-historical vantage point. Yet, upholding, rather than disentangling, this mélange 
entails grappling with the fact that these “impurities” or silences are inherent components 
of sense; their presence does not distort the meaning of being, but qualitatively affects it. 
In this sense, while the Western, logocentric apparatus is, for the most part, not equipped 
to approach, dwell in, and harken to occurrences of deep silence and let deep silences 
open onto other dimensions of being and sense that are prior to and cannot be accounted 
for by a discourse that operates at the level of conceptual thinking, taking confusions as 
the loci of doing philosophy calls for the elaboration of a sense that is other and prior to 
these pre-thetic dimensions, and that gives “voice” to the mute contacts with the world 
accomplished through “conceptless openings.” This, as we saw in the preceding chapter, 
is the accomplishment of the work of art. 
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VI. LE MONDE DU SILENCE: ONTOLOGICAL POSSIBILITIES AND THE 
IMPOSSIBLE TIME OF DEEP SILENCE 
 
The sensible is precisely that medium in which there can be being without it 
having to be posited; the sensible appearance of the sensible, the silent 
persuasion of the sensible is Being’s unique way of manifesting itself without 
becoming positivity, without ceasing to be ambiguous and transcendent. The 
sensible world itself in which we gravitate, and which forms our bond with the 
other, which makes the other be for us, is not, precisely qua sensible, ‘given’ 
expect by allusion—The sensible is that: this possibility to be evident in 
silence, to be understood implicitly, and the alleged positivity of the sensible 
world (when one scrutinizes it unto its roots, when one goes beyond the 
empirical-sensible, the secondary sensible of our ‘representation,’ when one 
discloses the Being of Nature) precisely proves to be an ungraspable, the only 
thing finally that is seen in the full sense is the totality wherein the sensible 
are cut out. 
—Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible 
 
In this chapter, I approach questions of the dynamics of deep silence such that it 
makes possible the fecundity of being starting from an analysis of the phenomenon of 
nature. Thinking through Nature as a way to deep silence is propaedeutic insofar as 
silence is often associated with the perceived extra-linguistic realm that is nature. 
Furthermore, silence is mentioned in Merleau-Ponty’s texts primarily in two contexts. As 
we saw in Part II, “silence” appears in Merleau-Ponty’s discussions of aesthetic 
(linguistic and artistic) expression in texts like Indirect Language and the Voices of 
Silence or “Eye and Mind.” But “silence” also repeatedly figures as a qualifier for the 
sensible world or nature, which is, for example, literally equated to “the world of silence” 
in the title of the 1957 inedited text, La Nature ou le monde de silence (NMS).1  
An indirect approach to deep silence through Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of 
Nature reveals deep silence as essential to being, as a dimension whereby being manifests 
itself in its absence. Deep silence, I will argue, institutes a different modality of existence 
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beyond the signifying and being of presence that, crucially, secures the fecundity of 
being. Operating according to onto-temporal dynamics of what Merleau-Ponty calls 
precession, deep silence is at once there and not-there. If, in the preceding chapter, I 
focused on the transspatiality of the sense of deep silence, here I attend to the 
transtemporality of deep silence. I propose that, through the (temporal) instituting of 
unpredictability, hesitancy, and openness at the heart of being, deep silence accounts for 
being’s fecundity and uniqueness, for the (retroactive) growth of ontological possibility.  
The chapter is organized in four parts. In the first section, I briefly trace the 
development of the concept of Nature in Merleau-Ponty’s thought. In his later ontological 
writings, Merleau-Ponty deploys “Nature” to indicate a dimension of being that is at the 
“juncture of Being and nothingness” (N 102), a layer of being that is anterior to and 
makes possible the reflexive cleavage. As such, Nature forces us to grapple with “what, 
in things, resists the operations of free subjectivity,” which is to say with “the world of 
silence” (NMS).2 Equating Nature with the world of silence suggests that, on Merleau-
Ponty’s account, deep silence is the ground of being—of becoming, I should say. In the 
second section, I propose that, although it remains inchoate in his thought, we find, in 
Merleau-Ponty’s writings, traces of the realization that deep silence is a fecund archē of 
sense and being. As I argue this ground is a peculiar kind of ground that remains 
fundamentally unarchic (as in without foundation or principle) and elusive (as in resisting 
the operations of free subjectivity and expression through propositional language). Deep 
silence as le monde du silence is Merleau-Ponty’s way to think this origin that has a 
quality of an Abgrund and that would otherwise remain “without name in any 
philosophy.” At once, deep silence attunes the beholder to and eventuates a modality of 
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being and signification that operates through haunting, echoes, and ingressions. This 
modality of existence operates according to the temporal modality of precession.  
In the third section, I elaborate on the anarchic and fecund nature of deep silence 
by spelling out the kind of possibility at play in Merleau-Ponty’s notion of a “pregnancy 
of possible” (VI 125). Possibility, I propose, comes into existence as always already past 
through a retrograde movement enacted by the actualization of the real. In “Eye and 
Mind,” Merleau-Ponty accounts for this peculiar temporal movement via the notion of 
precession, i.e., a mutual anticipation between connected terms, like that of the 
equinoxes. Precession, as we will see, figures a retrograde inscription of possibility 
whereby being grows internally and, as such, remains fundamentally open and deeply 
silent. Attending to precession helps makes sense of the claim that deep silence operates 
at a level prior to the reflexive cleavage, that deep silence at once co-exists with and 
within, e.g., voice and the presence of consciousness as their doublure, while also pre-
existing them by coming into existence as always already past and, as such, making 
possible the, e.g., voice-silence intertwining. In this sense, I propose, being’s generativity 
is tied to deep silence’s diachrony. I conclude the chapter by returning, in the fourth 
section, to the claim that deep silence lies at the heart of being and argue that, as 
condition of possibility, deep silence is not a “close set of possibilities,” but an open set 
of possibilities. Remarkedly, as condition of possibility, deep silence actualizes the 
present without its normativity being knowable in advance. Rather, I propose, its 




1. Deep Silence as “Primordial” Ground 
Merleau-Ponty opens the First Course on Nature, titled “The Concept of Nature” 
(1956-1957), with reflections on language and linguistic expression. Given the 
intertwining of language and phenomena, is Nature “something other than the product of 
a history, in the course of which it acquired a series of meanings that end by rendering it 
intelligible[?,]” he ponders (N 3).3 And, if that’s the case, wouldn’t the study of Nature 
be nothing but the study of these words, these meanings? Merleau-Ponty doesn’t seem to 
think that that is the case, suggesting that there is—and that his inquiry is after—a 
“primordial, nonlexical meaning always intended by people who speak of ‘nature’” (N 3). 
As he observes in La Nature ou le monde du silence, although it is accurate to say that 
Nature is not separable from humanity or history, it would be a mistake to “reduce the 
concept of nature to a branch of anthropology” (NMS); “Nature,” as he famously 
observes in first course on Nature, “The Concept of Nature,” “is what has meaning, 
without this meaning being posited by thought: it is the autoproduction of a meaning” (N 
3). As he sets out to accomplish over the course of the three nature lectures, his task is to 
“restore the true traits of the ‘veiled idol’ [idol voilée] [by seeking] the being of Nature 
[…] below [en-deçà] its being posited [être-posé]” (NMS).  
Although this passage may seem to be primarily concerned with questions of 
sense, a closer look alerts us to specific onto-temporal dynamics at play within and 
instituting of Nature, suggesting that the phenomenon of Nature cannot be accounted for 
in terms of either empiricism or idealism, a philosophy of the object or a philosophy of 
consciousness. Nature is different from matter or objects conceived in terms of accidental 
and mutually-external relations of causation, partes extra partes, because Nature “has an 
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interior, is determined from within” (N 3). But Nature is also not an object of thought for 
a constituting consciousness, a stable and passive substratum awaiting cultural 
inscriptions. “Nature is different from man [sic]: it is not instituted by him and is opposed 
to custom, to discourse” (N 3). This interior or internal regulatory dynamic (this silent 
logos) exceeds human consciousness and anthropological projections. It is 
“autoproduction” (N 3). Thus, Merleau-Ponty’s study of Nature invites us not only to 
move beyond traditional dualisms; it also gives us the tools to reconfigure the how of 
Nature. “Nature,” he observes, “is an enigmatic object, an object that is not an object at 
all; it is not really set out in front of us. It is our soil [sol]—not what is in front of us, 
facing us, but rather, that which carries us” (N 4).  
The significance of this last statement is profound: First, customs, discourse, 
reflection, and human consciousness are not only dependent on Nature insofar as they are 
instituted through and by it; as Merleau-Ponty’s remarks indicate, Nature is what carries 
us, i.e., a ground or condition of possibility for reflection and language. Second, the study 
of Nature as an instituting principle also forces the inquirer to come to terms with an 
“enigmatic object,” specifically, with a peculiar kind of ground, that “resists the 
operations of free subjectivity” (NMS) and that, as such, remains unarchic or without 
foundation. This dimension of being is what, in the preceding chapter, I called silent 
logos, the summons of the sensuous world that grasp and usurp the beholder.  
Before attending to this insight and shedding light onto the ways in which deep 
silence is an anarchic ground or instituting principle it is necessary to make explicit the 
meaning of Nature operative in Merleau-Ponty’s and the current projects. As scholars 
have observed (Barbaras 2001, 2002; Toadvine 2009a; 2009b; Bannon 2011; Hamrick 
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and van der Veken 2011), the afore-mentioned conception of Nature as “autoproduction” 
is characteristic of Merleau-Ponty’s later writing, and is instituted as well as institutes a 
shift in his thinking toward ontological considerations, thus marking a departure from his 
earlier phenomenological thinking.4 In Nature and Logos, Hamrick and van der Veken 
argue that, until his first course on nature at the Collège de France in 1956-1957, 
Merleau-Ponty deploys the concept of nature somewhat uncritically, ascribing to it the 
traditional philosophical meaning common to Descartes and Kant (2011, 24). 
It is in the Third Nature lecture (1959-1960) that Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical 
style and approach to the investigation of Nature changes. While Merleau-Ponty deploys 
the term “nature” to index “life that has meaning [une vie qui a un sens]” (N 3), i.e., 
carbon-based, sensible things (streams, fires, cats, human beings, roses, rocks, and so on), 
the concept of “Nature” takes on an ontological connotation, designating “a leaf or layer 
of total Being” (N 265), a “part of this complex which reveals it all” (VI 204, 205). This 
is to say that Nature is no longer the context for a phenomenology of embodied existence 
(as it was in the Phenomenology), but key to an explicitly ontological project concerned 
with “a layer” of being, specifically, with the “primordial—that is, the nonconstructed, 
the noninstituted [primordial, c’est-à-dir le non-construit, le non-instítué]” soil that 
carries us and that, importantly, is “autoproduction” (N 4). Nature is not exhausted by its 
“symbolic transcriptions” (NMS). Starting the inquiry into Nature from a philosophy of 
reflection/subjectivity would miss the “primordial being against which all reflection 
institutes itself,” which is to say “brute or wild being which has not yet been transformed 
into an object of vision of choice.” To this end, Merleau-Ponty continues,  
it is vital that we take into account … the Being …. that precedes us, surrounds 
us, carries us; the being which carries other humans with us in a jumbled manner 
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and which is accessible through more than one perspective. The being is already 
there before them, it precedes them, it grounds them, joins one to the other and 
within each of them, which ‘holds’ by itself, holds all things together, and does 
not reduce itself ot what each of us has to be. (NMS) 
 
These remarks tell us that, studied from within, Nature gestures us toward or makes 
visible the operations of being that functions as a ground or condition of possibility for, 
among other things, subjectivity, scientific thought, consciousness, and reflection—in 
sum, for logos proforikos (VI 179).5  
Thus conceived, Nature is what Matisse’s strokes or the pink crosses express, i.e., 
a silent logos one can trace through the re-orientations effected by the summons of the 
crosses, for instance. Not surprisingly, in fact, the title of the inedited text from the late 
1950s, Nature ou le monde du silence, from which the above passage comes, equate 
Nature (as a layer of being) with silence. As such, Nature/silence is a peculiar kind of 
ground, one that can no longer be thought of in terms of a philosophy of reflection 
(idealism) or an ontology of the object (materialism) as both are ill-equipped to account 
for “what, in things, [has meaning while] resist[ing] free subjectivity.”6 Rather, Merleau-
Ponty tells us, Nature/silence is “at the juncture of Being and nothingness” (N 102), 
which is to say that it is prior to the division of in-self and for-itself, an in-between that 
lines both Being and Nothingness conceived via reflection and propositional language.  
 To think the juncture of Being and nothingness, this element that “has no name in 
philosophy” (VI 147), Merleau-Ponty introduces multiple notions such as “flesh,” “wild,” 
or “brute” being, moving between them to avoid, one may suggest, crystallizing the 
elusive dynamics of being into the rigidity of a single, overly defined concept. Although 
not synonymous, these figures share their being depicted as “original” sources anterior to 
distinctions such as that of subject and object, Being and nothingness, nature and culture 
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(VI 307). This casting has an important ontological and conceptual implication: it means 
that, as juncture or hinge, Nature is to be recovered before “the reflexive cleavage” 
abstractly separates it into and reduces it to discrete entities, into something said (VI 
130).7 But how are we to think through Nature/silence as this original source that 
inaugurates discrete phenomena, sense, and difference in “hiding” (VI 113)? That is, how 
are we to make sense of Nature as “autoproduction” of a “primordial meaning” that is 
“below its being posited” (N 7, NMS)? As we saw in the preceding chapter, art 
rehabilitates silent logos beyond subjectivity without subsuming it under concepts, 
offering instead a “conceptless opening” onto the world. But how does Nature/deep 
silence operate such that sense eventuates by grabbing the beholder while keeping her at 
a distance, by transporting her transspatially and transtemporally? Grappling with this 
question directs us toward ontological speculations; it requires first attending to the 
ontological claim that Nature is “determined from within” (N 3).  
In the Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty invites the readers to think the 
processes that emit spatio-temporal individuals as a spatializing and temporalizing, a self-
differing characteristic of Nature, there thematized as flesh. Central to flesh conceived as 
processes generative of difference is its reversibility, its chiasmic structure. Nature is 
processes in and through which Being and nothingness, sense and the sensible, voice and 
silence emerge “by a sort of coiling up or redoubling” (VI 114). Famously, Merleau-
Ponty elucidates this redoubling or reversibility of being by reference to the touching-
touched hand.8 The touching and the touched are reversible; via a crisscrossing whereby 
the touching hand descends into the things that it touches, the touching hand becomes one 
of them (VI 134). 9 It is in the section on Animality in the Second Course on Nature 
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(1957-1958), however, that Merleau-Ponty provides concrete non-anthropomorphic 
descriptions of the reversibility of flesh, here conceived as Nature. The difficulty of this 
transition is grappling with the claim that there is a reversibility of being. In fact, while it 
may be relatively intuitive to claim that the “doublure” of the touching is the touched 
(since the sentient is also always sensible), what does it mean to say that the sensible has, 
as its reverse, something like a sentient touching, “something that,” in David Morris’s 
words, “(latently at least) makes sense of the world” (2010a, 143)? This is to say, what 
does it mean to propose that there is a sens of Nature that exceeds anthropomorphic 
projections, a silent logos that is not posited by thought? We find answers in Merleau-
Ponty’s discussion of the tick-milieu relationship.  
As you may recall from chapter 4, tick and milieu, he observes, are not positioned 
in a simple relation of cause and effect that can be understood “moment by moment” (N 
175).10 Rather, their relation is “ontologically internal to one another” (Morris 2013, 
332). Similar to the touching and the touched, tick and milieu are not external to one 
another, but internally and reciprocally open, encroaching nodes of the same flesh. 
Toward the end of the First Course on Nature, in his commentary on Whitehead, 
Merleau-Ponty exemplifies this relation by reference to the being of an electron that 
cannot be accounted for in a Parmenidean model of “absolute Being, which is all or 
nothing” (N 115). The electron, on Merleau-Ponty’s account, is better thought as an 
“ingredient” making an ingression “in its own vicinity, it is the hallway of certain 
‘traces,’ of certain ‘roles’ observed by the observer” (N 115). As the language of 
ingression indicates, the electron or the tick—but, more generally, elements that are 
ontologically internal to one another—affect one another by way of traces and 
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suggestions. The electron or the tick are not transparent beings, fully saturated or in-
themselves; rather, they are porous, opaque, and hollow—in sum, always already out of 
themselves, traced/tracing their surroundings. These traces are not “outside” of the 
electron or the tick, but, by soliciting a reciprocal orientation, i.e., norms or equilibria, 
within each, make themselves present, qua traces, internally. “Crucially, this also means 
that “the tick” and “the milieu” always remain latent, “poles that are never seen for 
themselves” but that nevertheless call forth their encroachment and emergence (N 178).11 
There isn’t tick and milieu, touching and touched, or voice and silence as discrete 
entities. Each exists as a “yet-to-be-tick” and a “yet-to-be-milieu” or a “yet-to-be-silence” 
and “yet-to-be-voice” that, through their intertwining, tracing, and haunting, invite the 
development of the other. Akin to the example of the crosses, the artists, and the local 
geography discussed in the preceding chapter, the tick and electron are in ontologically 
internal relations with their surrounding in that their meaning and development are called 
forth by the “murmurs” of other phenomena in their constellation.12 
Insofar as the claim that Nature is autoproduction is concerned, the internal 
openness of beings means that the encroachment of “yet-to-be-tick” and “yet-to-be-
milieu” is a “relation of meaning” (N 175) whose sens is not for a subject, dependent on 
their determination, but, rather, auto-determined. The developmental discriminations of 
the milieu’s stimuli or the tick’s response make a difference, matter or have a sense, to 
both the milieu and the tick’s development independent of anthropomorphic projections. 
For example, as Merleau-Ponty stresses, the presence of butyric acid secreted by the 
sudoripary glands of mammals is a difference that matters for the tick’s awakening from 
its dormant state (N 174), a difference that exerts a regulatory function. In this sense, 
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then, we can say that the sensible (at least latently) makes sense of itself, that there is a 
normativity of nature that is irreducible to cultural-linguistic norms (Ferrari 2018).13 It is 
in this sense that we can think of Nature as an ontological differential play of the “yet-to-
be-tick” and the “yet-to-be-milieu” that inaugurates the actualization of tick and milieu. 
In Morris’s words, within this ontologically internal and latent relationship, “diversity 
involves a genesis of differences from differences that are yet to be determined” (2010b, 
188).  
As the discussion of the meaning of the crosses already suggested, to think 
Nature’s internal determination or autoproduction, we must leave behind substance 
ontology moving toward a precursor of what will become known as hauntology (Derrida 
1994). As Jacques Derrida would subsequently put it, hauntology expresses the haunted 
state of existence and being by a present absence, a condition that challenges the 
metaphysics of presence. Phenomena are inaugurated through diacritical processes of 
self-differentiation whereby they continuously dispossess/are dispossessing by ingressing 
into one another, by shimmering with the traces of other phenomena in their 
constellation.14 In Merleau-Ponty’s words, “the things—here, there, now, then—are no 
longer in themselves, in their own place, in their own time; they exist only at the end of 
those rays of spatiality and of temporality emitted in the secrecy of my flesh” (VI 114). 
Crucially, the constant interplay of phenomena resignifies them and traces them 
differently, inaugurating different futures to follow.15 In this sense, Nature appears as 
processes of internal determination “grounded” in a constant and everchanging dynamic. 
This dynamic eludes ontological localism and full epistemic transparency. As such, it 
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also resists the completeness of the reduction, the coinciding with being in-itself, and a 
returning to origins.16  
Given Merleau-Ponty’s equation of this dimension of being with the world of 
silence, we can say that deep silence bespeaks the ground of being that, in its elusiveness 
and “haunting,” resists the operations of free subjectivity.17 After all, as he reminds us in 
the passage cited in the epigraph, “[t]he sensible is that: this possibility to be evident in 
silence, to be understood implicitly, and the alleged positivity of the sensible world 
(when one scrutinizes it unto its roots, when one goes beyond the empirical-sensible, the 
secondary sensible of our ‘representation,’ when one discloses the Being of Nature) 
precisely proves to be an ungraspable” (VI 214). Silence makes possible for being to be 
present/sensible as absence /ungraspable.  
Before attending more closely to the claim that silence operates as the fecund 
ground of being, it is important to note that the communion or complicity that makes 
possible reversibility and the disclosure of being does not elide difference; being’s 
reversibility does not entail reducing tick and milieu or touching and touched to self-
identical or undifferentiated sameness. There is never coincidence between touching and 
touched, tick and milieu, because reversibility is “always imminent and never realized in 
fact,” because, at play in reversibility, is an écart, “a sort of dehiscence [that] opens my 
body in two” (VI 147, 123). When thought from within the in-between, Nature 
fundamentally resists full apprehension of a free subjectivity as “coincidence eclipses at 
the moment of realization” (VI 147). The touching hand cannot have a full grasp on the 
world because, as it touches, it is always already also touched; there is a slippage of sorts, 
a deferring and decentering, whereby the touching descends into the touched, the tick into 
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the milieu (and vice versa). As Merleau-Ponty reminds us, what the (“active”) grasping 
reveals is its fundamental belonging to the grasped (its “passivity” or “inertia”), that 
“what there is to be grasped is a dispossession” (VI 266).18 After all, he continues, “every 
relation with being is simultaneously a taking and a being taken, the hold is held, it is 
inscribed and inscribed in the same being that it takes hold of” (VI 266). This is the mute 
contact with the world—the silent logos—that, as we saw in the preceding the previous 
chapter, eludes conceptual grasping and grasps the beholder instead.  
Remarkedly, this deeply silent resistance or concealment is not an obstacle that 
needs to be overcome to better know or get to this elusive and dissimulating being (PP 
179). That is, deep silence is not an epistemic defect (an all-knowing being would not be 
better positioned to fully grasp being), but rather, ontologically essential to being; it is the 
resisting element of being without which it would lack ontological depth and, as we are 
about to see, fecundity.19 In fact, the layer or leaf of being that Merleau-Ponty thematizes 
as Nature/silence is not a plentitude, but a fundamental openness, a “hollow” (VI 112). 
Importantly, this hollow is not a negativity either. As Merleau-Ponty adamantly stresses, 
being as hollow is not a lack or absence of being; “it is not a void” (VI 233). Rather, it 
institutes a different modality of existing whereby being eventuates as concealment or 
latency.  
At this juncture we can better make sense of the claim advanced in chapter 4 that 
being as Nature/silence is, to borrow Donald Landes’s wording, an inscription which also 
“exscribes” (2013, 9). The eventuation of being in beings discloses, while always also 
keeping at a distance, itself and its own sense; its sense and being can never be complete, 
always in the process of becoming and expressing through continuous reprisals, 
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interlacings, and reinscriptions. In this sense, we can say that the being and sense of being 
is present as absent. As Merleau-Ponty asks in the epigraph, “[f]or how would we speak 
of Being, since those beings and shapes of Being, which open to us the only conceivable 
access to it, at the same time hide it form us by their mass, and since every unveiling is 
simultaneously a dissimulation?” (PP 179). In light of these remarks, we see that being 
“is” tick-milieu relating without being reducible to the sum of its sensuous 
manifestations. At the same time, although Nature cannot be reduced to the sum of 
sensible things, it also cannot be conceived separately from them, as “identification 
would result in materialism, and radical separation would lead back to a Kantian 
unknowable in-itself” (Hamrick and Van der Veken 2011, 59). Hence, albeit not 
thematizable in propositional language, Nature is not transcendental to the sensible and, 
as such, ineffable or mute. Rather, Nature exists in a different modality of being, and 
signifies by haunting, becoming traceable through its concrete manifestations. Sensible 
nature is therefore the “originating presentation of the unpresentable” (VI 203).20 Similar 
to how the “sonorous existence of my voice is for me… an echo of its articulated 
existence, it vibrates through my head rather than outside,” so does the existence of 
Nature vibrate through sensible beings. Nature therefore exists as haunting or echoings.  
In conclusion, it would be a mistake to read the écart as introducing yet another 
dualism between the tick and the milieu, essence and existence, or ground and grounded. 
In his later ontological writings, Merleau-Ponty carries out the interrogation of what had 
previously been conceived as absolute antonyms from within their encroaching. This is to 
say that Merleau-Ponty reframes the question of the Being-nothingness relation as one of 
mutual divergence, not opposition, interrogating that which is “prior” to their division, 
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that within and through which Being and nothingness and, more generally, difference 
emerge one as “the possible of the other” (VI 228). As it turns out, the later of being prior 
to its being posited is a fecund dispossessing, a hollow. It is deep silence.  
2. The Grounding of Deep Silence: On Precession and Ontological Possibility 
Throughout the preceding section, I gestured toward deep silence as the fecund 
ground of being. Not only Merleau-Ponty’s equation of silence with Nature, which he 
recognizes as the hinge of being, invite such a conceptualization. Recall also, from 
chapter 4, Claude Leforte’s remarks about silence as the “ground” of language (xxx), a 
thought that echoes Merleau-Ponty’s own comments about nature being the world of 
silence that “carries us” (NMS) discussed in this chapter. In spite of the apprehension that 
deep silence functions as a grounding principle (of language, sense, and being), however, 
neither Merleau-Ponty nor Lefort spell out how deep silence operates. Locating deep 
silence at the heart of being as its ground, in fact, raises questions about the kind of 
ground or condition of possibility of (haunt)ontology and the groundlessness of being. If 
this ground is not a positivity, i.e., fully there, graspable, or experienceable, but also “not 
a void” (VI 233) or an absence of being, how are we to think the being of deep silence? 
The interrogation has plunged into the silent depths of being, and we are now faced with 
the seemingly paradoxical task of thinking the juncture prior to the “reflexive cleavage” 
and its antonyms. That is, the challenge is not only that of “thinking” without concepts, 
but also to conceive of a being that “is” more than nothing and less than something, not-
present without therefore being absent—in sum, a “fecund negative,” (VI 263).  
Prompted by Alloa’s (2014) and Vitali Rosati’s (2016) work on the topic, in this 
section, I make sense of deep silence as the ground of being by putting in conversation 
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Merleau-Ponty’s remarks about possibility with Henri Bergson’s treatment of virtuality. 
After all, in the Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty refers to this layer of being—
this fecund negative—as a “pregnancy of possibles,” a “possibility, a latency” (VI 250, 
133). The pairing of possibility and virtuality calls forth a depiction of possibility as more 
than a mere logical non-impossibility and less than what actually is. As virtual, 
possibility must be ontologically rich—it must exist—while not, for this reason, being 
overdetermined by or overdetermining the actual (what “is”). That is, it must exist “prior” 
to the eventuation of beings in the sense of making the eventuation of being possible, 
without being causally reducible to them. The problem at hand, then, is making sense of 
possibility—the possibility of deep silence, let’s not forget—as existing in a haunting 
modality of being. As I will show, thinking deep silence, possibility, and virtuality 
together shows how deep silence is the fecund void, the porosity or openness of being 
whereby historical structures shape one’s experience and meaning of the world.21  
Although evocative, Merleau-Ponty’s metaphor of “pregnancy of possible” calls 
for some clarification. Casting deep silence as possibility could run into the risk of 
inadvertently reifying the dualism of actuality and potentiality, reinscribing deep silence 
as the non-actualized or precluded possibility of speech. This conception would frame 
silence, yet again, as an absence over and against the fullness of speech. Certainly, 
however, in this context, “possibility” does not index the possible of scholasticism 
according to which what possesses potentialitas is that which can be. This view would 
fall prey of possibilism, a position that Merleau-Ponty strongly rejects. As he remarks in 
a 1959 working note titled “Pregnancy, transcendence--,” possibilism entails not only 
conceiving of existence as radically external to essence, but also upholding the 
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precedence of latter over the former, which effectively means that being does not 
necessitate existential determination; existence does not add anything to the being of a 
thing because its essence is always already completely present in it in its potential state 
(VI 206). Within this framework, while the actual always already ideally pre-exists 
concrete realization as possibility, this possibility is reduced to a non-impossibility or a 
mere logical possibility. In this sense, possibilism eviscerates the mattering of existence 
(pun intended); everything that could exist always already exists a priori in its potential 
state. In this context, silence would mark an already available utterance, SP, “existing 
silently,” i.e., currently unspoken but potentially sayable, within an already 
constituted set of possible utterances, S1, S2, … Sn, which set might be identified and 
defined in advance.  
Acknowledging that silence as possibility does not pre-exist the actual, however, 
should not result upholding the converse, that is, positing the primacy of the actual over 
the possible or conceiving the latter on the basis of the former. This would entail 
espousing actualism, a position that falls prey of the necessitarian attitude, i.e., a logic 
whereby the possible must necessarily realize itself since, in order to be conceived, it 
must have first been realized. This is a way of thinking that Merleau-Ponty also rejects 
for, as Alloa aptly points out, “possible and real converge in the image of a world without 
lacunae” (2014, 151), thus excluding becoming and the depth of existence. In other 
words, according to actualism all that could be necessarily always already is. Within this 
framework, silence would then be what cannot be spoken, a failure to say and an absence 
of meaning. Both positions, by overlooking the weight and contingency of existence bind 
the modality of existence of deep silence to the presence of logos, the stability and 
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transparency of what is. As such, both fall victim to an ideology “incapable of conceiving 
contingent becoming except as ‘irrational, as opacity, as residue’” (Merleau-Ponty, 
Résumé de Cours, 137, cited in Alloa 2014, 152), and, as such, as non-essential to being. 
What does Merleau-Ponty mean by possibility then? What kind of possibility is at play 
here such that deep silence is a “pregnancy of possibles,” which is to say, such that deep 
silence “is” other than an absence over and against the fullness of speech?  
If Merleau-Ponty’s remarks about approaching Nature as a leaf or layer of being 
are of any indication, “possibility” should here be considered in its ontological 
designation, which would effectively mean understanding deep silence as “ontological 
possibility”—a theme central to Henri Bergson’s work and familiar to Merleau-Ponty, 
who, like Gilles Deleuze, closely read Bergson’s work. Seeking to avoid the pitfalls of 
possibilism and actualism, Merleau-Ponty refuses a notion of the possible that would 
have ‘the actual’ as its antonym and develops one that figures the possible as an 
ingredient” of being, which is to say as the actual’s lining (or doublure). As an ingredient, 
then, the possible is always already an intrinsic component of being as much as the actual 
is; the possible, like the actual, exists (in being) essentially, but its modality of existence 
is more akin to the haunting or spectral dwelling witnessed in chapter 5. That is, it exists 
in the temporal mode of the virtual whereby it is neither fixed or discernable a priori, nor 
fully present in beings, but, rather, is immanent to the actual, haunting and becoming 
traceable through it.22  
In other words, incompossibles are not spread out across possible worlds, as mere 
logical possibilities, but held together in this one, each as the possible (as lining or 
doublure) of the other. Holding them together, however, requires new ontological 
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frameworks whereby incompossibles figure as real in both their actuality and 
possibility/potentiality. Within these new ontological frameworks, the actual and the 
possible ought not to be conceived as antonyms; they do not add up to yield all things, “a 
world without lacunae.” Rather—and here is the difficulty—being in its actuality and 
possibility is always already hollowed/ing and, as such, fundamentally opaque and 
incomplete. Following Bergson, scholars like Al-Saji (2007; 2008; 2012b), Lawlor 
(2003), or Alloa (2014) think this novel kind of possibility that exists while allowing for 
being’s lacunae in terms of virtuality.  
We now come to realize that the question we have been asking all along about 
deep silence as condition of possibility of experience (but also of the modality of 
existence effected by an aesthesis of deep silence) is, what does it mean to exist virtually, 
i.e., to exist and exert influence upon the actual (being and signification) without, for this 
reason, being shackled by the presence of consciousness, fully graspable in propositional 
language? In other words, what does it mean to say that deep silence accounts for the 
actualization or phenomenalization of being, i.e., the becoming-sensible of being (but 
also the becoming-sense of the sensible), “without its actualization becoming a task to be 
fulfilled, already established ahead of time”—the challenge that, on Alloa’s account, a 
philosophy of the virtual must meet to avoid falling prey to either possibilism or 
actualism (2014, 155)? Thinking deep silence’s possibilities in terms of virtuality brings 
attention to its peculiar temporal dynamics.  
If we are to take seriously the suggestion that deep silence allows to “think” the 
paradoxical origin or ground of experience—what otherwise remains “without name in 
any philosophy”—by attuning us to a modality of being and signification that exists 
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virtually, which is to say that makes sense/sensible through haunting, echoings, and 
ingressings, we need to return to the observation that deep silence operates at a level 
prior to the reflexive cleavage, that although deep silence co-exists with and within voice 
as its doublure, it also pre-exists it by making possible the voice-silence intertwining. In 
fact, we could say that the “priority” or “possibility” of deep silence is virtually real, or 
exists in the temporal mode of the virtual, which, in turn, reveals that deep silence’s 
fecundity is tied to its diachrony.23 Thinking the possible as virtually past allows us to do 
precisely that; it allows us to uphold, at once, the seemingly incompossible claims that 
the possible co-exists with the actual, as its lining (the claim discussed above), while also 
affirming the diachrony between the two, a move that avoids adopting a necessitarian 
attitude, aborting the pregnancy of possibility.  
Informed by Bergson’s thorough treatment of the difference between matter and 
memory, present and past, actual and virtual, in the Visible and the Invisible and the 
Passivity and Institution lectures, Merleau-Ponty suggests that there is a different kind of 
temporality of life than that of linear time.24 Even if only in passing, in “Eye and Mind,” 
he accounts for this temporal dynamic in terms of precession—a movement of mutual 
anticipation between connected terms, like that of the equinoxes.25 Consider Merleau-
Ponty’s unpublished note from the “Grand Résumé” of The Visible and the Invisible, 
written in the Fall of 1960:  
Circularity, but rather precession       visible-seer 
silence-speech 
I-Other [moi-autrui].26  
 
As this passage suggests, precession is part of Merleau-Ponty’s effort, characteristic of 
his later writings, to articulate a non-dualistic ontology that bridges the gap between self 
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and other, seeing and seen, without erasing the specificity of each term.27 In the 
preceding chapter, I accounted for the eventuation of meaning by reference to the 
circularity or transspatiality of sense, which concretizes through the gaps or in-between 
of the lateral interlacing of painter, work of art, and surrounding. In The Flesh of Images, 
Mauro Carbone argues that, differently from other terms that also indicate this chiasm 
such as enjambement (infringement) and empiétement (encroachment)—but also 
circularity, I would add—precession underscores the temporal, rather than spatial, 
modality of existence of deep silence. Specifically, precession features a peculiar 
temporal “movement of antecedence” or mutual anticipation such that “the primacy of a 
term rather than the other…becomes undecidable” (Carbone 2015, 58, 59). The seen does 
not anticipate the gaze, nor does the gaze come before the visible. Rather, they are 
mutually anticipating and intertwining terms.  
The language of undecidability made explicit by Carbone and implicated by 
precession is a much needed corrective to spatial thinking, i.e., a way of conceiving of 
time as a series of “nows” spreadable in front of us and succeeding one another, as well 
as the language often deployed when thinking about the relation between visible or 
invisible, touching and touched, actual and possible, which vitiates the understanding by 
conjuring up the image of succession, of a tick that precedes its milieu, which precedes 
the tick, which precedes the milieu, and so on, ad infinitum. This spatial thinking 
capitulates into actualism or possibilism. On the contrary, precession invites approaching 
the relationship or movement not from without, “moment by moment,” but from within. 
It is only from within that, as Merleau-Ponty warns us in the context of the relationship 
between the tick and the milieu, we would be situated to apprehend the sens—meaning 
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and orientation—of the relation (N 175). To put it in terms I used before, approaching the 
relation from without would consist in forgetting that “diversity involves a genesis of 
differences from differences that are yet to be determined” (Morris 2010b, 188).  
We are now positioned to grapple with the magnitude of this insight: Merleau-
Ponty is here telling us that for meaning to eventuate (and for us to apprehend it) 
difference (or deep silence as the écart of being) ought to come before sameness (the 
visible and sayable).28 Although, at first, the note on precession may seem to imply 
circularity as the key dynamic of precession, closer attention to its wording (“Circularity, 
but rather precession”) marks a divergence between circularity or reversibility and 
precession.29 Differently from circularity, which would take place between temporal 
“moments” or “terms” of the relation like visible and seer, silence and speech, precession 
witnesses an undecidability between the terms. That is, being happens prior to the 
determination of discrete differences. Importantly, as Merleau-Ponty explains in a 
working note about the reflexivity of the body, this means that being is not grounded in 
nor yields coincidence with a “constitutive source of perception” (VI 249). Rather, the 
reflexivity of flesh (like the experience of self-touching or of speech in monologue) does 
not reach beyond its imminence, always inevitably culminating in deep silence—in-
visibility. This deep silence, then, is the act of perception itself which yields a “Nicht 
Urpräsentierbar (a non-visible, myself)” (VI 249). In other words, the disclosure of the 
self to oneself or the eventuating of being (which yields a Nicht Urpräsentierbar, a deep 
silence) are possible because of the peculiar ground that deep silence “is.” As Merleau-
Ponty puts it, “…I am …a self-presence that is an absence from self—The progress of the 
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inquiry toward the center is not the movement from the conditioned unto the condition, 
from the founded unto the Grund: the so-called Grund is Abgrund” (VI 250).30  
Precession’s temporal and undecidable connotations make it a valuable analytical 
tool to think about the intertwining of the, e.g., tick-milieu or actual-possible not in terms 
of succession, but in terms of synchrony (which is not a coinciding or a sameness!): the 
possible comes into existence along with or at the same time as the actual, “as a 
virtualizing of the actual” (Al-Saji 2012b, 353). As Alia Al-Saji explains, this is to say 
that “the real is being created […] as both actual (present) and virtual (past) 
simultaneously” (2012b, 353–54). Thinking together possibility and virtuality, then, helps 
us see that the possible/virtual comes into existence along with the actual/present. In this 
sense, possible and actual are simultaneous; they co-exist with one another. Importantly, 
this framing eschews the pitfalls of possibilism in that it avoids conceiving of the possible 
such that for something to come into existence, for something to happen or to be, its 
existence had to be possible prior to its own actualization.31 
Although this latter framing aptly avoids slipping into possibilism, we need to 
tread carefully when saying that the possible is created along with the real, avoiding to 
conceive of the possible on the basis of the real along which it comes into existence. In 
other words, we ought to remain vigilant about not adopting a necessitarian attitude and 
reducing the possible to the actual, a move that would entail the foreclosing of becoming 
and, importantly, the fecundity of deep silence. Precession’s dynamic is such that as the 
possible comes into existence along with the actual, it is projected backwards, thus 
existing as always already past. That is, the possible becomes real in a different temporal 
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modality of existence than the actual; it comes into being not as present, but as (virtually) 
past.  
In The Growth of Time, Bergson refers to this peculiar temporal dynamic—in 
terms of the “retrograde movement of the true”—by saying that once reality is actualized, 
it “casts its shadow behind it into the indefinitely distant past” (2007, 11). In other words, 
actuality comes into existence along with the possibility of its realization, “retroactively 
… create[ing] its own prefiguration in the past and an explanation of itself by its 
predecessors” (Bergson 2007, 12). In this sense, the temporality of precession follows the 
logic of the futur antérieur whereby a work of art was not always possible prior to its 
realization, but, rather, it will have been possible once it is realized. Matisse did not know 
in advance all the possible brush strokes at any given instant. Nor did he have a complete 
sense of the painting. It is by becoming actual that Matisse’s Standing Nude with 
Downcast Eyes becomes “retrospectively or retroactively possible” (2007, 82).32 In this 
sense, as Al-Saji explains, “though its possibility does not precede the event to come, it 
will have preceded it once the event takes place. This is the retrograde movement—the 
temporal ripples propagating through being—that events and truths effect once they come 
into existence; the past is constantly recast by the present, in a nonchronological and 
reversible time” (2012b, 353). The temporal movement of precession thus figures a 
“retrograde movement of the true” (Bergson 2007, 11) by which time retroactively 
“add[s] something,” i.e., ontological possibility, to being.33 
In sum, then, the possible is “prior” to the actual and deep silence “prior” to the 
reflexive cleavage or present consciousness whereby this priority is neither temporal (in 
the sense of a developmentally linear unfolding) nor structural (in the sense of a 
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fundamental ontology).34 As virtual, in fact, the possibility of deep silence is prior to the 
actual in that it comes into existence as “an impossible past,” to use Merleau-Ponty’s 
expression, a past “such as it was one day plus an inexplicable alteration, a strange 
distance” that keeps it irreducible to the actual and the present of consciousness (VI 124). 
Note that it is in this latter sense that the possible is “originary.” The possibility of deep 
silence was never memoralized by and remains irreducible to present consciousness.35 As 
Al-Saji observes, this impossible past is “neither an empirical past, once present and now 
forgotten, nor a layer of positivity, underlying experience but hidden from view” (2007, 
184). The precession of being returns to “an elusive origin” or Abgrund. In fact, since the 
movement of precession is infinitely mutual, with each term being the eternal antecedent 
of the other, precession cannot unearth a possible that essentially precedes and preexists 
the actual, nor can it bring us back to an empirical/chronological past. Rather, as Carbone 
point out, precession is a “retrograde movement digging a peculiar kind of depth in time” 
(2015, 60)—an immemorial and deep silent depth—which brings into existence a 
retroactively instituted possible, a dimension of being that has never been present. This, 
in Merleau-Ponty’s words, is a “mythical time” (VI 242), a time of possibility that comes 
to be excavated into existence without having ever been experienced by present 
consciousness as such.36 Deep silence, then, exists at the heart of being as its condition of 
possibility, but this possibility functions in a different modality of being than the present; 
it remains opaque and elusive, resisting the operations of free subjectivity. Thus, the 
possible and the actual co-exist without coinciding; there is a fundamental diachrony 
between actual and possible, present and past. 
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The retrograde “adding” operative in precession underscores the ontologically 
creative force of deep silence, a force that keeps the possibles of being fecund, and 
unpredictable or unknowable in advance, i.e., before the real. Let’s think back to Norma 
Ledezma Ortega, the “warrior mother” we discussed in chapter 5. Ledezma Ortega as a 
warrior mother becomes possible once the murder of Paloma Angélica Escobar Ledezma, 
her daughter, and the dismembering-remembering of her mother take place. We now see 
that deep silence that characterized, in part, Ledezma Ortega’s experience was more than 
the opening onto a different expressing and sense-making dimension; deep silence was 
also the dispossession of being that marks the retrograde inscription of possibility and 
novelty into being. In fact, the retrograde movement is not a mere psychological 
reinterpretation of events, but a feature of the movement of becoming itself, an 
ontological transmutation. As Al-Saji explains, “this could be called an ‘ontological’ 
rather than ‘psychological’ past …, since this past overflows what is recollected of it and 
since it plays a structuring role in experience” (2018, 339). In other words, precession has 
ontological weight; it continuously and retroactively inscribes new virtual possibilities in 
being. By instituting/calling forth novel spatio-temporal orientations, these possibilities 
have a structuring role in experience. As we saw in the preceding chapter, the sense 
emergent through the interplay of artists, local geography, and beholders happens in the 
deep silences of such interlacings and becomes traceable through the reorientations of the 
beholders, the becoming witnesses of listeners, passerby, and even Ciudad Juárez. 
3. Deep Silence’s Normativity “in Filigree” 
In conclusion, to understand how possibility, albeit virtual, continues to exert 
influence on the present, we need to keep in mind that, like tick and milieu, the 
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relationship between the temporal moments is ontologically internal. That is, thinking 
difference first means that we are no longer dealing with “moments,” but with traces; 
present, past, and future do not exist in themselves, but “Ineinander, each enveloping-
enveloped,” i.e., emerging in relation to one another as the possible of the other (VI 268). 
Specifically, as Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of time in the Institution Lectures tells us, 
time coils over upon itself, resignifying itself: The past acquires sense retroactively, 
making sense by reference to a “present” register of sense it helps institute and that casts 
ripples backwards, in a past that comes into existence as immemorial. In this respect, the 
past is the receptivity or openness to a field, within which it acquires sense (IP 13). The 
present, responsible for opening up these dimensions in and of the past, necessitates 
elaboration and signification, it requires a future. In this sense, the present remains 
indeterminate and open, its meaning deferred, making sense in the future anterior. 
Importantly, however, the slippage of time is such that the past grafts itself onto the 
present by soliciting a future; the dimensions of sense and being with which the past 
becomes retroactively pregnant call forth a future by instituting fields of sense according 
with which the beholder comes to see, think, feel, and hear anew. In sum, then, we can 
say that the virtual and the actual encroach or ingress upon one another. The instituted 
possibles acquire signification within instituted fields while also contributing to the 
instituting of these fields, to the generating of new meanings, significations, and 
dimensions of being. 
Note that the logic regulating the interplay of these traces is not one of cause and 
effect, but of suggestions and orientation. They become dimensions or fields—not 
determinants—according to which we come to perceive anew according to the specificity 
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of her spatio-temporal context, i.e., on the interplay of lateral (historical, political, 
affective, personal, etc.) fields of sense and being. It is by virtue of the hollowing of deep 
silence that events can “deposit a sense [or, should we say, traces of sense] in me” (IP 
77). And although lived as present by the authorial subject, i.e., the sense deposited is not 
experienced by the ego as present to consciousness, this sense is not left behind “just as 
something surviving as a residue, but as the call to follow, the demand of a future” (IP 
77). That is, these new silent dimensions of being and sense are experienced laterally or 
indirectly, as re-orientations or solicitations, in other words, as the opening up of other 
possibilities of existence.37 In this sense, although the possibilities of deep silence come 
into being as immemorial and its meanings are never experienced by consciousness, the 
new dimensions of sense make themselves felt in the orientations and reprisals of the 
present. Recall, for instance, Ernesto Martínez’s experience. The possibilities of deep 
silence make themselves sensible in the absence of misogynist responses to violence and 
aggression, absences that inform the reprisals of modes of performing masculinity that 
eschew toxic masculinity. Similarly, the possibilities of deep silence of grief make 
themselves felt in the absence of the disappearing daughters, absences that are “present” 
in the novel orientations that life takes in the wake of their departure, as traces/ing, that 
is, is the remembering of Paloma Angélica Escobar Ledezma through the re-birth of 
Norma Ledezma Ortega as a “warrior mother.” In either case, although deep silence was 
central to each experience, the sense and possibilities instituted by and through it were 
not and count not be present to consciousness—fully graspable and articulable. As the 
grasping consciousness strives to make sense of the events by heeding them directly, the 
movement of precession reworks the events and their sense. In this sense, deep silence 
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resists the operations of free subjectivity because the temporal dynamic it institutes 
endlessly displaces it as an origin that can be known in advance. Rather, the instituting of 
new possibilities was experienced as the presence of an absence, as the deeply silent 
eventuation of being or being manifesting itself in its elusiveness, just out of reach.  
In this sense, albeit virtual and immemorial, i.e., not graspable by present 
consciousness, the possibility of deep silence continues to exert influence upon the 
present. In fact, suggesting that possibility is, to play on Merleau-Ponty’s formulation of 
the “impossible past,” an im-possibility because it is not, never was, and never will be 
present to consciousness, does not mean that possibility lacks existence, nor that it is 
locked away, a closed set of possibilities, sealed off without recourse and uninfluential to 
the actually present.38 The possibility of deep silence is an im-possibility only so long as 
one is forced to choose between the untenable position of possibilism and actualism. As a 
“pregnancy of possibles” the possibility of deep silence is rather continuously reinscribed 
by the retrograde movement of precession and exscribing or calling forth present and 
future sense. In this sense, deep silence accounts for being’s fecundity (i.e., for 
ontological growth), for the creativity and, possibly, healing invoked by Anzaldúa’s 
deployment of Coyolxauhqui.  
These remarks about the logic regulating the interplay of temporal traces position 
us well to return to Alloa’s challenge, and make explicit how deep silence brings about 
the actualization of a future and the virtualization of the past/possibility without this 
process being causally organized. The precession of deep silence appeals to a non-linear, 
non-deterministic temporal movement that resignifies the origin such that it continuously 
comes into existence along with the present as past/virtual. This means that the past does 
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not determine the future nor “becom[es] a task to be fulfilled, already established ahead 
of time” (Alloa 2014, 155). That is, deep silence’s regulatory dynamic, i.e., it 
normativity, is not a causal principle or blueprint of the future, but a “call to follow” (IP 
77), an invitation or register that gets constantly reworked along with its actualization and 
that becomes visible through praxis, traceable though the concrete eventuating of 
phenomena. Recall my observation, in section II, that Nature as a grounding or regulatory 
dynamic is an “incarnate,” “living plan” that norms the visible “not [from] outside its 
manifest realizations,” but from within (VI 139, 178). As we have seen, the tick’s 
encroachment upon its milieu is an intertwining that affects the tick’s and the milieu’s 
development: each ingresses onto the other, tracing or suggesting the call-and-response 
between the “yet-to-be-tick” and the “yet-to-be-milieu” that inaugurates the 
materialization of each. But by casting Nature as a “living plan,” Merleau-Ponty is also 
stressing that this transspatial element does not, in advance, specify the development of 
tick and milieu; the developmental norm is not determined in advance. To use Alloa’s 
expression, the developmental norm of deep silence is non-deterministic, it actualizes 
sense and being “without its actualization becoming a task to be fulfilled, already 
established ahead of time” (2014, 155). Rather, the tick-milieu encroachment affects the 
“plan” itself, which, in this sense, is an ever-renewing “living plan” that, by virtue of its 
renewals, remains latent, in filigree. Put differently, Merleau-Ponty reminds that deep 
silence is sensuous yet not fully determinate, a latency forged from and manifest within 
concrete dynamics that spread across beings. (As we have seen, as being actualizes, new 
possibilities are retroactively inscribed in being). Thus conceived, deep silence is a 
pregnancy of possible, i.e., an incarnate process of self-differentiation traceable in and 
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through the visible (but always already concealed or hidden in and through that same 
visibility) whereby its phenomenalization entails the continual renewal of being and the 
sense of the sensible. Concretely, as life goes by (and this dynamic becomes more 
pronounced through arrebatos, i.e., events that bring about a rupture or suspension of the 
familiar like in grief, loss, or trauma), new possibilities or dimensions of sense by which 
the present and the future may acquire novel signification and direction are retroactively 
inscribed within novel possibilities. In this sense, Merleau-Ponty invites us to think of 
deep silence as a pregnancy of possible that institutes new fields of sense and visibility 
that have not yet been voiced, as when a poet comes up with something new to say.39  
 These remarks bring attention to the deep silence that is “present” in being, a 
dimension through which life comes “to hold new possibilities, inscribing different 
virtual planes and dimensions of sense” (Al-Saji 2012a, 4) through which we come to 
make sense of the world anew. In fact, being’s internal growth makes it structurally 
incomplete, which is to say that being’s incompleteness or opacity, but also its fecundity, 
is kept instituted through precession, deep silence’s retrograde inscription of possibility. 
In this sense, deep silence accounts for both the resistance of the sensible (being remains 
opaque to the operation of free subjectivity is that it continuously comes to hold new 
possibilities), and also for the fecundity of being. That is, the past—but also being—is 
never a closed-off sum, a fullness of positivity, sealed and relegated to itself, i.e., to the 
past. The new dimensions of sense and being that are opened up by deep silence are not 
already contained within it as the possible of actualism. Rather, being remains open and 
incomplete, unforeseeable and unpredictable, in sum, deeply silent. Its possibilities are 
inscribed within it through its processes of eventuating.40  
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In this sense, precession makes visible the processes whereby being as becoming 
is inherently opaque or deeply silent. In fact, becoming is processes of continual 
retroactive reinscription and ontological transmutation, a reciprocal hollowing out that 
opens new dimensions of being and sense. Adriana, Paloma, or Idalí, for instance, are at 
once forgotten and remembered. Re-membering them required forgetting the meanings 
with which their mothers were familiar, including that of a life with their daughters. Yet, 
Adriana, Paloma, and Idalí also lived on, through traces, in the reprisals of the mothers’ 
new life endeavors, including the pink crosses. In this seemingly paradoxical sense, 
Adriana, Paloma, and Idalí are remembered as absent, through experiences (evocative) of 
their loss, through deep silences. Notably, the senses of the daughters’ disappearing and 
life in the presence of their haunting absence acquired new meaning, meanings that 
emerged as always already past, through the “showing of remoteness itself,” which is to 
say, through deep silences that “grasps us, the beholders of the text, and usurps our power 
to grasp or appropriate it” (Kaushik 2011, 25), giving time to futures to follow.  
4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I explored the modality of temporal being to which deep silence 
alerts us. I suggested that, “at the juncture of Being and nothingness” (N 102), deep 
silence is at once there and not-there, operating according to onto-temporal dynamics of 
what Merleau-Ponty calls precession. This movement of mutual anticipation not only 
accounts for the ontologically internal affecting of the temporal traces, but also for the 
fecundity of deep silence, which both co-exists with and pre-exists by making possible 
the present of consciousness and signification. This is to say that the generativity of deep 
silence is tied to a fundamental diachrony, a time before time, that institutes the 
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unpredictability, hesitancy, and openness of being and sense. The central insight 
advanced in this chapter, then, is that it is precisely the elusive character of deep silence 
as an origin or condition of possibility that accounts for being’s fecundity. In fact, at its 
very core, being is deeply silent, a hollow that ensures the non-coincidence of being, the 
eventuation of being in concealment, which includes also a conceptless communion with 
being. As we are learning to see (to hear? to feel?) this new modality of existence is the 
being of deep silence, which is elusive and presences through traces and haunting.  
Importantly, deep silence makes explicit that being eventuates at a distance, in 
concealment, and that this opacity is essential for being to becoming; it is what makes 
possible, with time, the eventuation of new futures, new sense, and new being. If deep 
silence exists in a different modality of existence whereby its concealing is the mode of 
disclosure of being it, how self and the eventuation of new sense, how is the beholder of 
the text and the phenomenological inquirer to listen for silences, to heed to and make 
room for the reverberations of deep silence—i.e., for the receptivity of new meanings and 
the inscribing/exscribing of ontological possibilities? It is to this question that I turn in 
the next and last chapter.  
 
NOTES
1 Think of Merleau-Ponty’s invocations such as the “tacit cogito” in the Phenomenology 
(PhP 424), the “tacit language” of perception in Nature, and the opening remarks in the 
Visible and the Invisible, in which Merleau-Ponty tells the readers that the task of 
philosophy is to draw “the things themselves […] from the depths of their silence” into 
expression, to “plunge into the world […] [to] make it say, finally, what in its silence it 
means to say” (4, 39). These remarks suggest that, for Merleau-Ponty, the world, things, 
and nature, in sum, the sensible, have a sense that, albeit silent or latent, is irreducible to 
anthropomorphic projections, and that the task of philosophy is to express this silent or 
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latent sense in such a way that the world “speaks” for itself. As the ample literature on the 
paradox of expression indicates, these two considerations are intimately linked: they yield 
the seemingly paradoxical task of expressing a latent sense of the sensible that eludes 
conceptual transparency or positivity (VI 214). That is, the recognition that there is a 
sense of the sensible (first consideration) calls for expressive modes that are suited to 
“giving voice” to phenomena that make sense silently—modes that do not model sense 
on our conceptual posits (second consideration). These considerations are taken up in the 
following chapters. A propos the kind of philosophical language better suited to express 
the silent world, Merleau-Ponty remarks the following: “. . . the words most charged with 
philosophy are not necessarily those that contain what they say, but rather those that most 
energetically open upon being, because they more closely convey the life of the whole 
and make our habitual evidences vibrate until they disjoin. Hence it is a question whether 
philosophy as the reconquest of brute or wild being can be accomplished by the resources 
of the eloquent language, or whether it would not be necessary for philosophy to use 
language in a way that takes from it its power of immediate or direct signification in 
order to equal it with what it wishes all the same to say (VI 102–3). 
2 Keep in mind, however, that saying that Nature is silent is not an indication that Nature 
is non-sensical or inexpressive. For Merleau-Ponty, Nature signifies latently and 
inchoately; it unravels into a non-linguistic and non-positive order of significations, 
which will be the subject of chapter IV. 
3 The relationship between nature and language is far from straightforward or 
uncomplicated. The question of how to get to or think nature (or the in-itself) is one that 
has persisted throughout the history of Western philosophy, from Plato to Descartes, 
Kant, Shelling, and Husserl. As Sean Williams explains, Merleau-Ponty’s insight lies in 
the recognition that neither a transcendental reduction nor the natural attitude gets to 
nature per se. The former, as observed in this chapter, is bound to remain incomplete; the 
eidos of phenomena cannot be abstracted or purified from the sensible insofar as the 
process of inquiry is of the same phenomena it seeks to grasp. The natural attitude, 
however, does not get at phenomena either insofar as thinking through the sensible 
requires logos. Grappling with this realization, Merleau-Ponty suggests that the Nature 
that the philosopher thinks through is not Nature in-itself, but a nature always already 
intertwined with language. We find confirmation of these insights in a working note from 
the Visible and the Invisible dated 1959. There, Merleau-Ponty reflects upon the chiasm 
between language and silence, acknowledging that the cogito of the Wesen (Descartes’s 
cogito) and the tacit cogito (of the Phenomenology) share a fundamental naïveté: while 
the transcendental reduction is structurally incomplete and opaque in that it presupposes 
the natural attitude, language envelops the tacit cogito and the description of the alleged 
silence of the psychological coincidence. “Taking possession of the world of silence, 
such as the description of the human body effects it, is no longer this world of silence, it 
is the world articulated, elevated to the Wesen, spoken—the description of the perceptual 
logos is a usage of logos proforikos” (VI 179). Importantly, however, the linguistic 
articulation of the tacit cogito does not sanction the end of the inquiry, but, rather, invites 




                                                                                                                                                 
4 The Structure of Behavior, for instance, opens with the following remarks: “Our goal is 
to understand the relations between consciousness and nature: organic, psychological or 
even social. By nature we understand here a multiplicity of events external to each other 
and bound together by relations of causality” (SB 3). For a discussion of the transition 
from Structure to Phenomenology, see David Morris’s Merleau-Ponty’s Developmental 
Ontology (2018). Moved to articulate being from “the midst of itself,” in the 
Phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty thinks from the body, a point of departure that is 
irreducible to transcendental consciousness and natural causality and that allows him 
precisely to think the insertion of consciousness into Nature. Yet, while the 
Phenomenology’s attention to the lived body—the corporeal being of perception—
challenges what Renaud Barbaras calls transcendental anthropomorphism, i.e., 
conceiving of the human being as a transcendental consciousness that constitutes the 
world as its object and meaning as ideation, it nevertheless results in ontological 
anthropomorphism in that it tends to take the human body as measure of all things, as 
“provid[ing] the meaning of being of any being” (2002, 19). As Hamrick and van der 
Veken observe, although the relation between body and nature is no longer one of 
causation or constitution, in the Phenomenology, nature figures more as a “context for 
phenomenology of embodied existence than as a topic of interest in its own right” (2011, 
11). It is the human body that occupies center stage, being conceived as “in the world just 
as the heart is in the organism: it continuously breathes life into the visible spectacle, 
animates it and nourishes it from within” (PhP 209). Upholding the primacy of the body 
entails that the nature of the Phenomenology remains dependent upon the human 
perceiver, which means that, as scholars pointed out, its meaning is a sense only in 
relation to a human perceiver (Barbaras 2001; Toadvine 2009b; Bannon 2011). As 
Toadvine observes, for instance, positing the body as a “primary methodological point of 
access” leads Merleau-Ponty, at the end of the chapter on temporality, to equate nature 
with “that which perception presents to me” (2009b, 214). This problem is compounded 
by the fact that Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of “natural space” in the “Space” chapter of 
the Phenomenology seems to reduce nature to an objective background against which the 
perceived world emerges (PhP 307), thus vacating it of its own (latent) sense (Barbaras 
2001, 23). A conception of Nature grounded on the anonymous body has fundamental 
implications for the development of a non-anthropomorphic onto-logy of Nature, i.e., for 
investigations into the being and meaning of Nature, which are more than “the correlative 
of my vision” (VI 131). In “Merleau-Ponty and Nature,” for instance, Barbaras argues 
that, by clothing consciousness in a carnal disguise, Merleau-Ponty displaces the mind 
and body dualism to a dualism of humanity and nature whereby nature is either reduced 
to an objective background against which the perceived world emerges, or is presented as 
inaccessible, covered over by human projections. The outcome is that questions, such as 
“does the specificity of perceptive life have a transcendental meaning or merely a 
psychological one? Does the perceived world define nature or is it inscribed in a nature in 
itself accessible to understanding?” (Barbaras 2001, 25), remain not only unanswered, but 






                                                                                                                                                 
5 It should be noted that scholars disagree about the extent to which there is a break in 
Merleau-Ponty’s thought. Scholars like Barbaras have argued that the categories 
deployed in Phenomenology pose a conceptual limit to his project: albeit the gap between 
fact and meaning is reduced, the unity still remained “a unity of fact and of meaning,” 
thus undermining the attempt to think through the unity beyond dualisms (2001, 27). See 
also Hamrick and Van der Veken (2011), p 16. In spite of Merleau-Ponty’s own criticism 
that his earlier work remained bound by a phenomenology of the subject, scholars bring 
attention to ways in which Merleau-Ponty’s early work prefigures his later ontology. To 
name a few notable examples: In Paradoxes of Expression (2013), Don Landes traces the 
continuity within Merleau-Ponty’s thought via the concept of expression. In “Time-
Things and the Ontology of the World,” Morris finds points of continuity in Merleau-
Ponty’s description of color perception in the Phenomenology and his later ontology 
developed in the Visible and the Invisible and “Eye and Mind.” Morris argues the 
Phenomenology’s three parts should not be read as layers founded upon the first section 
in which the body is a relatively “closed ‘body-subject’” (2016, 2). Rather, the later 
sections rework the relation between body and world as “chiasmatically crossing into one 
another, thereby effecting a radical return to the phenomenal field” (3) and casting the 
body as radically open to the transcendental field. In “Affect Orientation, Difference, and 
‘Overwhelming Proximity’ in Merleau-Ponty’s Account of Pure Depth” (2012), Shiloh 
Whitney challenges this view, providing a reading of “pure depth” as developed by 
Merleau-Ponty in the Phenomenology in terms of affectivity, and arguing that, thus 
conceived, depth is a point of continuum with Merleau-Ponty’s later thought. Lastly, in 
Nature and Logos (2011), Hamrick and Van der Veker suggest that, although the 
Phenomenology does not take up nature as a topic of inquiry on its own right (the 
philosopher becomes interested in nature on its own right from 1955 or 1956 on), 
Merleau-Ponty’s early work sets the stage for the new ontology that he develops in his 
final years by beginning the work of re-thinking “phenomenality in order to better 
inhabit” (Janicaud 1991, 15, cited by Hamrick and Van der Veker 2011, 11), as well as 
providing concrete details to better think the later concepts (12). 
 
6 Take, for instance, the outline of the Visible and the Invisible dated late 1960 wherein 
the study of what Merleau-Ponty calls “vertical” or “brute” being is referred to reflections 
on Nature: “Nature,” he observes in one of the notes for the course, “as thin sheet or layer 
of total Being—the ontology of nature as way toward ontology, way that we prefer here 
because the evolution of the concept of nature is a more convincing propaedeutic, 
revealing more clearly the necessity of ontological maturation” (VI 265). 
7 On Merleau-Ponty’s view, “we must dig beneath the sedimentation of meaning that 
limits us to thinking in terms of the in-itself and for-itself, ‘natural being’ in opposition o 
‘psychic being’ (IP 164, italics removed)” (Hamrick and Van der Veken 2011, 57). Deep 
silence, as I showed in the preceding chapter, effects this epistemological suspension, 
bringing about a conceptless opening onto wild being. 
8 In Voice and Phenomenon (2010), Derrida suggests that the auto-affection entailed in 





                                                                                                                                                 
up by Merleau-Ponty, and that is the primal scene of phenomenology—is the foundation 
of a metaphysics of presence. Such a model is operative in speech par excellence. 
Emmanuel Alloa criticizes Derrida for overlooking the fact that this auto-affection is also 
the “inception of a philosophy of nonpresence and nontransparency” (2017, 69). The non-
coincidence of touching and touched calls for ever renewing epistemic inquiries and a 
reflection that is never in possession of itself. In this spirit, Leonard Lawlor and Alloa 
trace the affinity between the early writings of Derrida and the later writings of Merleau-
Ponty, thus unsettling the often-invoked divergence between phenomenology and post-
structuralism. More precisely, both thinkers focus on Merleau-Ponty’s and Derrida’s 
reflections on Husserl’s The Origin of Geometry in Husserl at the Limits of 
Phenomenology and Voice and Phenomenon, respectively. Lawrence Hass also rejects 
Derrida’s totalizing criticism of phenomenology by observing that, given the fundamental 
difference between Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s theories of expression (the major 
difference is the transcendental regression operative in Husserl’s work), Derrida’s 
criticism of Husserl in Voice and Phenomenon does not apply to Merleau-Ponty, as it is 
too often mistakenly assumed (2010, 167). 
9 This means at least two things. First, as Morris explains, “by virtue of being a being 
who can touch something I am inherently also a being who can be touched. Being 
touched is thus an inherent reverse or flip side of touching, it is its lining (‘doublure’)” 
(2011, 165). That is, the reversibility of flesh is precisely that through which being 
discloses itself; it is “the sole means I have to go unto the heart of the things” and reach 
the things themselves “according to their being which is indeed more than their being 
perceived” (VI 135). In fact, the visible appears as such because the perceiver’s gaze 
envelops it. Second, this wrapping is made possible because the touching and the touched 
are made of the same stuff (the same flesh, to be precise); they belong to this “interiorly 
worked-over mass” (VI 147)—that “element” of ‘my’ body (and of the world) that, in its 
anonymity and generality, sides with the world (and with ‘my’ body) (VI 136). Recall 
Merleau-Ponty’s vivid descriptions of color perception from the Phenomenology and the 
Visible and the Invisible: the visible red or blue appear as such because they invite and 
orient the perceiving body, preparing the gaze to anticipate and take in the perceptual 
color. “The sensible gives back to me what I had lent to it, but I received it from the 
sensible in the first place” (PhP 222). Without this structural complicity—this shared 
flesh—perception (including the “perceiver” and the “perceived”) would not be possible. 
“I must find the attitude that will provide it with the means to become determinate and to 
become blue; I must find the response to a poorly formulated question. And yet, I only do 
this in response to its solicitation” (PhP 222). Notably, at this stage, there is no 
“perceiver” or “blue,” but only a reciprocal solicitation of what will become perceiver 
and color blue, a spell or enchantment that remains opaque or latent and inaugurates the 
two (PhP 220–22). This communion of perceiving body and the milieu’s manner of 
vibrating, Merleau-Ponty tells us, is necessary for the fixing or emergence of the 
perception of the color blue (and thus also of the perceiver) and the color blue. Only then, 
when the perceiver’s body has organized itself according to the murmurs of her 
surrounding, does “the sensible [catch] my ear or my gaze” (PhP 219). Echoing the 





                                                                                                                                                 
and the red of the Visible and the Invisible are inaugurated in the element of generality 
that is prior to the color red and the seer, in this “less precise, more general redness, in 
which my gaze was caught, into which it sank, before […] fixing it” (VI 131). In the VI, 
this “question and response” (VI 131 fn. 1) is thought from the in-between, from this 
tissue or lining “between the alleged colors and visibles […] that sustains them, nourishes 
them, and which for its part is not a thing, but a possibility, a latency” (VI 132–3). 
10 Note the resonance between this expression which Merleau-Ponty invokes to designate 
natural phenomena and the one that he used in the Child Psychology and Pedagogy 
Lectures to talk about linguistic meaning, where he observes that, “considered moment to 
moment, the linguistic phenomenon is never anything but negative, diacritic” (CP 
64).This remark brings attention to Merleau-Ponty’s reliance on Saussurian diacritics to 
conceive of his ontology of the flesh wherein flesh is an incarnate diacritic (Alloa 2009; 
2013; 2017; Stawarska 2009b; 2013). 
11 Following the work of Simon Don, it is possible to think of the tick and the milieu, but 
also of the notes of a melody, as meta-stable equilibria. That is, the internally differential 
processes through which tick and milieu emerge as discrete entities do not come to an 
end. The appearance of the tick as solid or “hard in itself that resides in a unique place 
and moment” (VI 147) is possible only through a localized analysis that abstracts from 
the general movement of being to fix moments in time. In process, the tick and the milieu 
remain internally and open onto one another, continuously affecting each other’s 
development. 
12 There is a circularity between tick and milieu whereby alteration in the tick—which 
always already occurs in response to the soliciting of the other—inaugurates a reprisal in 
the milieu—which, in turn, calls forth yet another reorientation of the one—and so the 
mutual anticipation of precession continues. Note how language here poses a challenge to 
accurately account for this intertwining: the calling forth of the milieu is not external to 
the tick, but takes place from within it as the traces of the milieu are always already 
internally inaugurating reprisals in the tick. In fact, the tick ought to be receptive or open 
to the milieu in order to be sensitive to its modulations. In this sense, this is more 
accurate to say that the sens is neither inside nor outside tick and milieu, but in-between 
their silent encroaching. It is by locating his interrogation in this in-between that allows 
Merleau-Ponty to state that “there is neither me nor the other as positive, positive 
subjectivities. There are two caverns, two opennesses, two stages where something will 
take place—and which both belong to the same world, to the stage of Being” (VI 263). 
Véronique Fóti’s nicely captures this insight when she affirms that, “with ‘life,’ there 
opens up a ‘field of action’ with its specific temporality and spatiality, and with leeway 
for a diversity of relationship” that is “not intelligible in terms of a straightforward causal 
sequence […] [or] as an essence outside of its particular expressive realizations, nor yet 
as a guiding telos, but is rather a quasi-oneiric pole, or a theme that haunts the animal’s 
entire being without ever being confronted as such” (2013, 76/77). 
 





                                                                                                                                                 
processes of phenomenalization regulated by this silent logos effectively addresses the 
nature/culture dualism, which continues to plague, for instance, Judith Butler’s theory of 
the materiality of the body (1997). Butler’s theory of materialization, I claim, deploys a 
limited notion of normativity, reducing the regulatory norms that govern the matter of 
bodies to cultural or linguistic, in sum, discursive norms.  
14 At this juncture, it is important to note that, in his later writings, Merleau-Ponty moves 
beyond phenomenology proper. As Emmanuel Alloa (2009; 2013; 2017) and 
Beata Stawarska (2013) have argued, Merleau-Ponty’s engagement with structural 
linguistics, especially the work on diacritics by Ferdinand de Saussure, confronted him 
with the necessity of leaving behind the tacit cogito. That is, Merleau-Ponty’s ontological 
turn attests to his realization that “thinking in-between” requires moving beyond 
phenomenology, dispossessing or opening oneself to the movement of being. Casting 
ontology as diacritical fundamentally challenges any localizable or substance ontology, 
calling, as anticipated, for the development of a non-Parmenidean ontology 
that displaces the agential/logical place of the metaphysical subject (conceived as either a 
constituting consciousness or social discourse). Once the body is thematized through 
flesh as an exemplar of flesh and not the model, the body appears as a diacritical mark, 
not the locus of apodicticity. Furthermore, as incarnate diacritics, this ontological 
structure entails a fundamental impropriety, a fundamental poiesis of sense and sensible 
that precludes making claims about this sense and this sensible in advance. This 
fundamental impropriety or poiesis accounts for the silence of being—being’s continuous 
self-differentiation entails being’s perpetual concealment, the impossibility of fully 
articulating or grasping, through an objectification, its structure (conditions of possibility) 
and movement. 
15 In other words, this requires moving beyond ontological localism, and—as Merleau-
Ponty suggests—conceptualize Nature as an “envelope-phenomenon” that is “between 
the elements” (N 213). As Merleau-Ponty observes, “[w]e must admit in the very fabric 
of physical elements a transtemporal and transspatial element” (N 176). Transtemporality 
and transspatiality are clear precursors to the spatializing and temporalizing pulp invoked 
in the Visible and the Invisible.  
16 The imminent reversibility of flesh highlights the “constitutive paradox” of being, its 
concealment-unconcealment (VI 136); that is, the ambiguous double nature of the 
touching-touched hand accounts not only for the disclosure of being (accomplished via 
mutual inherence), but also for being’s latency, for its haunting presence. In fact, the 
ècart at the heart of being institutes a distance or thickness that effectively conceals being 
in visibility. 
 
17 In Nature, Merleau-Ponty deploys the language of “oneiric intentionality” to qualify 
this indeterminacy, explaining that the milieu is not external to the tick like an idea or a 
goal, but haunts it. For a discussion of “oneiric intentionality, see Mazis, “Merleau-





                                                                                                                                                 
18 In a working note dated May 1960, Merleau-Ponty sums up this insight by stating that 
“to touch oneself, to see oneself, accordingly, is not to apprehend oneself as an ob-ject, it 
is to be open to oneself, destined to oneself (narcissism)——Nor, therefore, is to reach 
oneself, it is on the contrary to escape oneself, to be ignorant of oneself, the self in 
question is by divergence (d’ècart), is Unverborgenheit of the Verborgen as such, which 
consequently does not cease to be hidden or latent——” (VI 249). 
19 For a discussion of the notion of the negative in Merleau-Ponty’s later ontology, see 
David Morris’s Merleau-Ponty’s Developmental Ontology (2018a). 
20 Note how Merleau-Ponty’s conception of Nature resonates with Heidegger’s notion of 
phusis (2014, 14). 
21 Identifying deep silence as the condition of possibility of being positions the inquirer to 
makes sense of how contingent historical structures condition experience; it makes 
possible, when heeded to, to “pull up traces of history that is not quite or no longer 
there—that has been consigned to invisibility—but still shapes the emergence of 
meaning” (Guenther 2020, 15). In this sense, deep silence is both a promise and a 
challenge: A challenge insofar as it points to the resistance or opacity of ways in which 
historical structures make the experience of the world possible and meaningful. (No 
direct account of these structures can shed full visibility onto them as they are situated, 
intersubjective through and through, i.e., there are no purely transcendental, invariable 
structures to be grasped). It is a promise because it is by virtue of this deep silence that 
change happens.  
 
22 Deep silence is neither a lack, a nothingness, nor something external to the essence of 
being, but, rather, institutive of it. Deep silence figures as the means of disclosure of 
being, i.e., its phenomenalization, and its concealment, i.e., its opacity or resistance: As 
we have seen, deep silence is the experience through which communion with being takes 
place through, e.g., conceptless openings, while also keeping being concealed in that such 
experiences of communion dispossess free subjectivity, revealing that what there is to be 
grasped, to paraphrase Merleau-Ponty, is a dispossession. 
23 In other words, time or, specifically, deep silence’s peculiar diachrony, seems to play a 
role in deep silence’s virtual existence and fecundity. Note that this expression that 
should call to mind the phrase, common to 20th century French thought, especially that of 
Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, Deleuze, and Levinas, of a “past that has never been present.” 
For a discussion of memory as a “time which has never been present” in relation to 
Merleau-Ponty’s thought, see Alia Al-Saji’s “‘A Past Which Has Never Been Present’” 
(2008) and “The Temporality of Life” (2007).  
24 These last remarks bring attention to the fact that the possible exists in a different 
temporal modality than that of the present. In Matter and Memory, Bergson accounts for 
this other temporal modality vis-à-vis the difference between the actual and the virtual. 





                                                                                                                                                 
belongs to the past or, to evoke Deleuze, the ontological past. That is, the difference 
between actual and virtual, present and past, is not of degree, but of kind. As Bergson 
indicates by thinking through pure memory (which, on his account, is the past and exists 
in the temporal mode of the virtual) pure memory is never present to consciousness, 
coming into existence as always already past.  
25 The notion of precession appears in Merleau-Ponty’s published writing only once, in 
“Eye and Mind.” Reflecting on the “immemorial depth of the visible” that is manifest, in 
its absence, in paintings, Merleau-Ponty says that “this precession of what is upon what 
one sees and makes seen, of what one sees and makes seen upon what is—that is vision 
itself” (EM 187–88). 
26 Quoted in Mauro Carbone, The Flesh of Images (2015), 59. 
27 As Carbone observes, however, precession appears several times in Merleau-Ponty’s 
unpublished notes (2015, 58).  
28 This strange co-existence should call to mind Merleau-Ponty’s remarks about 
“difference without contradiction” whereby being is present or visible in its absence or 
invisibility, a unity of incompossibles such as the sensing hand’s simultaneous proximity 
and distance from the sensible, communion and non-coincidence, visibility and 
invisibility, sameness and difference (VI 135). At once, the touching and the touched are 
of the same flesh, while also maintaining their irreducible difference or divergence from 
one another. This ontological co-existence of incompossible invites rethinking concepts 
like “sameness” and “difference.”28 As Merleau-Ponty remarks in a working of 
November 1960, the seer and the visible—but we could say, the possible and the actual—
are “the same not in the sense of ideality nor of real identity. The same in the structural 
sense: same inner framework, same Gestalthalfte, the same in the sense of openness of 
another dimension of the ‘same’ being,” in the sense of “non-difference” (VI 260). This is 
to say that possible and actual are the “same” in that they share the same structural 
imminent reversibility; they are the other’s lining or doublure. Thus conceived, 
“sameness” refers to the same “inherence to the Whole,” the same openness to one 
another, the same processes of differentiation whereby each makes sense as “the possible 
of the other” (VI 228). 
29 Circularity should not be conceived as a mere repetition, as an empty return of the 
same. The structure of precession is such that circularity should be understood temporally 
as a “repetition, not of the same but in the form of a continuous displacement”—as a 
movement of revolt through which renewal and creation becomes possible. For a 
discussion of revolutionary time in Julia Kristeva’s work, see Sjöholm’s "The 
Temporality of Intimacy” (2004, 90). 
30 In The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty famously observes that “there is no 
longer identity between the lived experience and the principle of non-contradiction” (VI 





                                                                                                                                                 
latent content” lining what the philosopher speaks of, which is to say that “there is a 
divergence between the essences he fixes and the lived experience to which they are 
applied, between the operation of living the world and the entities and negentities in 
which he expresses it” (VI 87). Also recall Merleau-Ponty’s language of fecund 
negativity to qualify the possible or, as he puts it in reference to the fold, this “‘central’ 
nothingness is like the point of the stroboscopic spiral, which is who knows where, which 
is ‘nobody’” (VI 264). 
31 Although it is accurate to say that the actual was possible prior to its actualization in 
the sense that there were no logical impossibilities or contradictions impeding such event, 
this way of thinking hypostatizes logical possibility. That is, whereas the kind of 
possibility entailed in the assertion that the possible preexists the real is a mere logical 
possibility, i.e., it indexes the absence of logical barriers, the misconception lies in 
ascribing an ontologically richer sense to this “possible.” We erroneously take the 
statement “the real was possible prior to its actualization” to mean that what occurred, the 
actual, could have been predicted or foreseen by a sufficiently informed knower, that, “in 
the form of an idea, [the possible] was thus pre-existent to its realization” (Bergson 2007, 
10). For a discussion of how this temporal model shared by Bergson and Merleau-Ponty 
can secure the openness and hesitancy necessary for philosophy to continue to think, see 
Al-Saji, “When Thinking Hesitates” (2012). For a discussion of how this temporal model 
can offer resources to think through political transformation, see Al-Saji, “Creating 
Possibility” (2012a). 
32 It should also be noted that the retrograde movement of the true accounts for the error, 
brought about by the intellect’s objectification of the temporal movement, of positing the 
existence of the possible prior to its realization; it creates the illusion that the possible 
preexisted the actual. As Bergson explains, from the retrograde inscription of possibility 
“results an error which vitiates our conception of the past; from this arises our claim to 
anticipate the future on every occasion” (2007, 11). Indeed, it is only once the real has 
actualized that it does become possible to turn backwards toward the nebulous past and 
lift out the aspects that (come to) seem obvious antecedents to the given event, thus 
creating the illusion that the event had always been possible. Echoing Nietzsche’s 
remarks about cause and effect (2001, §112), Bergson points out that the retrograde 
movement is a remodeling carried out by the “effect” upon the “cause” (2007, 85); from 
the vantage point of reality having taken place, we look back and link together past 
events, ascribing them meaning and organizing them in what seems to be a causally-
binding narrative that preceded the moment we seek to justify (1998, 47). I take Bergson 
to be suggesting that metaphysical or spatial thinking is fundamentally indebted to this 
generative flux; the error of metaphysical thinking (thinking that the possible pre-exists 
the real and, thus, that the future can be predicted) is enabled by the onto-temporal 
movement of becoming. Subsequently, metaphysical thinking, by abstracting from the 
movement of becoming, covers over the dynamicity of time, giving us access only to the 




                                                                                                                                                 
33 As we will see in the following chapter, Jacques Derrida points out that, although the 
deconstructing of the Now B into the retention of Now A and the protention of Now C 
points to the mediated structure of the present, it does not destabilize the successivity of 
time; “this model of successivity would prohibit the Now X from taking the place of Now 
A” (2016, 72). That is to say that this model still posits the present as primary; it 
conceives of the past as present- or immediate-past and the future as present- or 
immediate-future. This conception of time forecloses the possibility of the existence of 
another kind of past that is “anterior” to the present- or immediate-past, an “absolute 
past.” As I argue in “An-Archic Past” (Ferrari 2017), the Bergson of Time and Free Will 
is guilty of performing this naïve deconstruction. Yet, given Bergson’s positing of a past 
that comes into being as already past, it seems to me that Heidegger’s claim that Bergson 
merely reverses Aristotle as well as Derrida’s criticism of Husserlian phenomenology 
does not apply to the Bergson of Matter and Memory, but, on the contrary, echoes the 
concerns that guide Bergson’s work. 
34 It is not temporally prior in that, as we have just observed, the possible comes into 
existence along with and through actualization. It is not structurally prior because this 
possible is not a Kantian a priori or a blueprint of sorts delineating the actualization of 
being in advance. 
35 Keep in mind that “originary” should not suggest a Kantian a priori that grounds the 
inquiry or an original signified to which the inquiry can return. 
36 Merleau-Ponty first introduces the notion of “a past that has never been present” in the 
conclusion of the “Le Sentir” chapter in the Phenomenology of Perception, 252. This 
notion, however, becomes central in his later writings, especially in the Visible and the 
Invisible. There, Merleau-Ponty argues that the immemorial is a past that is irreducible to 
the present. In fact, this past maintains its opacity; it is a past “such as it was one day plus 
an inexplicable alteration, a strange distance.” Merleau-Ponty’s reference to this “strange 
distance” suggests that the immemorial is an originary past, a past that comes into being 
as past. In turn, this qualification suggests that the immemorial is not a positivity, a thing, 
or an idea, but also “not a void” or negation of being either. Rather, the immemorial is a 
hollow, a fecund negative such that “there is neither me nor the other as positive, positive 
subjectivities. There are two caverns, two openness, two stages where something will 
take place.” Merleau-Ponty, Visible and the Invisible, 124, 272, 263. Significantly, the 
immemorial exists in a chiasm with the present, manifesting itself via traces in the 
present, by instituting new fields of meaning within which new, present expressions 
acquire their signification while, in turn, signifying the instituted field anew. In sum, 
then, “the immemorial secures both the non-coincidence of past and present, while also 
allowing for the encroachment of the two” (Ferrari 2016, 282).  
37 Put differently, this movement of precession of deep silence witnesses the partial 
forgetting of familiar sense and being, a distance that makes possible the instituting of 
new sense, the retroactive signification of events that are thus partially conserved through 





                                                                                                                                                 
new fields it needs to “both forget[…] and conserve[…]” (IP 187): Deep silence forgets 
the familiarity of the event while conserving its traces in the new meta-stable equilibrium 
of sense and being it calls forth. In other words, the mutual affection carried out via this 
eternal movement of reciprocal anticipation of the terms involved in the reversibility of 
flesh hollows out a (past) dimension of being that was never present. The instituted past 
ought to be and is forgotten through precession. Yet, these processes of reprisal of the 
past do not annihilate it, but, rather, conserve its traces insofar as they spring forth from 
the reworked past itself. In this sense, this co-existence of incompossible, of forgetting 
and conserving, makes new sense and being possible. Significantly, deep silence is the 
hinge of the reprisal, of the reconversion. 
38 This would be the necessary conclusion if Merleau-Ponty had not moved beyond a 
dualistic philosophy of consciousness or a conception of time as linear. In fact, such a 
claim relies on two assumptions: First, it espouses a liner conception of time whereby the 
temporal units are juxtaposed, indifferent, and mutually external to one another. Second, 
while the “now” of the present is understood as malleable, as undetermined as it takes 
place, the past is conceived as defined, fixed, or determined (by the present that it once 
was). As Al-Saji puts it in the context of the impossible past, the “modality of pastness 
seems to imply not only irreversibility but immutability and completion—a closed set of 
possibilities” (2018, 340). But Merleau-Ponty has moved on, and is now striving to think 
a mode of temporal existence more akin to the haunting or ingressing of the electron 
discussed above, one whereby one can be there and not-there, in which possibility—or 
deep silence—can be at once present and absent, or, more accurately, present in its 
absence. 
39 In a working note, reflecting on evolution, Merleau-Ponty states that, “for me it is no 
longer a question of origins, nor limits, nor of a series of events going to a first cause, but 
one sole explosion of Being which is forever” (VI 265). Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of 
nature deploys a normativity more akin to George Canguilhem’s (1991; 1994)—a latent 
normativity or a normativity in filigree that, in its encompassing of regulatory processes 
that are irreducible to discursive norms and are “autoproduced” by nature itself, provides 
resources to think nature as non-substantial processes of phenomenalization. In fact, 
entailed by Merleau-Ponty’s shift toward a conception of Nature as spatializing and 
temporalizing is the acknowledgment that the generation of meaning is not effected 
exclusively by the (human) body (even when it is encroached upon the visible) or 
cultural-linguistic norms, but takes place in and through the sensible itself, which is to 
say that the differences autoproduced by the sensible’s self-divergence have a sense that 
is irreducible to a meaning for the embodied subject. Merleau-Ponty gestures toward this 
insight in a working note dated November 1959, when he says that “this separation 
(ècart) which […] forms meaning […] is a natural negativity, a first institution, always 
already there” (VI 216). 
40 Claiming that the movement of precession, the crossing over between, e.g., real and 
imaginary, is ontologically creative means that the world is not a given and closed totality 





                                                                                                                                                 
silence is not external to the becoming of the world, but constitutionally implicated in it. 
That is, deep silence is both active and passive, instituted by the world while also actively 
instituting it, partaking in ontological creation. The relationship between the possible and 
the actual discussed above can be thought about in terms of this peculiar temporal 
movement of mutual anticipation, on the one hand, as the precession of the possible with 
regard to the actual—since the possible, once projected backwards, allows us to construct 
causally binding chains of events, thus making the actual visible—and, on the other hand, 
the precession of the actual with regard to the possible—the actual needs first to happen 
in order for the possible to come into existence and be projected backwards. Accounting 
for the relationship between the possible and the real in terms of precession, as I do, also 
suggests that the temporal structure of the futur antérieur is that of mutual anticipation, 
thus bringing to light its ontologically generative movement. 
 
223 
VII. THE (DEEP) SILENCE OF BEARING WITNESS: ON GLORIA 
ANZALDÚA’S DECOLONIZING AESTHETICS 
 
[K]nowing and doing can be released from a particular kind of thinking, 
which is necessary for opening up the possibility for a radical departure from 
a certain kind of World. 
—Denise Ferreira Da Silva, “Toward a Black Feminist Poethics” 
 
 In Part II, I suggested that an aesthesis of deep silence puts forth sensibilities 
capable of listening for what otherwise falls through the cracks of a philosophy of 
reflection; it recovers a fundamental openness to the operations of being, to a “natural 
logos” that “pronounces itself silently in each sensible thing” (VI 207–08). As discussed 
in chapter 6, the temporal dynamics of this natural logos open existence beyond the 
bounds of presence, revealing deep silence as a “pregnancy of possible” or a “fecund 
void” effecting ontological growth. In this chapter, I return to one of the guiding 
questions of this project, investigating how to bear witness to the violence waged and 
those victimized by colonial heteropatriarchy without capitulating to modern/colonial 
logos, a question already broaches in chapter 5. In chapter 5, the investigation focused on 
the modalities of expression capable of letting silences resonate. We learned that the 
aesthetics is such an avenue. Here, I spell out how the mobilization of deep silences in 
phenomenological descriptions is key to bearing witness to colonial experiences of 
marginalization without the recapitulation of transparency and the linearity of time 
central to modern/colonial apparatuses. A critical phenomenology of deep silence 
accomplishes this goal not only by revealing time in its heterogeneity and diachrony, but 
also by developing sensibilities and carrying out analyses able to “think” beyond the 
presence of consciousness. This approach matters to those who are not rooted in the 
present of modern Western consciousness—i.e., those whose experiences critical 
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phenomenology seeks to bear witness. Hence, the importance, for a decolonizing critical 
phenomenology to put forth sensibilities—a decolonizing aesthetics or aesthesis of 
silence—that undoes the totalizing and transparent system of linear temporality.  
 Attending to Gloria Anzaldúa’s iterations of the myth of la Llorona recounted in 
Prietita and The Ghost Woman and “My Black Angelos,” I show how Anzaldúa bears 
witness to experiences of conquest, colonial violence, and trauma—to experiences that, 
often, elude direct representation—by deploying a mythopoetics of deep silence, an 
instantiation of what I call an aesthesis of deep silence. Thus situated, I suggest that 
Anzaldúa’s mythopoetics and, more precisely, her iterations of the myth of la Llorona are 
illustrative of how the mobilization of deep silence can be key to a decolonial aesthetics, 
inaugurating decolonial sensibilities attuned to silences and opacity rather than speech 
and transparency. In other words, Anzaldúa’s “silent” mythopoetics makes visible what 
cannot be fully heard across cultural differences and logocentric schema while also 
expressing it in ways that do not reify modern/colonial apparatuses.   
 As you may recall from chapter 4, Anzaldúa overcomes the tradition of silence in 
at least two ways, one traceable at the level of her explicit commitments and another 
operative at the aesthetic/performative level of her style. The first, more conventional 
way by which Anzaldúa’s “wild tongue” breaks the silence is by giving voice to the 
material and creative experiences of those who had been excluded from representation 
and the subject position.1 Rather than doing so via an appeal to the logic of purity central 
to modern/colonial theories of meaning, Anzaldúa calls it into question; her “tongue of 
fire” does not conform to modern/colonial expectations, “speaking” instead through 
code-switching and infused with “passionate rationality” (I 12).2 But Anzaldúa 
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overcomes the tradition of silence in a second manner. Through her style, she “present[s] 
another way of ordering and composing, another rhetoric” (I 261) or, more precisely, a 
mythopoetics for which the mobilization of silences is essential. In this sense, Anzaldúa 
resignifies the phenomenon of silence away from the “silencing” upheld by liberatory and 
feminist traditions toward a deep silence critical to gaining access to the sensible world 
and generate new meaning. This move is such that, without falling back onto the impasse 
in which dualist thinking culminates, when faced with the seemingly paradoxical 
question, can the subaltern speak?, Anzaldúa “speaks” this otherwise-ineffable in-
between—of the mute contact with the world, but also with the other, violence, and 
trauma—through a mythopoetics of images, myth, and silences, which “provide access to 
what cannot be said or perceived directly,” as Charles Scott and Nancy Tuana point out 
(2017, 4).  
 The aim of this chapter is thus twofold, relevant to both Anzaldúa’s scholarship 
and critical phenomenology’s methodology. First, I show that an aesthesis of deep silence 
makes possible bearing witness to colonial violence, trauma, and marginalization without 
capitulating to specularization, or the rendering of experiences of racialized others 
specular to one’s interpretative paradigms and readily available for dissection and 
inspection by the white gaze. Crucially, it accomplishes this task through its deployment 
of silences; through its silences, Anzaldúa’s mythopoetics bears witness to the colonial 
past in its absenting, through an experience of its loss. Precisely because of its 
mobilization of deep silence, it bears witness to colonial lineages spectrally, i.e., 
presenting them as what, although never fully present, continues to haunt the present.  To 
be clear—it is la Llorona’s spectral modality of bearing witness that gives access to 
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listening to what remains unsaid—to the silences—of cross-cultural encounters. In this 
sense, Anzaldúa’s mythopoetics makes “visible” colonial historias without rendering 
them transparent and consumable by the colonizer spectator.  
 Second, myth’s mobilization of deep silences not only eschews specularization; it 
also creates the opportunity for decolonial reinscriptions. Bearing witness to experiences 
of colonial trauma and violence in the form of their absenting, I suggest, enables the 
retrograde inscription of a colonial past and the eventuating of a decolonizing sense that 
has not yet been voiced.3 Through its reprisal of the past in its opacity—through deep 
silences—myth holds open a space-time of hesitancy that interrupts the linear time of 
coloniality and brings about new possibilities of apprehending the past, allowing for the 
retroactive resignification of the colonial past. In this sense, myth is not a matter of 
mimetic representation or interpretation of facts, but of being-with; its power of 
insubordination does not lie in its bearing witness to facts or preserving the past as an 
eternal, immutable present, but, rather, in its acknowledgment of “the impossibility of 
any adequate representation” (Acosta Lopéz 2014, 81). Concretely, this means that myth 
exposes not only the limits of cross-cultural communication and of modern/colonial logos 
vis-à-vis bearing witness to phenomena like grief; it also makes explicit how the opacity 
of mythopoetics, specifically, and of being and sense, more broadly, ought not to be 
translated but rather harkened to when healing or decolonizing reality. Informed by 
Anzaldúa’s mythopoetics, I conclude by suggesting that a critical phenomenology of 
deep silence eventuates modalities of expression that undermine what Alejandro Vallega 




1. Bearing Witness to Historias through the Myth of la Llorona  
 As the name “mythopoetics” suggests, a pivotal dimension of Anzaldúa’s “other 
rhetoric” is myth.4 Throughout her corpus, Anzaldúa mobilizes several myths central to 
Mexican and Aztec mythology like those of Coatlicue, la Llorona, la Chingada, la Virgen 
de Guadalupe, and Coyolxauhqui. Incorporating myth into her writing serves several 
purposes. First, it positions Anzaldúa to reach her audience affectively and personally. As 
she remarks in a 1995 interview with María Henríquez Betancor, myth allows her to 
remain attuned to historical, political, affective, and ancestral contexts, enabling the 
author to write “not exclusively about ideas but bring in personal history as well as the 
history of their community” (I 242). Second, the myths situate both the writer and the 
reader within concrete lineages of thought and values, imaginary and symbolic 
landscapes, and halos of signification, thus making visible historical structures such as 
colonial heteropatriarchy.  
 Anzaldúa calls this type of writing that intertwines personal and collective 
histories “autohistoria-teoría,” wherein the “‘auto’ [stands] for self-writing, and historia 
for history—as in collective, personal, cultural and racial history—as well as for fiction, a 
story you make up” (I 242).5 Akin to what pink crosses accomplish in Juárez, Anzaldúa’s 
mythopoetics thus become the keeper of the past; it functions as a testimonio of sorts, 
wherein this past is not that of the singular subject but always already an intersubjective, 
collective, and, remarkedly, colonial past. After all, on her account, “[l]ook[ing] at our 
history” is the first step toward healing. As she explains in the context of her recuperation 
of the myth of la Llorona, “[t]here’s a loss—la llorona is weeping and wailing for her lost 
children and we’re still mourning the loss of our past and before we can come to grips 
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with the trauma, the susto, that we suffer because of all the assaults by all these different 
colonizers—los patones [big-footed ones]—we need to look at our history” (Anzaldúa 
and Blanco 1991).6 But what does it mean to “look at history,” exactly? How is it 
possible to bear witness to a history of colonization without reproducing harm? What role 
do myth and mythopoetics play in such an endeavor?  
 In what follows, I suggest that, on Anzaldúa’s account, “looking at our history” is 
not a mere re-presentation of facts, but a bearing witness that straddles the line of the real 
and imaginary, resignifying the colonial imaginary. In her teoría, it is often through the 
deployment of myths that Anzaldúa accomplishes this task. This discussion will position 
us to see, in section two, that central to a decolonizing methodology and, specifically, 
Anzaldúa’s iterations of the myth la Llorona, is the bearing witness to the past spectrally, 
i.e., as loss.  
 Differently from the reclaiming of other mythological figures central to Chicana 
culture, the recuperation of la Llorona has been crucial to Chicana identity insofar as the 
grief over the lost children that the myth makes visible symbolically bears witness to the 
concrete losses and dispossessions of a people. After all, “for women the conquest has 
always been about what happens to their children and about what happens to their bodies 
because the first thing the conquistadores did was rape the Indian women and create the 
mestizo race” (I 181). As Anzaldúa explains in an interview with Patti Blanco, la Llorona  
typifies [her] reflection on the lost land, the lost homeland, because we’re a 
people that, first of all, had an identity imposed on us by the Spaniards and then 
later by the Anglos. That took away our personhood, who we really were, a sense 
of self. Then our land was taken away—and we were very much rooted to the 
land, our ancestors. Now, as modern-day mestizas and mestizos, as modern-day 
Chicanos, our language is not permitted. When I was growing up, we were not 
allowed to speak Spanish in school. And then in California they passed that 




 At its most basic level, the myth of la Llorona centers around the grief of a mother 
who has lost her children and wanders in search of them, weeping. As it turns out, the 
woman killed her children by drowning them into a stream. Overtaken by grief and 
despair when she realizes what she has done, she takes her own life. Wandering from 
stream to stream, la Llorona is doomed to exist as a ghostly figure for eternity, 
desperately searching for her children’s lost souls. It is her cries, her llantos—“aiii! Mis 
hijos! Donde están mis hijos!?”—that give her the name of la Llorona. This is where the 
variations begin. The myth of la Llorona is transcultural (different versions of the myth 
can be found in the Mexican, Mayan, Native North-American, and Nigerian traditions, 
among others), and its iterations vary quite significantly from culture to culture. Both the 
status of Llorona’s relationship with her lover (from spouse to mistress) and how la 
Llorona loses her children (the children are taken away, lost due to neglect, killed so she 
can have an easier life, or—as the most common variation has it—murdered in a fit of 
rage when her lover leaves or betrays her) are also subject to variation.  
 Traditionally, the myth functions as a patriarchal and colonizing allegory. On one 
hand, it serves as a cautionary tale for women, instructing them to conform to established 
social expectations to avoid ending up like la Llorona, i.e., committing what patriarchal 
culture deems to be the worst deed a mother could perform—prolicide or killing one’s 
children. On the other hand, as Domino Perez argues, the traditional recounting of the 
myth seeks to “displace the Aztec pantheon and the female deities in [the myth] with 
male centered Christianity” (2003, 52). The story often ends with a warning to children to 
behave and to not wander outdoors at night, for they may fall into la Llorona’s clutches.  
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 Because of its ambiguity and variations, however, the myth has been reprised and 
reclaimed through feminist interpretations to become a story of transgression and 
resistance (Limón 1990; Rebolledo 1995; Candelaria 1997); in her refusal to conform to 
social expectations norming what counts as a good wife, mother, and woman, la Llorona 
poses a danger to colonial power, transgressing one of the central values of 
heteropatriarchal culture, i.e., the nuclear family in which women and children are 
subordinate to the patriarch, the man (I 191). It is la Llorona’s liminality, i.e., her ability 
to bear witness to both collective loss, pain, and trauma and resistance, that makes this 
particular myth special to Anzaldúa’s thinking and her project of reclaiming the past and 
creating reality. Reminiscent of the cycle of transformation of the warrior mother of 
Juárez discussed in chapter 5, Anzaldúa observes, “I’ve recuperated la Llorona to trace 
how we go from victimhood to active resistance, from the wailing of suffering and grief 
to the grito of resistance, and onto the grito of celebration and joy” (I 229).8 
 Anzaldúa’s remarks should call to mind the practice of “faithful witnessing,” 
which María Lugones describes as witnessing “against the grain of power on the side of 
resistance” (2003, 7). In Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes, Lugones further explains that 
[t]o witness faithfully, one must be able to sense resistance, to interpret behavior 
as resistant even when it is dangerous, when that interpretation places one 
psychologically against common sense, or when one is moved to act in collision 
with common sense, with oppression. Faithful witnessing leads one away from a 
monosensical life…a life in allegiance with oppression. (2003, 7) 
 
Attention to history as faithful witnessing is commonly accepted within feminist, 
juridical, and, more recently, decolonial debates as a “method of collaborating with those 
who are silenced” (Figueroa 2015, 642).9 As Yomaira Figueroa writes, faithful 
witnessing offers a lens through which it is possible to recognize the  
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assertion of humanity and dignity in laments that would otherwise be unseen or 
ignored […] It is in the faithful witnessing of the moments of resistance, failures, 
deceptions, triumphs, violence, love, and small histories that one actively 
participates in the affirmation of other voices and the substantiation of other 
truths. Without this kind of recognition, histories are erased, silenced, and 
ultimately invalidated as human experiences. (2015, 644) 
 
 The act of recognition, of attending to experiences that are otherwise rendered invisible 
is the stepping-stone for resistance and the reinscription of oppressive, monosensical 
histories circulating within the modern/colonial apparatus. Stressing the importance, to a 
decolonizing project, of reinscribing oppressive narratives, historian Emma Pérez frames 
her groundbreaking The Decolonial Imaginary as a “political project for 
reconceptualizing histories” (1999, 4). Inscribing colonial silences into a decolonial 
imaginary is Pérez’s way of disrupting traditional and linear history, which tends to cover 
over the “interstitial gaps, the unheard, the unthought, the unspoken … [that] interrupt the 
linear model of time [and within which] oppositional, subaltern histories can be found” 
(1999, 5). In this vein, Anzaldúa’s iterations of the myth of la Llorona bear faithful 
witness to the colonial past, inscribing a different story than the one commonly appealed 
to and deployed by heteropatriarchal modern/colonial society.10 That is, they bear witness 
to generational trauma and resistance by attending to the invisible or dark side of 
coloniality, i.e., to colonial “silences,” narrating the historia from another perspective, 
from the in-between, thereby enacting and restoring a decolonizing agency. As Pérez puts 
it, these colonial “silences, when heard, become the negotiating spaces for the 
decolonizing subject” (1999, 5). But, again, what does it mean to “hear” the silences, to 
“look at history”? And what do these negotiating spaces look like? 
 Anzaldúa’s mythopoetics (and her deployment of the myth of la Llorona in 
particular) is a peculiar kind of bearing witness; through its imaginative reclamation of 
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the myth it does not re-present the historical past (neither the official, colonial history, 
nor the unofficial one). That is, it is not a mere “eye-witness to historical facts or 
accuracy”—a trait that characterizes witnessing in popular conceptions (Oliver 2001, 81). 
Rather, it contributes to historical production—as Anzaldúa explains, “[h]istory is fiction 
because it is made up, usually made up, by the people who rule” (I 242)—by inscribing 
existing histories with existing “silences,” thus exscribing decolonial imaginaries.11 
Through this process of inscription, Anzaldúa “keeps” the past not by conserving or 
memorializing it, but by rewriting it. As AnaLouise Keating notes remarking on 
Anzaldúa’s deployment of historias,  
because [Anzaldúa] believes that ‘myths and fictions create reality,’ she seizes the 
existing myths—the stories that disempower us—and rewrites them, embodying 
her spiritual vision—her desire for social justice—in her own words. Her writing 
invites us to see ourselves differently, to recognize the connections between body 
and text, between the intellectual, spiritual, and physical dimensions of life, 
between self and other (2005, 12).  
 
 Thus, Anzaldúa effects the “unlearning [of] consensual reality” (LDLO 44), 
turning its mythological figures into hinges between the lineages of colonial conquest and 
decolonial insubordination, collective trauma and healing.12 Anzaldúa’s mobilization of 
myth in her autohistoria-theoría plays a crucial role in making sense anew of collective 
trauma tied to conquest and colonization that continue to haunt people through their 
many iterations recurring in collective imaginaries. Through her iterations, la Llorona’s 
behavior is presented as resistant and, as such, empowering for Chicanas. In this way, as 
cultural theorist Tey Diana Rebolledo points out, bearing witness to the colonial past 
through the myth of la Llorona facilitates the recuperation and “mourning [of Chicanas’] 
lost culture, their lost selves” (1995, 194)—in sum, of a lost past of biological, cultural, 
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and linguistic lineages foreclosed and forgotten by official discourse through the raping 
of women, seizing of land, and legal dispossession of cultural and linguistic identities.13 
  What is relevant for the current analysis, however, is the modality whereby 
Anzaldúa’s iterations of the myth bear witness to the lost past and the avenues for 
decolonizing reinscriptions/exscriptions such witnessing makes possible.14 Yes, la 
Llorona matters because of the culturally empowering role that the feminist reclamation 
of the myth has played in Chicana culture; how this reclamation is effected matters even 
more to the present inquiry. After all, it is my contention that the modality of bearing 
witness matters when going beyond colonial epistemologies. Consider the case of the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a warning of what may ensue 
when modalities of bearing witness poorly suited to listen for silences are deployed.  
 In “The Mute Always Speak: On Women’s Silences at the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission,” Nthabiseng Motsemme observes that although the TRC 
was tasked with providing a platform for healing by allowing ‘perpetrator’ and ‘victims’ 
to confront the racially fraught past of apartheid, the pervasive logocentrism of the 
Commission prevented racialized and colonial harms to be heard, allowing the TRC to 
carry out the task of “myth making” instead, which entailed rewriting the past through 
words, images, and symbols to present South Africa as a “rainbow nation” characterized 
by cross-racial harmony. As Motsemme argues, by assuming that “the world was only 
knowable through words, and thus [that] the basis for beginning a process of healing 
South Africa’s violent past would be organized through acts of testimony” (2004, 914), 
the TRC deployment of visibility and transparency actually rendered invisible past 
violations that could not be expressed dialogically. As such, “in its performance and 
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ritualization, [the Commission] created a space in which the spoken word would be 
transformed into truth and history” (911). That is, rather than contending with the fact 
that words may be inadequate to convey the humiliation, pain, and systematic 
degradation—or that, as scholars have observed, speech may fail in the recounting or 
remembering an experience too painful or frightening—those who, in light of trauma, 
could not speak were seen as “languageless, unable to communicate” (Ross 1996, 22).15 
The history that was fabricated by the TRC was the product of a revisionist project 
abetted by logocentrism.  
 In light of the limits of verbal language in narrating and remembering violence, 
and the historical dangers of not listening to silences, Motsemme proposes to read the 
silences of women’s testimonies during the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) hearings as “part of a range of ‘languages of pain and grief’ to 
narrate hidden but troubled elements of their recent past” (2004, 910). Hearing and 
reading silences as communicative, she argues, is paramount in exploring other meanings 
of the struggles of living under apartheid and colonial violence that would otherwise 
remain inaudible. Resonant with the Ute/Paiute tribes’ silence vis-à-vis sacred artifacts 
like the shields, unspeakability vis-à-vis trauma is an integral part of the struggle of 
making sense of experiences of violence against the human flesh.16 Not attending to these 
silences or treating them as communicative ostracizes experiences that do not conform 
with logocentric expectations, while also reifying colonial epistemology within which the 
racialized other figures as always already abjected. In sum, it precludes bearing witness 
to an integral dimension of the dark side of modernity, i.e., the pain, grief, and resistance 
tied to colonization and coloniality. What needs to be done is attending to “silences” as a 
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means of eventuating meanings of colonial experiences otherwise uncommunicable by 
the (modern/colonial) spoken word.17 After all, as we already saw in chapter 5, pain, 
suffering, but also resistance and indignation often find expression not in language, but 
through the deep silences of the aesthetics, including song, spirituality, dance, images, 
and myth. In my view, this is to say that an aesthesis of deep silence not only signifies but 
conveys sense beyond the presence of modern/colonial logos.  
 It is this aesthesis of deep silence conveyed through myth and affectively charged 
images that we hear resonating at the heart of Anzaldúa’s mythopoetics. As I show in the 
section that follows, Anzaldúa’s iterations of the myth of la Llorona bear witness to the 
colonial past as lost, that is, through an experience of its loss. La Llorona does not re-
present the past in its full visibility, without visual or auditory lacunae; nor is the past 
spoken of directly, represented by the myth into an eternal, immutable present. Instead, 
the myth evokes the past—including generational trauma tied to conquest—indirectly 
through a mythopoetics of images, affect, and deep silences that make the reinscription of 
the colonial past possible.18  
2. Spectral Witnessing Beyond Specular and Spectacular Descriptions 
 Central to Anzaldúa’s mythopoetics are images, which offer avenues to summon 
dimensions of sense “outside the restrictions of grammar, good sense, rationality, or 
analysis” (Scott and Tuana 2017, 13). As Anzaldúa explains, “I attempt to talk with 
image/stories, to engage with creative and spiritual processes and their ritualistic aspects” 
(LDLO 5) that continuously get overlooked in dialogical exchanges. It is images that we 
find in her iterations of the myth of la Llorona. In Prietita and the Ghost Woman, for 
instance, Anzaldúa constellates the myth with symbolically charged animal figures like 
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deer, salamanders, and pumas that elicit Aztec mythology and ancestry. This is the case 
also in the poem “My Black Angelos,” in which Anzaldúa summons the pre-Colombian 
Aztec lineages of la Llorona by deploying images of serpents, which evoke Cihuacoatl 
(snake woman) and Coatlicue (the serpent skirt), two of the central figures in the Aztec 
pantheon and female deities displaced by the Christian-centered traditional recounting of 
the myth. Most importantly, Anzaldúa recollects the past against the backdrop of the 
wailing of la Llorona, which affectively charges both retellings of the story with 
memories of colonial conquest and grief over the loss of children, cultural identity, and 
land: 
Aiiii aiiii aiiiiiii 
She is crying for the dead child 
The lover gone, the lover not yet come: 
Her grito splinters the night 
Fear drenches me. (I 206) 
 
As we are learning to hear, the ancestral past is not spoken for or about; rather, it 
presences indirectly, summoned through images and affect that historically and 
geographically situate the poem. This is to say not only that the poem is shot through 
with passionate rationality and makes sense by invoking personal and collective history. 
It is also to say that the past that we come to apprehend is evoked in its spectral presence, 
i.e., through traces such as la Llorona’s cries which fleetingly echo through the night, in 
the reverberations and fluidity of water, and the silences of the sacred animals that guide 
Prietita through King Ranch.  
 The past’s spectral presencing becomes stark in the second stanza of “My Black 
Angelos,” when we are made aware that it is the narrator’s fear that summons la Llorona:  
I stink of carrion,  
she turns upwind tracking me. 
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Her teeth reflect the fire 
From her rouge eyes 
My black Angelos, 
La bruja con las uñas largas, 
I hear her at the door. (I 206) 
 
As Domino Perez observes, by pointing out that the narrator “stink[s] of carrion,” and 
that it is her smell that lures la Llorona into “turning upwind tracking me,” Anzaldúa is 
suggesting not only that some part of the narrator is dead or decaying, that “the narrator 
has let die within her the history and spirit of Coatlicue and Cihuacoatl, a death that 
denies her access to indigenous female figures of power” (2004, 57); on my account, it 
also ventures that it is by virtue of that absence or loss that la Llorona “returns to claim 
this lost child to enable a necessary and frightening recovery of what has been lost” 
(Perez 2003, 57).  
 We witness a similar spectral process of the past’s eventuation in Prietita and the 
Ghost Woman where, at multiple junctures in the historia, the echoes of the past become 
audible to Prietita when she harkens to silences. While in search for herbs that would cure 
her mother’s illness, for instance, Prietita asks for the assistance of many creatures, one 
of which is a salamander, whom she knew from her nature book in school had “no 
voice.” “Salamandra, please help me,” Prietita pledges. “You can’t speak but maybe you 
can show me where there’s some rue,” she asks. Like the other animals before and after 
her, without giving a straight or full answer to her question, the salamander offers 
guidance, leading Prietita along. And as the voiceless salamander disappears into the 
underbrush Prietita hears the crying sound of the ghost woman, la Llorona, for a second 
time.19 Both the symbolic and performative silences effected throughout affective 
interruptions and pauses in both the children’s story and the poem show that la Llorona 
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bears witness to a colonial past by upholding opacity, thereby making the past (and the 
loss of the past) present in absence, through an experience of its loss. After all, it is 
through the silences that la Llorona grieves and remembers colonial losses, inviting the 
reader to do the same—to apprehend the lost past through silences.  
 Notably, summoning the past as lost, through silences, means that the past 
presences for those to whom the echoes of Aztec mythology resonate, evoking more 
complex historias. Thinking through mythopoetics requires adopting an epistemic stance 
whereby one resists the inclination to “control the images as [one’s] conscious mind 
wants” (LDLO 25), wherein silences, images, and symbols are interpreted not as 
translations of the letter into available significations or familiar concepts.20 That is, the 
colonizing past eventuates for those who are willing to listen to silences, harkening to the 
resonances of images that may, at first, be foreign to their cultural background, 
“surrendering to them and letting them guide” the process of inquiry instead, as Anzaldúa 
reminds us (LDLO 25). In either case, the past presences fleetingly, through words not 
fully spoken, through suggestions and carnal relations. It is thus—spectrally—that la 
Llorona gives way to an experience whereby loss, in Acosta López’s words, “is not 
solved but denounced, in which the silences heard by the spectator allow the unheard of, 
which always speaks from the present’s excess, to echo and take form time and again” 
(2014, 78).  
 Contrary to the myth-making of the TRC, then, which Motsemme understands as 
a harmful distortion of the past, the myth-making of la Llorona accomplishes, through 
Anzaldúa’s mythopoetics, precisely what the former invites us to do, i.e., “give voice” to 
a past that would otherwise remain unspeakable, silently mute. That is, spectrally—
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through her haunting llantos and generative silences—la Llorona opens onto a non-
representational order of experience—to a past ripe with pain, trauma, and colonial 
violence, but also, as we are about to see, with decolonizing avenues of resistance.21  
In my view, this spectral modality of bearing witness reveals a fundamental 
aspect of a decolonizing aesthetics that seeks to go beyond colonial epistemologies and 
the desideratum of transparency. This is so in at least two ways. First, it avoids 
specularization, which, following Aimee Césaire, Al-Saji defines as the tendency of 
rendering the colonized’s experiences spectacles for and specular to white observers. This 
consideration is especially relevant considering the danger we face when striving to make 
colonized bodies, experiences, and historias visible. As she explains, “even when the 
invisible workings of the flesh are revealed in their activity as well as their passivity, their 
being rendered a spectacle introduces not only the danger of ‘thingification’—
‘chosification’ (Césaure 1955, 23)—but also the circumscription and elision of the very 
affectivity that I am trying to describe” (2019b, 8). That is to say that a phenomenology 
that strives, in its descriptions, for full visibility risks objectifying the experiences and 
bodies of racialized subjects; it risks confiscating the lived and affective dimensions of 
experience, reducing them to phenomena that, qua spectacles, can be surveilled, 
scrutinized, and measured by the white gaze. This scrutinizing logic—this dissecting 
gaze—reproduces the “logic of racialization that fixes and dissects the body …, cuts 
instantaneous cross-sections of its experience, making it again the slave of an 
appearance” (2019, 8). In light of these considerations—and resonant with the pink 
crosses of Juárez—we see how Anzaldúa’s bearing witness to the colonial past in its 
absenting matters in that it makes “visible” colonial historias without rendering them 
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transparent and consumable by the colonizer spectator, by attending to expressive 
manners that do not fix and dissect experiences. 
My invitation to bearing witness spectrally resonates with Mariana Ortega’s 
suggestion, in “Spectral Perception and Ghostly Subjectivity,” that decolonial feminisms 
“engage in haunting,” which she describes as a “methodology of making visible what is 
supposed to remain invisible” (2019, 402). I agree with Ortega that “dwelling with 
ghosts” is the first step in learning to bear witness, “to see and to feel anew” (2019, 407). 
Rather than striving for visibility, however, I depart from Ortega and propose that 
spectrality should be upheld as a modality of bearing witness to the experience of those 
whose experiences have and continue to be transversed by colonial violence. The risk of 
not doing so would be using modalities of expression that are entrenched in colonial 
legacies of oppression and domination, that, concretely, aim for transparency, logical non 
impossibility, and the resolution of paradoxes and ambiguities. Dwelling with ghosts 
calls for a modality of listening, perceiving, sensing, but also expressing that is attuned to 
the flickering, shimmering, and hesitancy of existence. Anzaldúa’s mobilization of deep 
silences in her iteration of the myth of la Llorona avoids capitulating to transparency by 
effecting the remembering and mourning of the colonial past as loss, through silences. 
Rendering the other’s experiences a spectacle—i.e., fully visible, spread out in 
full transparency—entails also rendering it specular to one’s interpretative paradigm. 
This is because specularization is achieved by treating the silence or “residue of 
meaning” that, as Ofelia Schutte reminds us, exists between linguistic-cultural symbolic 
systems as “irrelevant to philosophical meaning and knowledge, and thus to the 
operations of reason” (1998, 56, 61). In other words, specularization is the outcome of 
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treating sense and reality as transparent or a world without lacunae—a desideratum 
informing modern/colonial epistemic and ontological schemas. A culture’s, language’s, 
or subject’s meaning is approached as if it were immediately accessible to another, fully 
and clearly translatable through dialogical exchanges, and deployable cross-culturally to 
express contextually different experiences of oppression and resistance. Such an account 
skates over, rather than harkens to, the silent junctures that mark, at once, contact and 
divergence with being, the world, and others. Specifically, it treats silence and the écart 
of being as gaps to be either ignored or filled.22 In this way, the myth of la Llorona 
reminds the beholder of the need to listen for silences, at once grappling with the 
incommensurability of the other’s difference as well as the generation of new sense. As 
we saw, withstanding, rather than escaping, the silences makes room for la Llorona to 
appear, carrying with her the traces of the past and the opportunity to remember, grieve, 
and, ultimately, heal.  
It is this peculiar kind of remembering—one that, at once, remembers and 
forgets—that Anzaldúa finds essential for healing:  
Betrayed for generations, traumatized by racial denigration and exclusion, we are 
almost buried by grief’s heavy pall. We never forget our wounds. La Llorona, our 
dark mother with her perpetual mournful song, has haunted us for five hundred 
years— our symbol of unresolved grief, an ever present specter in the psyches of 
Chicanos and Mexicanos. […] If you name, acknowledge, mourn, and grieve your 
losses and violations instead of trying to retain what you’ve lost through a 
nostalgic attempt at preservation, you learn not just to survive but to imbue that 
survival with new meaning. Through activist and creative work you help heal 
yourself and others. (L 88) 
 
To be clear, then, rather than simply attending to and making audible the voices that have 
been hidden and “relegated to silences, to passivity” (Pérez 1999, xvi) it seems to me that 
sensing against the grain of colonial epistemologies, ontologies, and even sensibilities 
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requires a peculiar modality of bearing witness to the past that listens for and expresses 
its silences, i.e., a being with them that allows their strangeness and opacity to 
qualitatively alter one’s perception of reality without translating or speaking for them. As 
a white, Western observer, listening to silences means checking one’s desire or curiosity 
vis-à-vis uncovering the “secrets” or the meaning of a culturally diverse other. As Doris 
Sommer suggests of well-intentioned testimonio readers who approach the genre as 
providing unmediated access to the subalterns, “maybe empathy for an informant is a 
good feeling that covers over a controlling disposition, what Derrida calls ‘an 
inquisitorial insistence, an order, a petition…To demand the narrative of the other, to 
extort it form him like a secretless secret’ (Derrida 1979, 87). The possibility [which we 
saw concretize in Merleau-Ponty’s encounter with the Malagasy, for instance] should 
give us pause” (1996, 131).23 Rather than abstracting from or interpreting/uncovering 
difference, deep silence requires historicizing, i.e., living- or being-with the uncanny. 
That is, being-with silence opens onto regimes of meaning that are not entirely legible 
through or translatable into yet another discourse. 
 But there is more. In my view, this modality of bearing witness to the past 
whereby one harkens to deep silences matters to a decolonizing project because of the 
relationship with time it institutes. The mobilization of deep silences in Anzaldúa’s 
iterations of the myth of la Llorona effects a modality of bearing witness to non-
normative experiences that decenters the presence of consciousness and teleological 
visions of liberation that continue to oppress and dehumanize colonized and racialized 
others, opening onto modalities of existence and sense-making not bound by the presence 
of consciousness. La Llorona’s spectral witnessing is such that the past she is tasked to 
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remember is not fixed or memorialized into an eternal present, but, rather, held open, 
reverberating with a polysemy of co-existing temporalities, which makes possible for the 
past to be continuously and retroactively at once inscribed and exscribed. To make sense 
of how bearing witness spectrally matters to a decolonizing project, it is helpful to turn to 
what scholars call the “coloniality of time,” namely, the operations of power whereby the 
modern/colonial world-system situates the experience of existence in the present of 
modern Western consciousness. 
3. Deep Silence, Temporal Decentering, and Imaginary Reinscriptions 
Central to much decolonial literature is the claim that the coloniality of 
power/knowledge (discussed in chapter 2) institutes a new temporal relation between the 
European and the non-European whereby the geopolitical, historical, and cultural 
landscapes marked by race are projected backwards into the past of a historical trajectory 
whose culmination is European.24 As Aníbal Quijano argues—and here I quote him at 
length—the coloniality of time makes it  
possible to think about relations between them in an evolutionary perspective…, 
so that all non-Europeans could be placed vis-à-vis Europeans in a continuous 
historical chain from ‘primitive’ to ‘civilized,’ from ‘irrational’ to ‘rational,’ from 
‘traditional’ to ‘modern,’ from ‘magic-mythic,’ to ‘scientific’; in sum, from non-
Europeans to something that could be, in time, at best Europeanized or 
‘modernized.’ (2000, 221) 
 
That is, coloniality—and its decentering—is a matter of time; the modern/colonial system 
at once relies upon and partakes in the reification of a narrative of linear progression and 
human evolution whereby “cultural differences were classified according to their 
proximity to modernity or to tradition” (Mignolo 2012, 160).25  Within this colonial 
chronology, the colonized are dehumanized through racialization at the level of 
temporality, specifically, by being relegated to and overdetermined by a mythical past.  
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 In “Too Late: Racialized Time and the Closure of the Past,” Alia Al-Saji claims 
that, at stake in the coloniality of time, is not only the institution of linear, racialized time, 
but also the overdeterimination of the past and, thus, the foreclosure of ontological 
growth or possibility discussed in the preceding chapter. The colonial racial imaginary—
what Fanon refers to as the “historico-racial schema” (2008, 90)—“differently 
configure[s] the kinds of past and fields of possibility available to subjects” (Al-Saji 
2013, 4). As such, the temporal experience of a colonized and racialized subject whose 
existence—whose presence/t—is overdetermined by a stereotyped black past is lived as 
ontologically overbearing—as closing off possible futures. The racialized past “is hence a 
closed past, incapable of development on its own terms and cut off from the creativity 
that gives rise to an open future” (Al-Saji 2013, 6–7). Notably, then, the linearity 
instituted by the coloniality of time forecloses the variability and playfulness of the past, 
the possibility of pasts “living on,” as resonances of histories and lineages, in the present. 
Instead, the past is lived as a closed set of possibilities, sealed off without recourse, at 
once too influential to the present (of the colonized subjects whose existences are 
overdetermined by this past that becomes lived as an eternal present) and uninfluential to 
the present (of modern/colonial consciousness), which takes itself as having progressed 
beyond it, as the creator of novelty irrespective or even dismissive of the ways in which 
meaning eventuates through historical contexts (and not as the sudden invention of 
individuals).  
 This sense of “lateness,” i.e., of coming into a world always already saturated 
with (white) meaning and possibility, is shared across experiences of coloniality. In Black 
Skin/White Masks, for instance, Fanon repeatedly points out that he has “come too late, 
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much too late. There will always be a world—a white world—between [him] and [the 
colonizers]: that impossibility on either side to obliterate the past once and for all” (2008, 
101). “Too late,” he exhorts a few pages later. “Everything is anticipated, thought out, 
demonstrated, made the most of” (2008, 97). While from the “sheltering comfort … of 
historically privileged ‘home perspectives’” (Ruiz 2014, 196), the world is perceived as 
inexhaustible, open to creation and possibility, for Fanon “these possibilities lose their 
contingency and virtuality; they become factical and necessary…[losing their] 
playfulness and imaginary variability” (Al-Saji 2013, 8).26  
 In light of these remarks, we being to see how any critical, decolonizing 
phenomenology ought to be keenly aware of its relationship with temporality. Any 
reprise of the colonial past that repeats, conserves, or memorializes it into an eternal 
present would not undermine the coloniality of time but, rather, reify a linear temporal 
trajectory whereby the colonized continue to be overdetermined by and relegated to a 
mythical past. Without decentering the coloniality of time, avenues for insubordination 
are limited to either the reclamation of a romanticized past or the creation of a wholly 
new future/culture inattentive to situational, i.e., temporal and spatial, differences and the 
structural and economic features of social oppression. It is this appeal to metaphysical 
essentialism too often implicit in the reclamation of a romanticized past that Fanon 
criticizes, in Black Skin, White Masks, when discussing the negritude movement. As Glen 
Sean Coulthard observes, although it sought to rehabilitate colonized subjects by purging 
them of “the internalized effects of systemic racism and colonial violence by rejecting 
assimilation and instead affirming the worth of their own identity-related differences,” 
the movement was hindered by a “retrograde orientation towards a subjective affirmation 
 
246 
of a precolonial past” (2014 131, 132). In particular, Fanon finds issue with the 
movement’s essentialist nature, claiming that “there is not one Negro—there are many 
black men” (2008, 115).27  
Al-Saij’s remarks about the coloniality of time’s closure of the past, however, 
should also call to mind the guiding question of this chapter, i.e., what are the modalities 
to bear witness to the violence waged by colonial heteropatriarchy without capitulating to 
logos? In the preceding section, I proposed that attending to the past, history, and non-
normative experiences of colonization calls for a particular kind of bearing witness—a 
spectral witnessing—that upholds silences rather than skate over them. The mobilization 
of deep silences, however, is essential to the instituting of the imaginary variability of the 
past necessary for ontological growth and fecund possibilities also because, as we are 
slowly coming to see, the coloniality of time is more than the instituting of a Euro-
centered, linear trajectory; the coloniality of time is a matter of sensibilities, i.e., of how 
something comes to be recognized as knowledge and existence in the first place.  
In Latin American Philosophy from Identity to Radical Exteriority, Alejandro 
Vallega explains that the coloniality of time is such that “it is the knowledge of this 
specific time and consciousness [i.e., of the present of modern, European reason] that 
figures the limits and possibilities of all human understanding and existence” (2014, 105). 
As he explains, 
the time of this consciousness becomes a disposition, a sensibility, that situates 
thought and any possible human knowledge. This means that even before 
experience may count as phenomenon or knowledge, even before thought begins 
to be formulated, it will be put under the yoke of this single present. (2014, 105) 
 
This is to say that the coloniality of time makes explicit the imbrication of the present of 
modern/colonial consciousness and thought/knowledge—an intertwining resonant with 
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the one discussed in chapter 2 in the context of what I called a racialized metaphysics of 
presence. While there I emphasized the racialized dimension of “voice,” we can now 
appreciate temporality’s work in the racialization of sense, knowledge, and, importantly, 
possibility/ontological growth. In fact, temporality’s invisible work delineates a priori the 
field of possibility of any thought/knowledge; the presence of consciousness limits 
thought/knowledge to what spreads out in absolute transparency.28  
A decolonizing project, then, cannot operate at the level of thought/knowledge. 
As Denise Ferreira Da Silva explains in “Toward a Black Feminist Poethics”—and it is 
worth quoting at length— 
the known and knowable World and our critical intellectual tools modeled after 
the Category of Blackness consistently reproduce the effects of efficient causality. 
Stuck in the always already there (of) Thought—as reproduced in concepts and 
categories—where the Category of Blackness (like other social categories), 
because it refigures formalizations (as laws, calculations, or measurements), 
arrests Blackness’s creative potential (that which slavery has never been able to 
destruct), boycotting the impact of the exposure of violence (symbolic and total), 
which is, as Barbara Christian has engaged so brilliantly, the Black Feminist 
Critic’s recurrent task. (2014, 84) 
 
Echoing Vallega, Da Silva remarks that unshackling Blackness from the binds of 
universal reason, which, through its categorical thinking, abates Blackness’s creative 
possibilities, requires the decentering of the category of time. “Without an examination of 
the World that seeks to expose how Time works through our Categories, the racial 
dialectic will stay safe” (2014, 88). This is because time and categorical thinking work in 
unison, reproducing entrenched ways of knowing that produce the category of Blackness 
as a “referent of commodity” (2014, 81) and arrested development.29 The outcome is that 
so long as universal reason persists its formalizing through categories and concepts, 
Blackness will signify the antithesis of progress.  
 
248 
These considerations make pressing the inadequacy of simply reproducing the 
other’s non-normative experiences—including the colonial past—by reference to 
available categories and significations, especially when striving to call into question 
oppressive quasi-transcendental structures that render the familiar oppressive to many. 
How we bear witness to the past and non-normative experiences matters. A decolonizing 
phenomenology cannot take place exclusively at the level of thought, knowledge, or the 
spoken word, as these modalities of existence reproduce colonial assumptions and 
structures. Without the undoing of the coloniality of time, of sensibilities that confine 
existence to the presence of modern/colonial consciousness, even positive appropriations 
of the colonial past (including reclamations of the myth of la Llorona), experiences of 
marginalization, or silenced indigenous voices risk remaining under the attraction of the 
temporal prejudice of modernity. This would not only result in the evisceration of 
existence’s depth, opacity, and affect—of all dimensions that do not make sense in the 
presence of modern/colonial logos. It would also entail that any positive affirmation 
would be, yet-again, signified as a cluster of antiquated attachments. Hence, the 
importance for a decolonizing project to put forth novel sensibilities—a decolonizing 
aesthesis, if you will—that undo the totalizing and transparent system of linear 
temporality. Concretely, this means bearing witness to the past such that the generativity 
of linear, colonial time is disrupted, decentered into the playfulness and imaginary 
variability of the past. Following Maria Acosta López, we can say that a decolonizing 
aesthetics “must present the past as what can never be fully present, i.e., as that which 
always exceeds the very same possibilities of its own representation” (2014, 77). But how 
does deep silence decenter the coloniality of time?  
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If Jacques Derrida’s critique of the metaphysics of presence is of any indication 
for the present purposes, the task of undoing the coloniality of time begins by decentering 
the present now, revealing it in its mediatedness.30 On Derrida’s account, however, the 
deconstruction of the present is a necessary but insufficient condition for moving beyond 
metaphysical thinking and the primacy of presence. Time’s “homogeneity and its 
fundamental successivity,” Derrida writes, also need to be deconstructed (2016, 72). 
Indeed, although the deconstructing of the Now B into the retention of Now A and the 
protention of Now C points to the mediated structure of the present, it does not 
destabilize the successivity of time; “this model of successivity would prohibit the Now X 
from taking the place of Now A” (Derrida 2016, 72). That is to say that this model still 
posits the present as primary; it conceives of the past as present- or immediate-past and 
the future as present- or immediate-future. As such, this conception of time forecloses the 
existence of another kind of past—an “absolute past,” as Derrida calls it (2016, 72)—ripe 
with novelty and ontological possibility. While Derrida addresses this second concern by 
locating, at the heart or Augenblick of existence, a hiatus or differance that makes 
possible the eventuation of being, while remaining invisible in the present, in the 
preceding chapter, I proposed that, at the heart of being, there lies a deep silence that, at 
once, makes possible the non-coincidence of being and retroactive inscriptions of 
possibility. In my view, by instituting interruptions, pauses, and hesitation, the 
mobilization of deep silences holds the promise of bringing about sensibilities that make 
sense of the sensible world beyond the presence of modern/colonial consciousness. 
Suggesting, as I did, that deep silence ensues the openness and fecundity of being means 
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that deep silence has the power of interrupting the linearity of colonial time, the 
homogeneity and successivity that fixes the colonized’s past.  
It is this decentering that deep silences effect throughout Anzaldúa’s iterations of 
the myth. By bearing witness spectrally, i.e., through the mobilization of deep silences 
and traces that resonate in the present, la Llorona’s past resists not only full visibility, but 
also reinscription into the linear temporal trajectory of coloniality. It does so by 
suspending familiar narratives and framings, by instituting time lags that make possible 
the resignification of the past. The overbearing and static colonial past and imaginary are 
thus fissured and decentered, shot through with écarts that allow for their resignification 
and the disclosing of new meanings of what previously had been familiar historias. We 
witness such interruptions in Prietita and the Ghost Woman. It is when Prietita moves 
further away from the fence, which symbolizes the familiar, a home perspective of sorts, 
and ventures into the unknown guided by silent animals that she hears the cries of la 
Llorona, the echoes of a lost past. The silences opened by the historia suspend the 
reader’s presuppositions, making her hesitate before translating la Llorona’s predicament 
into familiar meanings, before rendering the eventuating pat in terms of colonial frames 
of reference. At first, approaching the poem without hesitation, the reader falls back onto 
the internalized and familiar colonial frames of reference, reading la Llorona as a 
menacing figure howling at night.  
Suggestive of this colonial heteropatriarchal significance, the first and second stanzas 
read:  
In the might I hear her soft whimper  
wild masses of hair 
rustling in the silence. 
Una mujer vage en la noche 
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anda errante con las almas de los Muertos. 
 
Aiiii aiiiii aiiiiii 
She is crying for the dead child 
the lover gone, the lover not yet come: 
Her grito splinters the night 
fear drenches me. 
I stink of carrion,  
she turns upwind tracking. 
Her teeth reflect the fire 
from her rouge eyes 
my black Angelos, 
la bruja con las uñas largas,  
 I hear her at the door. (B 206)  
 
Yet, as the narrative progresses, the silences and affective interruptions invite the reader 
to reconsider her assumptions, situating the grief of la Llorona in the lineages of colonial 
violence and conquest summoned through the images and silences deployed by 
Anzaldúa. This contextualizing and harkening to silences allows the myth to “speak” 
differently, to tell different stories of an Aztec mythological pantheon rich with female 
deities like la Llorona, who guides Prietita to the rue and back to her family, which 
symbolize healing and the reclaiming o fa previously disavowed ancestral lineage. La 
Curandera’s rebuttal to the general surprise that la Llorona did not conform to her 
menacing stereotype, but led Prietita back home, is indicative of this reclaimed narrative: 
“perhaps she is not what others tin she is,” Doña Lola points out (P 28). Or take the 
opening stanza of “My Black Angelos,” which is repeated in the conclusion of the poem 
with a remarkably altered meaning: 
aiiiiii aiiiiiaaaaaaaa  
Una mujer vaga en la noche  
Anda errante con las almas de los muertos.  
We sweep through the streets 
con el viento corremos  




The outcome is a resignification of colonial past and imaginary. As Domino Renee Perez 
observes, “the wail from the opening stanzas of the poem is no longer a mere signifier of 
La Llorona’s presence; the grito is now liberating since the narrator no longer hides from 
the weeping woman.31 By embracing La Llorona, the narrator embraces the indigenous 
part of herself that she had been taught to fear” (2003, 58). In the Forward to Unmaking 
Race, Remaking Soul, Joy James writes that “[c]ultural production that creates a 
breathing space, or momentarily stops breath, allows us to pause to catch our thinking 
and move in a different way in pursuit of freedom” (2007, xii). Here, we witness the 
narrator recuperating her previously-disavowed ancestral lineages and Chicana history, 
symbolized by her becoming one with la Llorona and “sweep[ing] through the street […] 
roam[ing] with the souls of the dead.” Notably, having developed sensibilities capable of 
dwelling with ghosts, the narrator welcomes her previously disavowed past within the 
“present” of her modern existence. And as the reader listens for silences, this process of 
harkening turns the beholder into a hollow, and la Llorona “crawls into [her] spine”:  
aiiiii aiiiii aiiiii 
She crawls into my spine 
her eyes opening and closing,  
shining under my skin in the dark 
whirling my bones twirling 
till they’re hollow reeds. (B 206) 
 
The exscriptions effected through the mobilization of deep silences bring about different 
aesthetic sensibilities able to hear beyond the presence of modern/colonial logos, letting 
the grieving murmurs of the past resonate in their polysemy, turning into llantos of 
resistance.32  
Remarkably, however, Anzaldúa’s mobilization of the deep silences interrupts not 
only “specular and spectacular renderings of suffering and colonial violence” (Al-Saji 
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2019b, 11) but also teleological visions of liberation and the homogeneity of coloniality 
temporality. Through the mobilization of deep silences, Anzaldúa brings about a different 
aesthetic sensibility, ultimately allowing for multiple temporalities to co-exist. The past 
re-membered by la Llorona is not homogeneous, monolithical, and memorialized, but, 
rather, a multiplicity of pasts co-existing in the present and resonating simultaneously. In 
her llantos, we hear, at once, the resonances of colonial, heteropatriarchal cautionary 
tales, evoked by the menacing depictions of la Llorona in the myth; the pain, violence, 
and loss suffered at the hand of colonial conquest and the weight of a past with which 
colonized peoples have to contend; but also the grito of resistance, of the unabating 
defiance of heteropatriarchal and colonial rule marked, on the one hand, by the 
perseverance of her longing, searching, and haunting and, on the other hand, the 
shimmerings of central figures in the Aztec pantheon that traditional recountings of the 
myth seek to displace. In evoking the simultaneity of diverse temporal lineages, Anzaldúa 
is not calling for a simple return to a colonial past or upholding an essentialist and 
romanticized view of native lineage, as early critics of Borderlands/la frontera lamented. 
Rather, through the iterations of the myth, the pasts are held together, in their ambiguity 
and polyvocality, resonating in the narrator’s “modern” existence.33   
Anzaldúa’s myth, by virtue of its silences, interrupts key assumptions of 
coloniality, specifically that of transparency and the linearity of time. The time-lags 
instituted through the silences are such that the constraining “mythical past” of which 
Fanon spoke can be reclaimed by Anzaldúa and Chicanas without playing into the 
coloniality of time.34 Through myth’s silences the reader must learn to hear again as there 
is no image, sound, or experience to be neatly located into a linear narrative, fixed and 
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spread out by and for an entitled observer. In their spectral co-existence, the past lineages 
echoing through the myth and previously neatly organizable within the neo-liberal, now 
encroach upon each other, exploding the presence of consciousness and yielding novel 
decolonial meanings eventuating through the iterations of the myth.35 
4. Conclusion 
If one of the major interventions we have inherited from Audre Lorde is that the 
“master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house” ([1978] 2007, 110), it should 
be clear by now that, in this chapter, I seek new tools of listening, speaking, and wading 
into the fullness of deep silence. That is, I am less concerned with how we dismantle 
the master’s house, with which theories we critique colonialism; but I am very 
concerned with how we re-build decolonial houses. In my view, deep silences offer 
resources for such a project of rebuilding. As I suggested in this chapter, deep silences 
are central to a decolonial aesthetic project insofar as they can be mobilized to reinscribe 
the decolonial imaginary in ways that undo specularization and the coloniality of time. 
Specifically, I proposed that la Llorona’s liminality—her spectral dwelling—offers 
promises for decolonial insubordination, transformation, and healing at registers other 
than interpretative or mimetic. La Llorona’s mourning is not a story that records facts, 
speaks for, or seeks to memorialize, i.e., to make the past/history eternal in its 
immobility. Rather, by bearing witness spectrally, i.e., through silences, the myth re-
writes historias of colonial conquest; through its interruptions and silences, this 
remembering is fundamentally opaque. In this sense, echoing Maria Acosta Lopéz’s 
comments on Colombian art, we can say that the myth of la Llorona 
is driven by the strength of its own fragility, that is, its own absence is capable of 
evoking what still claims to be remembered without, however, trying to recover it. 
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This is what the work’s silences and discontinuous temporalities seem to say to 
us; this is how the intervals, opened up by its ephemeral appearance, speak. 
(2014, 77)  
 
This spectral bearing witness matters to a decolonizing aesthetics because it allows not 
only to “give voice” to colonial experiences without eliding their opacity—a 
methodological approach that avoids capitulating to specularization. It also matters 
because it is through her fragile remembering, her silent witness bearing, that la Llorona 
burst open the linearity and homogeneity of colonial time, retroactively resignifying the 
past. Bearing witness spectrally not only fissures the “now” moment, but it also decenters 
the successivity of time. Rather than seeking for an un-mediated, originary past to be-
represented, Anzaldúa’s silent interruptions throughout the myth institute the hesitation 
necessary for the past to be inscribed and exscribed anew time and again. Thus, bearing 
witness through deep silences effects a shift in sensibilities, eventuating a decolonizing 
aesthetics whereby pasts co-exist in the present in their absenting, as traces or virtual 
planes that resonate in the present as open and fecund set of possibilities.  
The myth of la Llorona, then, makes clear that it is by respecting that distance or 
écart, by listening to those silences, that decolonizing sense-making takes place. Not only 
the past summons through the silence, but, when it eventuates, it remains conceptually 
and propositionally elusive. We can thus say that this peculiar modality of remembering 
or bearing witness accomplished through the silences of myth is how what is perceived 
and sometimes lived as an “unspeakable” past speaks in the present. In this sense, deep 
silences eventuate decolonial avenues of feminist insubordination that at once question 
our inherited beliefs and struggle to find a new equilibrium without appealing to stable 
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and counter-hegemonic narratives or tools, upholding the playfulness and imaginary 
variability of the past instead. 
 
NOTES
1 Note how, in this context, “the tradition of silence” refers to the materially enabled 
patterns of exclusion from what counts as legitimate forms of expression of languages 
and voices that do not conform to Eurocentered norms or standards of justification. As 
such, “silence” here figures as the outcome of oppression, i.e., of being prevented from 
speaking or saying something, and as relative to speech and signification as when, e.g., 
one has something to say but is forced into silent submission, when one is silenced. 
2 As Collins explains, “this type of passionate rationality flies in the face of Western 
epistemology that sees emotions and rationality as different and competing concerns” 
(Collins, Fighting Words, 243 cited in I 12). 
3 In her work, Anzaldúa speaks of this in-between in terms of Nepantla. 
Epistemologically, Nepantla designates the way in which people experience not in 
certainty but in question their inherited beliefs, and struggle to find a new equilibrium 
without the appeal to a stable identity. As Scott and Tuana highlight in “Nepantla” 
(2017), the transformation brought by conflicting lineages and sensibilities and 
characteristic of Nepantla also effects a transformation in “perceptivity and affectivity” 
(2017, 4). 
4 For a discussion of the role of myth in the construction of Chicano/a identity, see Alicia 
Gaspar de Alba, “There’s no Place like the Aztlán,” in Unframing the Bad Woman 
(2014). 
5 For discussion of how Anzaldúa’s autohistoria-teoría promotes la conciencia de la 
mestiza, see Caren S. Neile, “The 1,001-Piece Nights of Gloria Anzaldúa: Autohistoria-
teoría at Florida Atlantic University” (2005) and AJ Pitts, “Gloria E. Anzaldúa’s 
Autohistoria-teoría as an Epistemology of Self-Knowledge/Ignorance” (2016). 
6 On Anzaldúa’s account, healing entails learning that “there’s another way of looking at 
reality. There are other ways of writing. There are other ways of thinking. There are other 
sexualities. Other philosophies…In these worlds I’m trying to present another way the 
senses can perceive reality” (I 229). 
7 This is to say that the significance of the myth of la Llorona is not in her unique 
experience, but in the myth’s “ability to stand for the experience of her community of a 
whole” (Beverley 1996, 35). Thus, although the subject of myth differs from that of 
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testimonio in that the narrating “I” is not a “real person who continues living and acting 
in a real social history,” myth shares with testimonio the “shifter—a linguistic function 
that can be assumed indiscriminately by anyone”—structure of the “I” (Beverley 1996, 
37, 35). Myth as deployed by Anzaldúa, then, does not have the “auto-referential self-
sufficiency” (Beverley 1996, 37) of fiction, for example, whereby the subject and the 
story come to an end with the end of the narrative. 
8 For discussions of Anzaldúa’s reclaiming of the myth of la Llorona, see Domino Renee 
Perez, “Words, Worlds in Our Heads: Reclaiming La Llorona’s Aztecan Antecedents in 
Gloria Anzaldúa’s ‘My Black Angelos’” (2003); Norma Alarcon, “Chicana’s Feminist 
Literature: Re-vision Through Malintzin/or Malintzin Putting Flesh Back on the Object” 
(2015). 
9 In Decolonizing Methodologies, for instance, Linda Tuhuwai Smith brings attention to 
the importance of “witnessing” and “testimonio” as means through which “the voice of a 
‘witness’ is accorded space and protection” (2012, 145). Although Lugones envisions, in 
Figueroa’s words, faithful witnessing “as a decolonial practice [that] goes beyond 
colonial epistemologies” (2015, 648) insofar as it breaks with popular conceptions of 
witnessing as bearing witness to “historical facts or accuracy” (Oliver 2001, 81), the risk 
of specularization still remains. Lugones observes that to bear faithful witness “one must 
be able to sense resistance, to interpret behavior as resistant even when it is dangerous, 
when that interpretation places one psychologically against common sense, or when one 
is moved to act in collision with common sense, with oppression” (2003, 7). We can see 
how Ernesto Martínez, whose experience of sexual violence I recount in chapter 1, bore 
faithful witness, positing himself, though his analysis, to recognize and locate gestures of 
resistance in a practice that, under colonial expectations, would have been an instance of 
oppression and complacency. 
10 For a discussion of the resources that la Llorona offers to develop decolonizing 
subjectivities through witnessing, see Emma Velez, “Women in Philosophy: Why the 
Decolonial Imaginary Matters for Women in Philosophy” (2019). 
11 La Llorona stands for a radical reconfiguration of societal and cultural norms 
constituting the world. The myth’s emphasis on social change sets it aside from 
autobiography, for instance, which, on John Beverley points out, stands for individual 
triumph over dire social or political circumstances. “There is implicit an ideology of 
individualism in the very convention of the autobiographical form that is built on the 
notion of a coherent, self-evident, self-conscious, commanding subject that appropriates 
literature precisely as a means of ‘self-expression’ and that in turn constructs textually for 
the reader the liberal imaginary of a unique, ‘free,” autonomous ego as the natural form 
of being and public achievement” (1996, 35). 
12 In the context of aesthetics, scholars refer to approaches that strive to incorporate and 
draw upon a variety of traditions to make something new that is respectful of tradition as 
“syncretism.” For a discussion of syncretism in Native American, Latin American, and 
African American women’s art, see Phoebe Farris, “The Syncretism of Native American, 
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Latin American, and African American Women’s Art: Visual Expressions of Feminism, 
the Environment, Spirituality, and Identity” (2007). 
13 In “Heterosexualism and the modern/colonial gender system,” María Lugones argues 
that racial discrimination regulated the ascription of gendered identities, distinguishing 
between “women” and “females” and extending the status of women so described in the 
West only to white women, while understanding colonized females “to be animals … in 
the deep sense of ‘without gender,’ sexually marked as female, but without the 
characteristics of femininity” (2007, 202–03). Even when colonized females were turned 
from animals into similes of bourgeois white women, “there was no extension of the 
status of white women to colonized women” (203). Without gender recognition, 
colonized and racialized “females” remained vulnerable to rape and white, 
heteropatriarchal violence. For a discussion of how the racial prohibition on woman 
“encrusts colonial racism in the lived experience of becoming a woman, such that women 
of color remain in many ways unintelligible as women,” see chapter 2, “Sexualized 
Racism and the Politics of Time,” in Megan Burke’s When Time Warps: The Lived 
Experience of Gender, Race, and Sexual Violence (2019). 
14 Chicana writers Helena Maria Viramontes and Sandra Cisneros refigure la Llorona as a 
symbol of maternal resistance in their short stories, “The Cariboo Cafe” (1995) and 
“Woman Hollering Creek” (1992). For discussions of the empowering effects of feminist 
reclamations of la Llorona on Chicana identity, see José Limón, “La Llorona, The Third 
Legend of Greater Mexico” (1990); Rebolledo, Women Singing in the Snow (1995); 
Cordelia Candelaria, “Letting La Llorona Go” (1997). 
15 For an analysis of how silences appear in Holocaust survivors’ testimonies, see Rosh 
White (1998). See also Butalia (2000) and Scarry (1985) for discussions of the limits of 
verbal testimony in testimonies of the India-Pakistan partition and bodily pain, 
respectively. At this juncture, it is worth turning, even if briefly, to the lessons we learned 
from the mistakes of early testimonio critics. As María Josefina Saldaña-Portillo explains 
speaking of the critical response to Rigoberta Menchú’s testimonio, Me llamo Rigoberta 
Menchú, to appreciate other registers of meaning eventuating through testimonio, it is 
paramount to consider the “effects of terror and torture on the individuated and collective 
memory” (2003, 160)—dimensions that early critics of testimonio, who conceived 
testimonio as unmediated-text overlooked. That is, the function of testimonio is not that 
of accurately reporting “facts” (it is not mimetic representation) or of being an 
unmediated text (it is not immediate or direct presence or intuition). Rather, it straddles 
the line between the real and the imaginary, mobilizing traces of pain, trauma, and 
violence instituted by the colonial past, thus “giving voice” to a “history,” to borrow 
René Jara’s words, “which, as such, is inexpressible” (Jara 1986, 2). 
 
16 These mentions of the unspeakability of traumatic experiences should call to mind 
Scarry’s (1985) discussion of physical pain, which, she argues, has the ability to destroy 




                                                                                                                                                 
17 Faced with this challenge, Bakare-Yusuf contends that what needs to be done is 
“reconceptualize pain and suffering as having their own ‘morphology and [their] own 
logic which governs [their] expression and representation and which produce [their] own 
meaning” (1997, 175). 
 
18 Note that bearing witness through an experience of loss, i.e., by upholding silences, 
does not mean condoning or subscribing to the institutional silences of an epistemology 
of ignorance. Instead, it means undergoing the difficult work of coming to terms with the 
fact that, as historical and institutional silences are inscribed within the decolonial 
imaginary, silences are also always already exscribed. That is, since the meaning of 
cross-cultural encounters (but of any encounter, really) is never fully transparent, but 
eventuates at a distance, it is paramount to find expressive modalities that do not elide 
these silences, letting them resonate instead. It is pretending otherwise that would result 
in epistemic oppression. The danger of eliding, rather than listening for, silence and 
opacity is the foreclosure of sense and sense-making practices that operate beyond the 
bounds of the presence of modern/colonial logos, a move that would undermine the very 
possibility of bearing witness to the other in her difference. 
 
19 It is when Prietita moves further away from the fence, which symbolizes the familiar, a 
home perspective of sorts, and ventures into the unknown guided by silent animals that 
she hears the cries of la Llorona, the echoes of a lost past, for the first time. Then again, 
for a third time, Prietita hears the cries when she is enveloped by silent darkness, unable 
to see the stars, a familiar sky. 
20 “To change or reinvent reality, you engage the facultad of your imagination. You must 
interrupt or suspend the conscious ‘I’ that reminds you of your history and your beliefs 
because these reminders tie you to certain notions of reality and behavior” (LDLO 44). 
Note the resonances between this epistemic approach and the one described by María 
Lugones in “Playfulness, ‘World’ Travelling, and Loving Perception.” Lugones proposes 
an epistemic approach of loving perception characterized by playfulness, i.e., “openness 
to surprise, openness to being a fool, openness to self-construction or reconstruction and 
to construction or reconstruction of the ‘world’ we inhabit playfully” (1987, 17). 
21 In Anzaldúa’s work, myth functions similarly to how Alberto Moreiras claims 
testimonio does: “the specificity of testimonio…depend[s] on an extraliterary stance or 
moment….a direct appeal to the non-exemplary, but still singular, pain beyond any 
possibility of representation” (1996, 195). Pain and collective trauma taken up in 
Anzaldúa’s mythopoetics is the extraliterary stance mobilizing myth. Yet, differently 
from Moreira, albeit collective trauma and pain cannot be named or represented through 
mimetic identification, the pain or trauma figure nonetheless in and are worked through 
myth, specifically through myth’s deployment of deep silence. Within the myth of la 
Llorona, pain and trauma “appear” as weeping and verbal interruptions that rewrite 




                                                                                                                                                 
22 The very nature of this myth, i.e., its situatedness within historias (stories-histories) of 
conquest, is such that la Llorona, at once, incites or even fabricates the reader’s curiosity 
vis-à-vis that historia, drawing the reader in, while also maintaining the reader at a 
distance, reminding the reader of the incommensurability at the heart of sense and 
being—that the significance of that very historia about which the reader is now curious 
eventuates only through traces, through silences. In fact, the carnal relations through 
which the meaning of mythopoetic eventuates mean that, for someone who is not privy to 
the lived experiences of in-betweenness, the sense of colonial trauma and pain remains 
opaque. In this sense, similarly to what Fanon accomplishes on As Al-Saji’s reading, we 
find, in Anzaldúa’s mythopoetics, “knots of opacity carrying affective charge [that] 
transport the reader in time and place, without being fully epistemically decipherable. 
The text speaks differently when read against different contexts and to differently 
positioned readers” (Al-Saji 2019a, 3). 
23 Sommer adds, “[n]atives who remained incalculable, because they refused to tell 
secrets, obviously frustrated colonial state control” (1996, 131). 
24 In “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America” (2000), Aníbal Quijano 
identifies three processes whereby coloniality racializes time: 1) the appropriation of 
cultural discoveries of colonized people on the part of the colonizers; 2) the repression 
and expropriation of precolonial pasts, land, and culture, cast as prehistoric or empty 
land; and 3) the projection of the colonized to a mythical past. 
25 In When Time Warps, Megan Burke puts Quijano’s and Mignolo’s claims about 
colonial chronology in conversation with Lugones’s notion of the coloniality of gender to 
argue that “a woman is the progression of a female animal” (2019, 54). 
26 By way of his repeated mentions of a time-lag, Fanon brings attention to the ways in 
which coloniality overdetermines his being by weaving him “out of a thousand details, 
anecdotes, and stories” that freeze or lock him into a mythical past of “cannibalism, 
backwardness, fetishism, racial stigmas, slave traders, and above all, yes, above all, the 
grinning Y a bon Banania” (2012, 91, 92). That is, Fanon clearly conveys that the 
colonial world does not leave room for him to create the meaning of his own existence; 
“the meaning was already there, awaiting” in a stereotyped black past (2012, 113). These 
last remarks should call to mind the characterization I used in the preceding chapter to 
think through the modality of existence of the past. There, I suggested that the past, when 
fecund, is not sealed off without recourse; rather, it is constantly and retroactively 
reinscribed through deep silence. If the insights about the fecundity of the past developed 
in chapter three are of any indication, then, the claim that the overdetermination or fixity 
of the past entails the closing off of possibility, of a future, should not come as a surprise. 
What sets apart Fanon’s experience of the world from that of someone who does not live 
the precarity of the in-between is that, for him, the world is saturated, complete prior to 
his arrival. That is, the past—but also the future—is sterile, closed off from the 
emergence of possibility. 
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27 The lack of attention to the coloniality of time is also the pitfall of much contemporary 
(neo-liberal) political thought, which, as a result, has shifted from “redistribution to 
recognition” (Coulthard 2014, 34). 
 
28 The outcome, as Vallega notes, is that no matter its content, “its status and validity as 
thought/knowledge will be situated…under the judgment of the coloniality of power and 
knowledge” (2014, 107). 
29 The categories of sameness and difference, specifically that of racial difference like 
Blackness, are temporalized in the 19th century via the introduction of the notion of 
development. 
30 “Spectrality” should call to mind Derrida’s notion of “hauntology,” which brings 
attention to the haunted state of existence and being by a present absence, a condition that 
challenges the metaphysics of presence. In his corpus, Derrida seeks to move away from 
a conception of existence as self-presence, as a way of understanding being characteristic 
of Western metaphysics that accords primacy to the present now, treating it as the 
unmediated foundation of being, sense, and time. In Speech and Phenomena, for 
instance, Derrida points out that the ‘now’ moment is always already mediated by traces 
of other experiences, thus bringing attention to the deferred/deferring structure of time 
and the impossibility of a self-contained or self-sufficient now moment (1973, 68). 
Effectively, as we saw, the meaning of things and experiences cannot be fixed to a self-
identical and stable meaning (Caputo 1997, 104). 
31 Contrary to the patriarchal interpretation of the myth, according to which la Llorona is 
disempowered—her actions of prolicide, despair at the realization of what she has done, 
or her seizing children who are not her own out of confusion are explained through an 
appeal to insanity, which, as Cordelia Candelaria points out, leaves her without agency or 
hope—in Anzaldúa’s iteration, the interruptions effected by silence in the story are sites 
of re-reading and re-writing of reality. Although familiar expectations would have la 
Llorona figure as a cautionary tale, invoked and deployed to norm children and women 
into good behavior, the silences suspend this reading, effecting a rewriting of the colonial 
imaginary. Significantly, at these silent junctures, neither the salamander nor la Llorona 
give Prietita clear answers. Prietita needs to withstand the uncertainty of deep silence; as 
Prietita loses herself and follows the silent salamander the cries of la Llorona echo 
through the forest, ultimately leading her, without anticipation, to the rue and her 
family—in a word, to healing. The story ends with Prietita “silently…push[ing] the rue 
branches into the hands of la curandera” (P 28). 
32 In The Location of Culture, Homi Bhaba argues that the interruption and resignification 
of colonial imaginary takes place through “temporal break in-between the sign…through 
this time-lag” (2004, 174–75). 
33 In “Ch’ixinakax utxiwa,” Silvia River Cusicanqui observes that an experience of time, 
like that of Indigenous peoples of the Andean region (Cusicanqui names the Katari-




                                                                                                                                                 
that is not linear entails a project of “indigenous modernity” whereby “the past-future is 
contained in the present. The regression or progression, the repetition or overcoming of 
the past is at play in each conjuncture and is dependent more on our acts than our words” 
(Rivera Cusicanqui 2012, 96). Through practice—specifically, through “a decolonization 
of imaginaries and of the forms of representation” (Rivera Cusicanqui 2012, 96)—
indigenous peoples can affirm their heritage and their contemporaneity. 
 
34 A few lines later, Rivera Cusicanqui elaborates on this notion of “indigenous 
modernity” by observing that “[t]he contemporary experience commits us to the 
present—aka pacha—which in turn contains within it the seeds of the future that emerge 
from the depths of the past [qhip nayr uñtasis sarnaqapxañani]. The present is the setting 
for simultaneously modernizing and archaic impulses, of strategies to preserve the status 
quo and of others that signify revolt and renewal of the world: Pachakuti” (2012, 96). 
35 In this way, Anzaldúa’s mythopoetics undermines what Vallega calls the “coloniality 
of images,” which consists in “single present and totalizing presentations of exploited and 
violated lives” (Rivera 2017, 171). As Vallega points out, Fanon’s struggles to find a 
positive sense of self are largely tied to what he calls the coloniality of images, the 
outcome of which is that the images at Fanon’s disposal for making sense of himself are 
“already by definition situated by the ordering of the coloniality of power and 
knowledge” (2011, 215). That is, coloniality—as Al-Saji pointed out, “structures the 
phenomenological field of sense” such that blackness will always already be associated 
and signified in relation to the past of modernity; “the images he finds may make visible 





In this dissertation, I grappled with the normative implications of coloniality vis-
à-vis the phenomenon of silence at both the theoretical and sensible levels; I investigated 
how modern/colonial assumptions about the transparency of sense affect Western 
understandings of the phenomenon of silence, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, 
how they eventuate modalities of existence that preclude hearing beyond the presence/t of 
modern/colonial logos and, thus, eviscerate the fecundity and polyvocality of deep 
silences. The central argument I advanced in this dissertation is that deep silences are a 
powerful decolonizing tool. In these concluding remarks, I return where I began, namely, 
to considerations regarding how critical phenomenology can bear witness to experiences 
of colonization without capitulating to the snares of epistemic transparency.  
As you may recall from the Introduction, in addition to the recognition that 
historical structures are quasi-transcendental conditions of possibility of experience, its 
re-orientation toward the political also means that critical phenomenology is more than 
the mere description of (oppressive) conditions of possibility but their hacking. In light of 
these remarks, my suggestion that the task of critical phenomenology is to bear witness to 
the violence waged and those victimized by colonial heteropatriarchy may seem 
misplaced. After all, if critical phenomenology is more than the mere description of the 
structures of experience phenomena wouldn’t the act of bearing witness risk undercutting 
the normative and critical force of this approach?  
The notion of “bearing witness” has a long history within feminist, religious, 
decolonial, and juridical debates, in which it is seen as affording unrecognized subjects 
the opportunity to demand justice. In Decolonizing Methodologies, for instance, Linda 
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Tuhiwai Smith claims that witnessing and testimonies are the vehicle through which “the 
voice of a ‘witness’ is accorded space and protection” (2012, 145). That space, however, 
does not entail a mere accounting of colonial violence, but, rather, it enables the indicting 
of such violence and effecting normative change. In this vein, as we saw in chapter 7, 
María Lugones’s notion of faithful witness is meant to challenge physical and 
metaphysical subjugation by, among other things, conveying meaning against the grain of 
domination. As Yomaira Figueroa points out, thus understood, faithful witnessing 
“makes visible the often unseen consequences of the coloniality of power, knowledge, 
and gender” (2015, 643). In so doing, it challenges dominant perspectives that adhere to 
singular interpretations of truth, knowledge, and rights “toward a polysensical approach: 
one that understands that there are many worlds, that sees/reads many perspectives, 
particularly the perspectives of those who are dehumanized or rendered invisible” 
(Figueroa 2015, 643). My positing bearing witness (as an act of testifying to that which 
cannot be seen) as the scope of critical phenomenology should be read in the vein of 
these traditions wherein bearing witness is not limited to descriptive work, but carries 
with it the normative force of recognizing resistance where dominant narratives see none. 
Significantly, as we have seen throughout this dissertation, this normative and critical 
impulse extends beyond the realm of intellectual endeavors, bearing praxical and 
affective implications, like transforming grieving mothers into warriors and reinscribing 
decolonizing imaginaries. 
I have also proposed that a critical phenomenology that hacks the oppressive 
quasi-transcendental structures is one that harkens to and mobilizes deep silences in its 
descriptions. As we saw in chapter 5 and 7, this is because of what scholars like María 
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Lugones and Alia Al-Saji call specularization, or the risk, often incurred by 
phenomenology, of making experience visible. A phenomenology that strives, in its 
descriptions, for full visibility risks confiscating the affective dimensions of existence, 
reducing the experiences and bodies of racialized subjects to phenomena that, qua 
spectacles, can be surveilled, scrutinized, and measured by the white gaze. This 
scrutinizing logic reproduces the dissecting gaze of colonizing enterprises. (Recall, for 
instance, Frantz Fanon’s exhortation, in Black Skin/White Masks, that his “body,” upon 
his encounter with the white boy on the train, “was returned to [him] spread-eagled, 
disjointed, redone, draped in mourning” (2008, 93). But recall also the language used by 
many sexual violence survivors to describe their experiences of testifying about their 
assaults or the reasons they gave for not coming forward. The experience of having one’s 
body as well as one’s experience laid out for public probing, dissected and objectified is 
the risk of a phenomenology that strives for transparency.1) Problematically, as we have 
seen, rendering the other’s experiences a spectacle entails also rendering it specular to 
one’s interpretative paradigm. As such, it elides the other’s peculiarities, the sense of 
their own existence.  
Rather than dismissing the residue of meaning present in the cross-cultural 
encounter, a critical phenomenology of deep silence invites letting that excess or silence 
resonate in us as a strangeness, attending to the qualitative ruptures and the subsequent 
spatio-temporal re-orientations it may bring about. By upholding opacity and deep 
silence, this modality of bearing witness undermines the transparency and immediacy of 
the present. It is in this sense that harkening to deep silences is essential to hearing the 
other in her difference, to hearing meanings where coloniality hears none. Crucially, as 
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the concluding chapter of this dissertation showed, it is through its reprisal of the past in 
its opacity that a critical phenomenology of deep silence institutes a non-linear temporal 
modality of existence that undermines the linearity of time central to coloniality. As such, 
deploying deep silence is key to (a) decolonizing critical phenomenology insofar as it 
decenters linear chronology by opening the experience of existence beyond the present of 
modern Western consciousness.  
In conclusion—if one of the major interventions we have inherited from Merleau-
Ponty is that phenomenology is “a problem and a promise” (PhP xxi), in this dissertation 
I seek new tools for speaking, listening, and wading into non-normative experiences 
without capitulating to the snare of modern/colonial transparency. That is, I am very 
concerned with how a critical phenomenology can describe the world with all possible 
precision, while upholding, through its descriptions, the openness and opacity of the 
world, phenomena, and others within it. In this dissertation, I propose that “pulling up 
traces” of sedimented ways of seeing and making sense of the world, as well as histories 
and peoples that have been consigned to invisibility, calls forth modalities of bearing 
witness that do not rely on propositional language or communicative transparency. 
Rather, it calls forth a critical phenomenology of deep silence, a bearing witness effected 
by, e.g., the aesthetics that listens for and mobilizes silences. In this sense, I find deep 
silence to be the starting point for a “philosophy still to be done,” to borrow Merleau-
Ponty’s words (EM 178), the traces of which we find in Anzaldúa’s mythopoetics. This is 
a philosophy—a critical phenomenology of deep silence—that has a lot to offer a project 
of harkening to and expressing the world, phenomena, and the other without capitulating 
to modern/colonial schemas. In this sense, the reprisal to silence I am thereby proposing 
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is not an exhortation to remain mute, but the invitation to recognize the ways in which 
deep silence opens us to modes of communication that cannot be reduced to propositional 
speech (Sallis [1973], 110–11). A critical phenomenology of deep silence that cultivates 
sensibilities beyond logocentrism, then, also presses Western feminism beyond its 
affinity with the idea that political progress and moral agency require intellectual or 
cognitive development. The present approach nurtures different ways of seeing and, 
importantly, hearing that heeds to deep silences rather than logos, which fuels creativity. 
As such, a critical phenomenology of deep silence opens a space-time of possibilities for 
radical ethical and political action, for envisioning other forms of “aesthetic agency.”  
 
NOTES
1 The fear that testifying in a court of law would expose one to public probing and 
questioning about what is often lived as a traumatic experience, of having intimate details 
of one experience fixed, objectified, and spread out in front of a foreign audience, are 
among the leading factors for the low rates of reporting. According to the Department of 
Justice’s 2015 National Crime Victimization Survey (BJS 2015), only 310 out of every 
1,000 sexual assaults are reported to police. 
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